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iNTROduCTION
Much of the writing about race during the Vietnam war (1964- 
1975) focused on the two-front war fought by black American troops. 
One reason for this was simply the large number of black soldiers 
serving in Vietnam. A second reason is more complex, and involves the 
existential contradictions that arise when one is a black soldier in 
Vietnam, fighting to impose “democracy” on a colored people (who may 
not want it if the costs are too high) coeval with one’s inability to 
exercise one’s civil rights back in the United States. Third, there was 
that whole civil rights thing, followed by Black Power, which migrated 
overseas with each troop deployment. Coverage of the Civil Rights 
movement sensitized the press to coverage of the Black Power 
movement. What journalists and reporters saw in disproportionate 
black combat death rates. Article 15s, racist promotion criteria and 
rumbles between black and white soldiers, was the sometimes bitter 
fruit of the military’s attempts to integrate itself; to undo what it had 
done in segregating the post-Civil War militia into black and white 
branches.
The concentrated attention of this coverage sometimes masked 
the fact that there were other peoples of color fighting the American 
war in Vietnam, as this special issue of Vietnam Generation is designed 
to show. Too, looking at the conflict in the context of the rise and fall 
of colonial powers, it was clear that what America was about in 
Southeast Asia was a white man’s war—a last ditch stand to preserve 
some of the myths engendered by insecure acting out in the name of 
control. Like the black soldiers, these other non-white warriors 
suffered their own peculiar brand of torment as a consequence of their 
involuntary or voluntaiy participation, and paid a great price for their 
citizenship. Our goal for this issue, A White Man’s War: Race Issues 
and Vietnam then, is to foster further research into some of the 
questions raised here; questions bom out of the different experiences 
of blacks, Native-Americans, Latinos, and Asian-Americans during 
the period of active US involvement.
Contrary to the conventional wisdom, there are no “subcultures" 
in the United States. Each of the peoples cited here has some full- 
fledged scheme for making sense of their world, and a set of patterns 
to guide their conduct; that is what culture is. As we learn more about 
each of the cultures we embrace and profess, we set the stages for 
cross-cultural contrasts that might more effectively illuminate the
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founding concepts of our society and its construction. Vietnam was 
the United States’ first integrated—though not racially balanced—war 
in quite some time. As a consequence, it raised anew the old questions 
about the meanings of freedom, equality, justice and liberty and forces 
us to consider how these meanings change as a function of one’s 
status in the American social order. For, as Harold Cruse has 
observed in The Crisis o f the Negro Intellectual “..-America, which 
idealizes the rights of the individual above everything else, is in reality, 
a nation dominated by the social power of groups, classes, in-groups 
and cliques—both ethnic and religious. The individual in America has 
few rights that are not backed up by the political, economic and social 
power of one group or another.”1 When any particular group, readily 
identified by some ascriptive criterion, falls out of favor, its members, 
by virtue of their relative powerlessness, get the short end of the stick.
Lyndon Johnson wanted no wider war in Southeast Asia 
because it would interfere with his favored domestic agenda;2 thus, the 
war was done on the ethical cheap. Sons of the rich and powerful, and 
many of the sons of the middle and upper-middle class were afforded 
the easy out of college deferments. After the lifers and volunteers were 
used up in a bait-and-switch marketing strategy designed to attrite 
the enemy, the war came increasingly to be fought by the relatively 
powerless and dispossessed. When the skewed death rate of black 
combat troops began to raise a public furor back home, a simple 
answer was to thin them out by increasing the presence of other 
soldiers of color in the ranks. What before was a front-line unit that 
was 60% black, became a front-line unit only 40% black. Colored 
casualties might still be as high; but the impact of the numbers’ 
magnitude is masked by its spread among different groups whose 
existential pathways in America have been very different indeed. It 
would be wise to keep those kinds of notions to the front in moving 
through this issue of the journal. Be forewarned, however; there are 
gaps in the record. The solicited pieces on the Puerto Rican and Asian- 
American experience proved less than satisfactory. Consequently 
they have not been included. What remains suffices to line out some 
avenues of investigation.
An important addition to this volume are the extensive 
bibliographies on American minorities in the Vietnam war. By no 
means complete, these citations are meant to assist the scholar or 
student in beginning to explore the issues of race and Vietnam. We 
hope that you will explore them, add to to them, and annotate them.
Finally, there is this. Mother Africa teaches that the present 
flows into and creates the past which functions simultaneously as 
context for the present. As we retreat further and further from the war
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itself, we reshape it in accord with current needs. White folks took a 
beating but came back ticking!—This is the new message we are given 
as the “official" accounts are constructed to cement the growing 
number of cracks in the cultural wall. We present the essays in this 
issue in the hopes of widening those cracks and, indeed, forcing 
Americans to build a complete new structure which can contain us all. 
The old one can no longer serve.
Who controls the past influences the present. When one is not 
the custodian of his own experiences, the meanings made out of those 
experiences are subject to all manner of deletions, denials, and 
distortions. Who benefits when that is done? We encourage those of 
you who read this to write in with suggestions respecting questions, 
theories and methods of investigation that will help us to flesh out the 
record.
William M. King 
Associate Professor 
and Director,
Black Studies Program 
University of Colorado at Boulder
Kali Tal 
Editor
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1 (New York: William Morrow) 1967: 7-8.
2 Doris Kearns, Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream (New York: 
Harper & Row) 1976.
C o n tem po r a ry  AFr o -A m e r Ican S tucHes 
ANd tFie STudy of tHe V ietnam  W ar
Herman  B eavers
The relationship between Afro-American and Vietnam era 
studies seems to propose two questions. First, there is the question 
of how Afro-American Studies responds to a discipline that is, in effect, 
“younger" in the span of its existence and, on first glance, more 
narrowly focused. The second question is why should Afro-American 
Studies shift its focus to consider a field that, on its face, falls outside 
of its scope of interest? These questions are important, given the fact 
that Vietnam Studies is gaining momentum both in and out of 
academic circles and one wonders why Afro-American Studies has not 
engaged the field in the same manner that it has Women’s and 
American Studies.
Certainly within the last ten years Afro-American Studies has 
veered from the polemical to the constitutive: from narrow didacticism 
to a more synthetic form of analysis. In the mid 1970s, Afro-American 
Studies was still engaged in the task of constructing an Afro-American 
identity that distanced itself from the negative connotations ofblackness 
that four hundred years of Western civilization had accumulated in 
black minds. As part of such a project, scholars within the field often 
shunned methodologies that originated within “mainstream" 
scholarship, arguing that these approaches were either inherently 
racist or irrelevant to the study of Afro-Americans. The later 1970s 
and early 1980s saw a greater willingness on the part of Afro-American 
scholars to confront new theories. For example, literary critic Houston 
Baker shifted from his position as a staunch proponent of the Black 
Aesthetic, and began to use French post-structuralist theory as one of 
the key elements of a criticism that valorized Afro-Americanvernacular 
speech.
It is not my intent to denigrate that earlier project here. Rather, 
I want to suggest that Afro-American Studies—or Black Studies, if you 
prefer—fused social activism and scholarly enterprise. The result was 
that the boundaries between the academy and the black communities 
that often surrounded it were blurred. As Robert Allen points out:
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The demand for Black Studies cannot be separated from the 
rise o f the militant black student movement in the 1960’s. In 
fact, it is no exaggeration to say that the establishment of 
hundreds o f Black Studies curricula in colleges and 
universities is one of the major achievements o f the black 
student movement.1
Afro-American scholars attempted to create strategies relevant to 
revolutionary action as well as to confront the fact that “the totality of 
the black experience was not to be found in the curricula of the vast 
majority of colleges and universities."2
Ironically, this movement developed almost concurrently with 
the Vietnam war. And, indeed, as activists made conceptual links to 
Africa and other states in the Third World, Vietnam was among the 
topics of discussion. For example, consider these remarks by Robert 
Browne:
The Vietnam War is gradually replacing civil rights as the top 
story o f the Mid-Sixties, and because the protests against the 
United States policy in Vietnam has been primarily made on 
moral grounds, as was the demand for civil rights, there has 
been Inevitable coincidence o f the two movements on various 
levels.3
These observations can be found in a 1965 issue of FYeedomways. 
Clearly, Browne’s reading of events is perceptive. And his remarks 
suggest that black activists realized that it was in their best interest 
to involve themselves in the protests against the war. Thus, as early 
as 1965, Martin Luther King, Jr. was moved to take a stand against 
the war in Vietnam. He saw that it was wrong for Afro-American 
soldiers to take up arms against another people of color when the 
country they served would not accord American blacks full citizenship.
As Afro-American Studies moved into middle and later years 
of the 1970s, there was a tendency to voice solidarity with the 
Vietnamese struggle for independence. The United States’ role in the 
Vietnam war was characterized as racist imperialism. But as this 
reading has taken hold, a kind of conceptual slippage has resulted, 
causing Afro-American Studies and Vietnam era studies to dovetail, 
even though the former displayed at least a cursory interest in the 
latter during the 1960s. By constructing Vietnam as a “white man’s 
war,” where black men were pawns, black scholars have transformed 
the war into a symbol of black exploitation. This, coupled with the fact 
that the weir exemplified a larger imperative: the need to break ties 
with any- and everything “American” (a euphemism for things white), 
led Afro-American Studies away from the issue of Vietnam once the
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war ended.
Perhaps this explains why Afro-American literature and 
scholarship has not taken up the subject of Vietnam. The black 
soldiers who fought in the war. most o f whom were too poor to avoid 
the draft, were marginalized by this scholarly inattention. Their 
struggle to reintegrate themselves into American society is screened 
from view, even though Afro-American Studies enjoys a more 
institutionally secure status in the academy. Thus, one is hard 
pressed to find in Afro-American literature more than three novels that 
center on the Vietnam experience. Non-fiction books of note are 
equally scarce.
The irony in considering Afro-American and Vietnam era 
studies in joint fashion is that both scholarly projects have constituted 
themselves as revisionary enterprises. What is also clear is that 
Vietnam and blackness have undergone similar types of entiy into 
American public space. That is, we find that the representation of the 
war in literature and film seems to be analogous to that experienced 
by blacks in the late 1960s and early 1970s. As Afro-Americans were 
becoming a consistent part of newspaper and television coverage, 
suddenly commercial television shows from Bonanza to Star Trek to 
The Partridge Family all had story lines that presented images of Afro- 
Americans. Further, the film industry produced films where the plots 
centered on the many different ways an angry black man could kick 
white ass—and get the girl (also white). Black audiences ate it up and 
came back for more.4 And of course, in the print media, one needed 
only to use the word “Black” in the title for a book to become a best­
seller.
But there is a deeper relationship to be gleaned here. That 
relationship resides in the intersection of ideology and myth. And 
when we consider the image within this nexus, I hope it becomes clear 
that Afro-American and Vietnam era studies share a common agenda. 
An increase in cultural activity, whether it concerns Afro-Americans 
or American soldiers in Vietnam, hasveiy strong implications. Indeed, 
when one considers the marginality of both groups, the revisionist 
postures of their respective scholarly enterprises has grown, in part, 
from the necessity of demystification, debunking the myths that 
surround both. Unfortunately, neither of these enterprises exists in 
a scholarly vacuum and, thus, they are not safe from the American 
cultural machine.
Even as texts began to appear that revised our sense of what 
happened in Vietnam, images of the war were commodified and 
reconstructed within the context of American ideology. Bill Nichols 
examines the ramifications of this and observes:
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Images surround us. There are those we fabricate ourselves, 
perceptually, there are those fabricated for us, artistically or 
commercially. Represent: to stand for or In place o f something 
else to bring clearly before the mind.... To represent with 
images is to symbolize and symbolization is basic to 
intercommunication.5
As legitimate images meant to raise our consciousness proliferated, so 
too did images that served as mere representations. Thus, it was often 
assumed that all those artists who wrote or made films about 
Vietnam—or blacks—had somehow been transformed, enlightened.6 
And if they were, by chance, Vietnam veterans, they were not susceptible 
to the effects of the ideology that drives American cultural production. 
As Nichols informs us, however:
Ideology arises in association with processes of communication 
and exchange. Ideology involves the reproduction of the 
existing relations of production (those activities by which a 
society guarantees its survival). Ideology is how the existing 
ensemble o f social relations represents itself to individuals; 
it is the image a society gives to itself in order to perpetuate 
itself....7
Nichols argues that images, as representations, “establish fixed 
places...that work to guarantee coherent social actions over time."8 
Vietnam, no less than blackness in the late 1960s and early 1970s, is 
a part of the American image industry. As such, the proliferation of 
prose fiction and fiction films that deed with Vietnam suggests that 
artistic production on this topic is ideologically entrapped.
What does this have to do with Afro-American Studies? It 
should be clear that the struggle in the 1960s and early 1970s in the 
Black Studies Movement had everything to do with the revision of 
cultural representation. And what was also clear, though much later, 
was that the film where John Shaft "did in” the white dude didn’t 
present positive images of women at all, and was not much better at 
constructing a realistic image of black manhood. The proverbial 
snowball effect was in motion. It took black feminist criticism to 
deconstruct John Shaft. And when I consider the ways Afro-Americans 
are represented in Vietnam narratives, it is clear that Afro-American 
Studies must address the subject of Vietnam.9
Popular culture has perpetrated a mythic Vietnam experience: 
that, somehow, black and white soldiers were de-racialized. No longer 
could one make distinctions between black and white. Rather, 
Vietnam produced a new racial distinction: the grunt. However, as 
Loren Baritz points out:
10 V ietnam Generation
Racial conflict was suffused throughout the war, from 1968 
until the end. Every service, including the previously calm air 
force, had race riots o f varying magnitude. As some o f 
America's cities burned, or rather as the ghettos in some 
cities burned, the domestic rage found its counterpart in the 
military.10
What one finds In many Vietnam narratives, however, are 
white narrators who suggest that, against all odds, they understand 
the black grunt. For example, in Michael Herr’s Dispatches, we find 
Herr’s description of a black Marine named Day Tripper. To Herr, he 
is a “big black spade gone wrong somehow and no matter how mean 
he tried to look something constantly gentle showed.”11 Herr’s 
language suggests that as a black man “gone wrong,” Day Tripper has 
been transformed from Detroit homeboy to gentle grunt. The 
assumption here is that anger or hardness is the emotional state of 
most black men. The passage does not illuminate Day Tripper so 
much as it clarifies the positioning of Herr’s observation. His reading 
of Day Tripper suggests that his biases are somehow suspended; he 
can decode blackness within the Vietnam context, even as he maintains 
the racist language used to describe blacks in the States.
In Nicholas Rinaldi’s Bridge Fall Down, a novel that follows the 
stoiy of a team sent to blow up a bridge (a reprise of Hemingway’s For 
Whom the Bell Tolls) in a mythical Third World country modelled on 
Vietnam and Central America, we find Rinaldi's description of Thurl, 
a black lieutenant:
Up ahead, Thurl was laboring along, tall and bulky, black, 
from Harlem, his powerful left hand carrying his automatic 
weapon as if it were a toy. A  pink earphone was saddled to 
his right ear, feeding him tunes from a cassette. He was a 
lieutenant, but it was hard to tell, because he had long ago 
lost any enthusiasm he might have had for being a lieutenant, 
and now was more or less Just going through the motions, 
waiting for his tour to be over...he didn't give a damn about 
war or nonwar, discipline or anything else; he just shuffled 
along, his own man, amiable and easy, trying to survive the 
jungle.12
Rinaldi offers us a narrator capable of reading the black presence. The 
protagonist of the novel, Simon Grzegorz, is carrying high explosives 
in his backpack and thus he is described as "ground zero.” What this 
suggests is that the other characters in the book are deployed in 
fictional space around him; he is the conceptual center of the
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discourse. Grzegorz is, of course, a white male. Thus, his position in 
the narrative reflects mainstream cultural discourse. Rinaldi’s 
description of Thurl, the fact that he “shuffles along,” alludes to the 
stereotypical manner of describing black motion. Further, Thurl’s 
cassette inscribes the image of young black men with “ghetto blasters,” 
marginal because they commit the crime of being black and male, a 
threat to the hegemony of the white man. Thurl, in a novel written in 
1985 about Vietnam, is himself a representation of the ghetto blaster. 
His ferocity in a flrefight is what makes him valuable; his ability to kill 
coupled with his enclosure in a musical world bears a strong analogy 
to images of black men who listen to large radios and kill with little 
provocation. His apathy reflects the popular image of black men in the 
1980s. And Rinaldi’s characterization of Thurl as someone who has 
little regard for his own authority as a lieutenant, likewise implies that 
the white narrator has no reason to respect his authority either.
Steven Philip Smith’s novel, American Boys, presents a black 
character named Padgett. Though Smith can be credited with making 
Padgett a complex character, an artist who goes to war to confront the 
question of his sexuality. Smith’s narrative technique attempts to 
render Padgett’s black idiom with questionable results. Consider this 
passage;
One night he fell in with some guys from school, and they 
were smokin' and sippin’ when all o f a sudden the fat cat’s 
name come up. All the other dudes was pokin’ each other and 
grinning like they all know who he is, and they start puttin’ 
down this rap about him being a queen.13
This passage is unusual when one compares it to the paragraphs used 
to introduce other characters. Smith strains to represent Afro- 
American urban slang. Inevitably, Smith mystifies black speech 
because his representation of that speech is filtered through a 
narrator who suggests a white man who “talks black,” rather than 
Padgett’s actual thoughts being reconstructed on the page.
While there are aspects of Smith’s characterization of Padgett 
that are admirable, I want to suggest here that the danger (and this is 
equally true with each of the texts I have mentioned) is that the 
narrative valorizes a point of view that is white and male. Consider the 
way Smith tells us how Padgett gets “...the blackest hole he [can] find 
and cut[s] that bitch till her pussy hurt[s].” The reader can only bond 
with Padgett, in his state of sexual uncertainty, if he is willing to 
participate in a scene grounded in misogyny and contempt for 
blackness.
Each of the writers mentioned above falls prey to mainstream
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notions of black manhood. Their narratives, as cultural productions 
driven by ideological machinery, privilege the construction of the white 
narrator who is hip enough to understand, and thus decode the black 
presence in the war. Because there is such a dearth of Afro-American 
narratives to offset this state of affairs, or scholarship by Afro- 
American critics that deconstructs these images, inevitably, these 
narratives come to stand for the reality of the black experience in 
Vietnam. Nichols alludes to the danger of this: “Ideology appears to 
produce not itself; but the world. It proposes obviousness, a sense of 
‘the way things are’ within which our sense of place and self emerges 
an equally self-evident proposition.”14 These narratives, because they 
occur within an ideological space that seeks to commodify images of 
Vietnam, to make that commodified image into the reality of “what 
happened,” serve to “persuade us that how things are is how they 
ought to be"—white men rendering Vietnam faithfully, with egalitarian 
intentions.
The ineffectual nature of these renderings of the black experience 
in Vietnam is made clear when we consider it alongside David 
Berman's study of the war as it is rendered in school textbooks. 
Berman convincingly argues that American textbooks’ treatment of 
Vietnam was reductive, driven by a need to fit the experience into the 
prevailing American cultural myth. Berman asserts that when
we reduce warfare to a theoretical model we conceal its 
violence from our students, some of whom will go on to fight 
the next war, ignorant o f its costs. Academics treat Vietnam 
as a limited war, for which limited coverage is appropriate. 
Remarkable for its “lack o f passion" our educational writings 
on the war are consistent with the political tone o f textbooks 
“suitable" for distribution to high school students whose 
minds are in the process o f being shaped to inherit the 
ideology o f the patriotic American community.15
Berman’s remarks suggest that the revisionist history that 
erased Afro-Americans as a presence in American history is likewise 
revising their experience in Vietnam, homogenizing it until it disappears 
altogether. What I would like to offer in closing is a call to Afro- 
American scholars to consider Vietnam, not as an event that fourteen 
years and the Jesse Jackson presidential campaign have distanced us 
from, but as an event which continues to loom in the American 
cultural machinery. The discipline’s concern with demystifying the 
Afro-American presence must extend its parameters to encompass 
what has thus far been of marginal interest to scholars in the field. The 
critical skills that we bring to bear on mainstream notions of American 
history, sociology, and literature must be applied to the multifaceted
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construct that is the Vietnam war era. And the revisionary role we 
apply to mainstream representations of blackness must be focused on 
the Vietnam war.
I would call Vietnam era scholars to resist the reduction of the 
Vietnam war to a raceless experience where the nation somehow 
transcended its racial chauvinism. I hope it is clear that we must hold 
those who write about and create films about the Vietnam war 
accountable for the narratives and images they produce. In this, Afro- 
American Studies and Vietnam era studies share a common mission: 
to present the American landscape as it is, to achieve a self-recovery 
that allows us to embrace difference.
1 Robert L. Allen, “Politics o f the Attack on Black Studies," The Black 
Scholar, September 1974: 2.
2 Ibid.: 3.
3 Robert Brown, “The Freedom Movement and the Vietnam War," 
Freedomways (5:4) 1965: 472.
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somehow black men rebelled against the system and played out a violent 
fantasy. Inevitably, these films represented their own form o f containment, 
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often suggested that black men had more power than they actually possessed. 
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5 Bill Nichols, Ideology and the Image (Bloomington: Indiana University 
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6 Consider, for example, the Rambo films alongside Bill Moyers report on 
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7 Nichols: 1.
8 Ibid.
9 This is not to suggest that Vietnam scholars have been irresponsible, 
rather it is clear that Afro-American Studies must take up the project o f 
examining Vietnam narratives in the same way that Southern literature, for 
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10 Loren Baritz, Backfire (New York: William Morrow) 1985: 316.
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PRojECT 100,000: THe G reat S o c iety 's 
A nsw er  to  IWiliTARy M anpo w er  NeecIs in 
V ietnaivi
L isa  Hsiao
iNTROdlJCTiON
In 1966, during a speech In New York City, Secretary of 
Defense Robert McNamara announced that he would lower the mental 
and physical standards for admission into the Armed Services. 
McNamara based his decision on government reports1 which had 
studied the rejectees. He promised that the new program, “Project 
100,000" (POHT), would uplift America’s “subterranean poor” and 
cure them of the “idleness, ignorance, and apathy” which marked their 
lives. Proclaiming that these young men “have not had the opportunity 
to earn their fair share of this nation’s abundance, but they can be 
given an opportunity to return to civilian life with skills and aptitudes,”2 
the Secretary predicted that men recruited under POHT would return 
to the civilian world able to earn two to three times the amount that 
they would have earned had they not entered the military.3
Although the original announcement of Project 100,000 did 
not specifically mention the problems of black Americans, in a speech 
called “Social Inequities: Urban Racial Ills,” presented to the National 
Association of Educational Broadcasters, the Secretary of Defense 
claimed that POHT was created to assist black men in overcoming a 
heritage of poverty and deprivation. McNamara claimed that the DOD 
had the “potential for contributing to the solution of the social 
problems wracking our nation.”4 He described POHT as a step towards 
restoring the self-respect of these men, citing high black failure rates 
on the Armed Forces Qualification Test, as well as Moynihan’s theory 
of the cycle of family poverty.5 An excerpt from the speech reads:
What these men badly need is a sense o f personal 
achievement—a sense of succeeding at some task—a sense 
of their own intrinsic potential.... They have grown up in am 
atmosphere o f drift and discouragement. It is not simply the
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sometimes squalid ghettos of their external environment that 
has debilitated them—but an internal and more destructive 
ghetto of personal disillusionment and despair: a ghetto of 
the human spirit.6
McNamara announced that Project 100,000 would enlist or 
induct 40,000 men by June of 1966. He neglected to mention General 
Hershey’s declaration that escalating the war effort would require a 
monthly draft call of up to 40,000 men by October 1966. Perhaps he 
felt that the juxtaposition of those two pieces of information could lead 
to a line of questioning which would be uncomfortable for the Johnson 
Administration. In fact, his August 1966 speech gave no indication 
that rising manpower needs had any relationship to the decision to 
implement POHT. He also failed to point out that Congress had refused 
to fund his project, and that he planned to finance it out of the DOD’s 
regular budget. Instead, McNamara made four promises about the 
program: New Standards Men (the term for men enlisted under POHTJ 
would receive the same basic training as regular soldiers and all the 
special assistance they required; New Standards Men (NSM) would be 
trained in skills useful in military occupations and would have access 
to the best technological and military specialties; NSM would learn 
self-discipline by absorbing the military system; and, NSM would 
receive veterans’ benefits after their service in the Armed Forces. 
Declaring that the Armed Forces had previously maintained 
unreasonably high standards for admission, McNamara predicted 
that POHT would enlist up to 150,000 NSM a year.
Virtually no historical research has been done on Project 
100,000, and the Johnson Administration’s motives have remained 
obscure. The historical works which do mention POHT seldom devote 
more than a paragraph to the program, and their authors frequently 
accept the administration’s explanation without probing more deeply.7 
Most military, political, and social histories of the Vietnam War fail to 
note Project 100,000 as a policy of historical and cultural significance. 
By focusing on three areas—a short history of Project 100,000, an 
overview of discriminatory politicies in the military, and a look at the 
military’s treatment of rejectees—I hope to establish some basis for 
drawing conclusions about the Administration’s investment in POHT. 
The information contained in this essay is based on the small 
collection of available documents on Project 100,000, and should 
serve as an indication that a full scale study on the current status of 
POHT veterans deserves to be pursued.
Project 100,000 represented a landmark in both American 
domestic and foreign policy. The domestic policy of “helping” 
underprivileged blacks provided the troops necessary to carry out US
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foreign policy In Vietnam. Moynihan’s theory that military training 
and discipline could solve poor black men’s social and educational 
problems gave the Johnson Administration an excuse to draft these 
men and send them Into combat.8 Motivated by issues of race and 
racial paternalism, POHT failed in every way to benefit black Americans. 
Few NSM received the promised remedial education, few improved 
their post-war employment status, and many came home wounded; 
many did not come home at all.
Ironically, POHT also failed to benefit the military establishment. 
It provided the Armed Services with incapable, often mentally disabled 
soldiers. The first page of Moynihan’s report, The Negro Family, ends 
with a quote from Gunnar Myrdal’s An American Dilemma: “America 
is free to choose whether the [black American] shall remain her liability 
or become her opportunity." Moynihan's use of Myrdal is ironic, as 
Myrdal would probably not have supported the choices which 
Moynihan’s report urged Johnson and McNamara to make. By creating 
Project 100,000, the American government made a choice Myrdal did 
not envision: it exploited black Americans, using them as cannon 
fodder while cloaking their betrayal in the rhetoric of advancement. 
America had turned liability into opportunity—but not for the black 
man.
A BmeF History of ProJect 100,000
The DOD had lofty goals for New Standards recruits. Every 
branch of the military was tpld it had to accept a certain percentage 
of them in its quarterly quotas, with the Army required to take 25% of 
its quota from POHT, the Marines 18%, and the Navy and Air Force 
15% 9 Most rejectees had failed the AFQT; under POHT the military 
would accept them anyway, provided that they could demonstrate 
over time that they had higher intellectual abilities than their test 
scores indicated. The DOD also specified that the training, performance, 
and achievement data for each NSM had to be updated bi-annually.10
Between October 1966 and June 1969, POHTreceived 246,000 
recruits. The population of POHT men differed considerably from 
regular servicemen; 50% of POHT, versus 28% of regular servicemen, 
were from southern states.11 The median score of POHT men on the 
AFQT was 13.6,12 If curing “ignorance, idleness, and apathy" could not 
be achieved on a volunteer basis, mandatory induction represented 
the next best alternative. 47% of all NSM were drafted.13
As studies of rejectees had indicated, most NSM came from 
economically unstable homes with non-traditional family structures. 
70% came from low-income backgrounds, and 60% came from single­
parent families. Over 80% were high school dropouts, 40% read below 
a sixth grade level, and 15% read below a fourth grade level. 50% had
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IQs of less than 85.14
“Vietnam: Hot, Wet, and Muddy—Here’s the Place to Make a 
Man!" enthused an advertisement placed by POHT recruiters in Hot 
Rod Magazine. The Army and the Marines stressed glamor and 
excitement, as well as training, as part of a soldier’s job, andmanymen 
volunteered for dangerous assignments because recruiters made 
them sound like adventures. SS targeted low-income ghetto areas— 
particularly those where high concentrations of blacks lived—for their 
advertising campaigns.
In Oakland, California during one year, POHT recruited 120 
men from lower income groups, out of a total of 125 enlisted by SS. 
90% of these recruits had placed in Category 4 or 5 (Category 4 men 
were considered marginally qualified for service, and Category 5 men 
were previously disqualified) ; most of them were black or Chicano 
youths with police records.15 During the five years POHT lasted, an 
average of 40% of NSM were black. This figure contrasted sharply with 
the black 8% of the Service population. DOD certainly heeded 
Moynihan’s call to overrepresent black men in the Armed Forces.
Project 100,000 took in 149,000 men during its first year—an 
increase of 9,000 over McNamara’s original projection. After that first 
year, the Secretary of Defense told the public that “our Project 100,000 
is succeeding beyond even our most hopeful expectations.”16
All NSM entered regular basic training. 17,000 men took 
remedial reading courses in order to achieve a fifth or sixth grade 
reading level17; 6% took transition programs of educational or vocational 
training.19 After six weeks, the Armed Forces found 17% of the men 
still unable to read at a fifth grade level.20 Although these men had not 
yet met the minimum literacy standards required by the service, they 
were not recycled (sent back to take the course again). Instead, they 
were assigned to basic combat training or special motivational platoons 
for extra discipline. The Marine Corps had no remedial reading 
program: “We sire not impressed with the long term effects of a short 
term remedial reading program,” said a Marine Corps general.21
In training courses other than remedial reading, POHTrecruits 
confronted other difficulties. Continental Army Command (CONARC), 
which conducted technical and other high level skills courses, 
determined that the presence of NSM in many of these courses 
hindered the progress of other students. CONARC recommended that 
NSM be excluded from 64 of 237 entry level “advanced individual 
training” (AIT) courses because slow learning and comprehension 
abilities prohibited NSM from meeting academic course prerequisites. 
In 1968 the Army decided to exclude NSM from 54 additional courses 
because of the group’s previous poor performance and attrition rate. 
The Army next revised course prerequisites for 37 more courses in 
order to exclude NSM, before banning them from another 19 courses.
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John Grant was one example of a POHT recruit. With an IQ 
of 66, he could not do simple arithmetic. At the age of 15 he 
had married his pregnant wife, and the year Grant served in 
the military, he went AWOL fifteen times. Kenny Matts was 
another POHT recruit. Retarded as the result of a childhood 
brain injury, Matts could not take notes or spell. After failing 
the Armed Forces media training course, he went AWOL. Both 
Grant and Matts joined the services because they were drawn 
to its advertised programs for disadvantaged teenagers. Gus 
Peters came from a broken home, left school after finishing 
eighth grade, and was unemployed when he enlisted. Also in 
poor physical condition, Peters had an IQ of 62. He scored in 
the 10th percentile on the Armed Forces pre-enlistment 
aptitude test, and later failed basic training due to poor 
literacy skills17. Once in the service, Peters’ mental inabilities 
prevented him from completing training as a tank driver. 
Ridiculed by fellow soldiers, he went AWOL and was released 
with an Undesirable Discharge after only six months in the 
Armed Forces. Demoralized and without confidence, Peters 
experienced much unpleasantness, and acquired no skills 
during his short stint in the military.18
Of all AIT courses only five were restructured to accommodate POHT 
recruits.22
Even in the five restructured courses—Marine Hull Repair, 
Engineer Equipment, Wheel Vehicle Mechanic, Switchboard Operator, 
Supplyman—the Army had problems with NSM. Instructors found 
that NSM required more attention than other students, and more time 
to absorb class material, during which more competent trainees 
became bored. The Armed Forces was finding Project 100,000 
increasingly time consuming and expensive.23
By April 1968 the service found only 68% of NSM eligible for 
any AIT courses.24 Most NSM could not qualify for any advanced skills 
or technical specialty training; many received “soft skill” or menial 
jobs. The DOD, however, had another use for those NSM denied 
training. Over 40% received combat-related assignments, and 37% 
went to the infantry in Vietnam.25 The high numbers of black combat 
troops which POHT later brought to Vietnam added to disproportionate 
black casualty numbers.
A  1969 study by the Comptroller General’s Office and the 
Department of the Army cast doubt on McNamara’s initial assessment 
of the progress of POHT. Though the report, titled “The Management
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of Project 100,OCX),” called the program “a marked success,” the 
study’s conductors also publicized many negative results of POHT, 
and issued a number of criticisms.
The Department of the Army study found major 
problems with POHT training programs. NSM required enormous 
amounts of remedial reading training, but could not receive it because 
of the shortage of instructors and facilities. To remedy the situation, 
the Army would have had to spend a great deal of money and hire many 
additional personnel. Men who came into POHT under the medical 
remedial program had an extremely high discharge rate. Many costs 
associated with POHT, such as time costs and the cost of giving the 
other men less attention, could not be estimated. The continuous 
“recycling” (repetition of courses until NSM received a passing grade) 
which many NSM required made the reporting system impractical and 
deficient, since officers were reluctant and sometimes unable to 
complete the many special POHT reports.
The GAO had several suggestions for reforming POHT, including 
the recommendations that SS prevent the enlistment of men whose 
mental conditions demanded more than six weeks of training, and 
that local personnel be given adequate instructions for completing 
POHT reports. In addition, the GAO suggested that the Armed Forces 
establish reliable cost data for the training of NSM. The DOD accordingly 
formulated new policies for POHT. Stipulating that those who failed to 
meet minimum performance standards during or after training would 
be released, DOD specified that during the initial training phase, NSM 
would receive all the additional time they needed to complete the basic 
course. DOD also instructed Armed Forces officers to constantly 
monitor the individual and group progress of POHT recruits. The 
military establishment had gradually made impossible the realization 
of McNamara’s initial promise of equal, specialized training and 
valuable experience for NSM.
Throughout the program’s tenure, DOD supervisors reported 
that 90% of the men received excellent ratings of conduct and 
efficiency.26 The joint GAO-Army report, however, noted that faulty 
and inaccurate recordkeeping cast doubt upon many of DOD’s claims. 
Many members of the military establishment, especially those who 
worked directly with NSM, openly criticized and disparaged the 
program.27
Like the GAO and DOA, Armed Services officers found that 
POHT men needed more time—and money—than regular soldiers. 
Many NSM required remedial education, in addition to the basic skills 
taught in boot camp. In order to achieve the minimum literacy and 
skill levels required to advance, these men (frequently called “the 
moron corps” by their military peers) often had to recycle. Many NSM
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never passed some of the courses, no matter how many times they 
recycled.
Officers complained that they had to “babysit" these men, who 
sometimes could not master the most basic skills, such as brushing 
their teeth.28 In an Army Times editorial, one Army officer expressed 
the sentiment that the services, already preoccupied with fighting, 
should not take on the war against poverty. The military did not have 
the desire, the time, the money or the resources with which to assume 
responsibility for such a program, regardless of the DOD’s professed 
altruism.
At the heart of career officers' criticism of POHT was the feeling 
that the military—especially during wartime—should not serve as a 
social welfare program. Another Army Times editorial claimed that 
past performances by rejectees showed that the Armed Forces could 
only expect “poor mileage” from NSM. Many military men were aware 
of the results of an important study conducted by Eli Ginzburg, a 
Columbia University professor. Ginzburg’s report. The Ineffective 
Soldier, examined poor soldier performance in World War 2. His 
conclusions should have caused readers of the Moynihan and Marshall 
Commission reports to regard their conclusions as doubtful. Ginzburg's 
results indicated that intelligence and education were important 
qualities in good soldiers. In fact, his findings determined that high 
school dropouts were five times as likely to perform poorly in battle 
than college students, and three times more likely than high school 
graduates.29
In 1969, troop numbers in Vietnam began to decrease as the 
US de-escalated the Vietnam War. As the ceilings dropped, the 
number of recruits in POHT fell. Although McNamara had originally 
presented POHT as a social welfare program which would annually 
recruit up to 150,000 men, the military evidently had no desire to 
utilize these men in a peacetime army.
DOD cited several reasons for phasing out POHT. Revising 
their earlier estimations, they claimed that the program had been 
extremely expensive and not very successful. The Air Force, for 
example, spent 14% of its budget on its 14% quota of NSM, and even 
this was not enough, because 39% of their POHT recruits required 
additional funding in order to recycle basic training.30 Military officials 
explained to the DOD at the 1970 House Appropriations Committee 
hearings that de-escalation had reduced the numerical strength of the 
Armed Forces and that they had cut POHT numbers accordingly. They 
reasoned that if they continued to enlist 100,000 Category 4 men every 
year, these men would eventually constitute too large a percentage of 
the total troops, and would downgrade overall military standards and 
efficiency.
In 1970, SS set the POHT quota at 75,000. In 1971 it dropped
P roject 100,000 21
the number to 50,000, and in 1972 the DOD officially terminated 
Project 100.000.31 Even before the quota decreased, the Armed Forces 
had independently begun to eliminate more men during basic training, 
effectively restoring higher pre-Vietnam rejection rates. In 1968, the 
Marines released 6.8% of all Category 4 recruits because of mental 
inability. In 1969 they rejected 10.5%, in 1970 33.9%, and in 1971 
46.1%32 Spurred by the career militaiy’s opposition to POHT, the 
Armed Services took the initiative in eliminating these men from their 
ranks.
The military accepted some Category 4 troops until 1977, but 
the DOD now asserts that the military can not serve as an appropriate 
environment in which to rehabilitate the disadvantaged. Recent 
legislation prohibits the use of mental group quotas in military 
recruitment. Unfortunately, the military reached these conclusions 
too late for many NSM.
Almost all Category 4 soldiers entered the services under 
POHT. Their court-martial rate was 3% (as opposed to 1.4% for the 
control group of other soldiers) while their rate for nonjudicial 
punishments was 13.4% (as opposed to 8.2% for the control group).33 
Studies showed that Category 4 soldiers were three times more likely 
than other soldiers to go AWOL during basic training, twice as likely 
to receive early discharges, and two-and-a-half times as likely to be 
court-martialed.34 One third of NSM (approximately 360,000) were 
discharged for absence or disciplinary offenses. Of these, 80,000 of 
them received Dishonorable, Bad Conduct, or Undesirable Discharges, 
and 100,000 of them received General Discharges.35 Some 36,000 
POHT troops were killed, wounded, or dishonorably discharged before 
serving their first eighteen months36.
While many NSM came home disabled, and many others died, 
those who returned physically intact faced the same difficulties as 
other Vietnam veterans in terms of employment, emotional and family 
instability, and post traumatic stress disorders. Because a large 
percentage of NSM experienced combat, stress disorders may be even 
more widespread in POHT veterans. The difficulty many veterans 
faced in finding post-war employment was exacerbated in the cases of 
the many POHT veterans who had received less than honorable 
discharges. Deprived of promised training and education, these men 
had little prospect of earning the doubled or tripled income which 
McNamara had promised them.
Because McNamara insisted that the military avoid stigmatizing 
these men, their records contained only cursory indications of their 
status. This poor recordkeeping initially resulted in many NSM falling 
to receive special training, and later receiving no special attention 
from the Veterans Administration. The VA has repeatedly denied
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many benefits, even on appeal, to the numerous POHT men who 
received less than honorable discharges.
McNamara also demanded that NSM should never be informed 
of their unique status, so that they would not feel as if they were 
government charity cases. The long-term result of this ignorance is a 
group of men who cannot fight for the special treatment they deserve 
because they do not know who they are.
The injustices suffered by POHT veterans were intensified in 
the cases of black NSM. Since 40% of POHT men were black, their post­
war activities are included in various studies of black veterans. In 
1969, when the Armed Forces released their first group of POHT 
recruits, the unemployment rate for black veterans was 8.5% The rate 
rose to 16% by 1971. Although unemployment rates among black 
veterans dropped to 14% in 1972, during one month of that yearitwas 
as high as 22%. In 1972, while the overall rate for black vets had 
dropped to 11%, the rate among black veterans between the ages of 20 
and 24 was 16.3%.37 As 21 was the average age of NSM through POHTs 
tenure, by 1973 most of them would fall in the 20 to 24 age group. It 
seems likely, then, that POHT men contributed significantly to high 
unemployment rates among black Vietnam veterans. Project 100,000 
certainly failed to accomplish one of its primary stated goals: the 
"uplifting" of black males.
BUcks ANd The M iliTARy
The US Commission on Civil Rights reported in 1963 that 
“Negro servicemen believe on balance that the Armed Forces offer 
them greater career opportunities than they can find in the civilian 
economy.”38 In a 1965 survey, 40% of the black men questioned listed 
self-advancement as their reason for enlistment. Some all-volunteer 
airborne divisions were 24% black 39 Until 1967, black reenlistment 
rates for all service fields except communications and intelligence, 
technical specialties, and medical and dental were between 47% and 
49%-40 Observing these statistics, Moynihan viewed the military as “a 
socializing experience for the poor... until their environment begins 
turning out equal citizens.”41 But pre-1967 rates of black enlistment 
and re-enlistment may not have been indications of black patriotism— 
black men may have had few other available options.
Moynihan did not realize that for many black soldiers, the 
“socializing experience" of the Vietnam-era soldier would come in the 
jungles and deltas of Southeast Asia. In 1963—the same year in which 
the Commission on Civil Rights claimed that the military offered black 
soldiers great advancement opportunities—20% of all personnel 
assigned to combat were black.42 Some black men volunteered for 
combat in order to earn higher wages for high risk assignments. More
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frequently, however, the lower educational and technical skill level of 
black enlistees and draftees led to infantry duty.
The disproportionately high number of black men in combat 
units translated into disproportionately high casualty and death 
rates. While black Americans represented 11% of the population and 
8% of the military between 1961 and 1966, they comprised 16% of all 
combat deaths in Vietnam. In 1965,23.5% of all Army personnel killed 
in action were black.43 The DOD attributed unusually high black 
casualty and death rates to the frequency with which black men 
volunteered for elite combat forces like Airborne or the Green Berets, 
but overlooked the fact that many of these men qualified for no 
positions other than infantry duty. Between 1965 and 1970, blacks 
comprised 9.3% of total active duty personnel in Vietnam, yet they 
suffered 12.6% of the deaths. Black death rates exceeded by 35.5% 
the rates for all servicemen, and exceeded by 30% the rates for those 
men in Indochina.44
The National Advisory Commission on Selective Service found 
large discrepancies between draft rates for blacks and whites. In 1966, 
30.2% of blacks who joined the service were drafted, as opposed to only 
18.8% of all whites. The Commission hypothesized that black men 
were less likely to enlist because fewer of them were admitted into the 
reserves and officer service programs. As a result, blacks comprised 
a larger percentage of the draft pool. Commission figures confirmed 
this lack of representation in the reserves, revealing that only 2.8% of 
all nonwhites had any reserve duty experience, while 15.5% of all 
whites had some. An even more startling figure showed that only 0.2% 
of all nonwhites, versus 3.3% of all whites, were admitted into officer 
service programs.45 Clearly, the equality and opportunity which many 
ascribed to the Armed Forces was more illusion that reality.
The Commission’s report moved the DOD to instruct that 
admission standards for the reserves be identical to those for regular 
service. The reserves were a point of political controversy; critics 
asserted that many college students and other potential deferees 
enlisted in order to fulfill a patriotic duty and, at the same time, avoid 
going to Vietnam. Anti-war protesters, who included civil rights 
activists, college students, and others who felt the war was morally or 
politically insupportable, claimed that the reserves served as a haven 
from combat duty. In order to demonstrate the reserves’ exclusivity, 
the protesters cited the minute percentage of black men in the 
reserves, and compared that number to the high percentage of black 
men in combat. The DOD sent 3% of the reserves to Vietnam to serve 
as support troops in 1968, hoping to offset antiwar criticism, but the 
nature of the reserves was not substantially altered. By the end of 
1968, over 100,000 men had signed up for the National Guard waiting
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list, and at that time only 1% of the reserve forces were black.46
Further Investigation of Armed Forces’ policy toward black 
Americans revealed that discrimination began even before these men 
entered the service. The Armed Forces consistently rejected black men 
at a higher rate than they rejected white men. Over half of all blacks 
failed to meet military standards: black males comprised 11% of the 
US population of 18-21 year olds, and less than 5.5% of these men 
qualified for military service.
Both the AFQT, which determined mental fitness for service, 
and the exam for deferment contained implicit biases towards whites. 
In addition, if a black man passed the AFQT and wanted deferment for 
educational reasons, he had to pass the draft deferment test. An 
official from Science Research Associates (the company that lost the 
bid for the draft deferment test design to Educational Testing Services) 
claimed that “the test is culturally weighted to favor the white, middle- 
class and upper-class student, as are all tests of this type.”47
Representative Adam Clayton Powell of New York recognized 
the test’s racial bias in 1966, predicting that
An excessively disproportionate number o f those failing 
would be black students. The draft deferment test brings the 
circle o f racial discrimination full cycle. First, we provide an 
inferior education for black students. Next we give them a 
series o f tests which many will flunk because o f an inferior 
education. Then we pack these academic failures off to 
Vietnam to be killed.48
Other critics of the militaiy’s testing policies questioned the tests’ 
accuracy at determining standardized “dimensions of achievement 
across different groups.”49 The draft deferment test qualified candidates 
on the assumption that the highest scorers would be most successful 
in their chosen career paths, although a 1964 Columbia University 
study showed that academic achievers were more likely to attain lower 
levels of professional achievement.50 The AFQT, critics claimed, failed 
to measure “idealism, stamina, persistence, and creativity."51
L. Mendel Rivers, chair of the House Armed Services Committee, 
commented on rising military manpower requirements, stating “The 
Army is good for a man’s soul.”52 In 1965, 230,991 souls were 
improved by the draft, and in 1966 their numbers rose to 331.000.53 
Rivers’ view of the Army as a reforming institution may have had some 
effect on the decisions of local draft board members, who inducted a 
startling percentage of qualified black men. Though 94.5% of the men 
who qualified for the draft were white, black men made up 8% of the 
military overall—and 11% of the military personnel in Vietnam. The 
black draft rate increased at a much faster rate than did the general
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draft rate. Although black citizens comprised 11% of the American 
population, the National Advisory Commission on Selective Service 
cited studies which showed that, of qualified men, 30% of blacks (in 
contrast to 18% of whites) were drafted.54
In 1967, the National Advisory Commission on Selective 
Service revealed additional unbalanced induction figures for men with 
military experience: 27% of white men and 42% of black men with 
military experience were drafted.55 Racial imbalances like these occurred 
because of institutionalized policies of discrimination at the local 
level—especially in southern states.
October 1966 figures show that only 1.3% of all local draft 
board members were black. Seven states had no black draft board 
members, including Mississippi, where 42% of the population was 
black. Blacks were also unrepresented on draft boards in Alabama 
(30% black population), Louisiana (31.9% black population), and 
South Carolina (34.8% black population).56 The state Governor 
appointed draft board members, who frequently lived in wealthy 
districts far from their Jurisdictions, and had little contact with 
community members. Racial discrimination on some local boards 
went further than a simple lack of representation—the New Orleans 
draft board had one member who had also served as the head of the 
Ku Klux Klan.57
Most black leaders were acutely aware of the military's 
discriminatory policies, and were incensed by Moynihan’s suggestion 
that the Armed Forces could improve the status of black men by 
“socializing” them. To many, the idea that black men “deserved” larger 
military participation seemed a transparent excuse for sending even 
more black men to die in Vietnam. The white administration had 
seemingly developed the perfect cover for a genocidal campaign 
against black Americans. In his essay “Hell No, Black Men Won’t Go,” 
Gayle Addison, Jr. recalled a World War 2 newspaper editorial which 
he felt expressed the United States’ current intentions in Vietnam. The 
Waterbury Times opined:
It seems a pity to waste good white men in battle with such 
a foe. The cost o f sacrifice would be nearly equalized were the 
job assigned to Negro troops...-. An army o f nearly a million 
could probably be recruited from the Negroes o f this country 
without drawing from its industrial strength or commercial 
life....59
The complaints of black leaders were many and varied. The 
money spent on the war and defense, some argued, could be better 
spent to alleviate American domestic problems. Black men were 
fighting to help Vietnamese secure freedoms which black citizens did
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not have at home in America. There was a strong sense that black 
Americans were being robbed of their future, that the “talented tenth” 
of black youth were being shipped off to die in Vietnam.60 Eldridge 
Cleaver saw serious global repercussions to the black image:
It is no accident that the U.S. Government is sending all those 
black troops to Vietnam. Some people think that Vietnam is 
to kill off the cream of black youth. But it has another 
important result. By turning her black troops into the 
butchers o f the Vietnamese people, America is spreading 
hate against the black race throughout Asia.... Black 
Americans are considered to be the world’s greatest fools to 
go to another country to light for something they don't have 
for themselves.61
ONE-ThiRd o f  a  Na t io n : Rejectees ancI ARiviy Policy
Willard Wirtz, Secretary of Labor and Chair of the President’s 
Task Force on Manpower Conservation, opened the 1964 report One 
Third o f a Nation with a letter lamenting the fact that “Fully a third of 
the age group does not meet the required standards of health and 
education. Far too many of these young men have missed out on the 
American miracle.”62 In the year of the report’s publication, 1,400,000 
men turned 18. According to report estimates, one-third of them 
would be disqualified, for some reason, from participation in the 
Armed Services. The Task Force concluded:
O f persons who have recently failed the mental test... a major 
proportion o f these young men are the products o f poverty.
They have inherited their situation from their parents, and 
unless the cycle is broken, they will almost surely transmit 
it to their children.63
The rejectee group of 1964 consisted of about 600,000 men, 
and the correct conclusion that most of these men had grown up in 
poverty was based on the similarity of rejectees’ background 
characteristics. Most of these men had little education: 40% of mental 
rejectees had only completed elementary school, and 80% had not 
finished high school.64 50% of the rejectees came from families with 
annual incomes of less than $4,000. and 20% came from households 
with annual incomes under $2,000. 70% of rejectees came from 
homes with more than four children and 50% came from homes with 
more than six children.65 A  1963 poll published similar statistics: of 
2500 rejectees, 30% had left school before the age of 17 in order to 
support themselves or their families. (Half of all rejected black men 
cited this reason for leaving school.66) The 1963 poll revealed that 21%
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of the rejectees came from families who had received public aid during 
the past five years; 14% of them presently received public aid. 31% 
came from families in which the parents had divorced or separated, 
and 9% of these men had court records.67
Investigations at the time of the poll determined that these men 
had not escaped the poverty environment in which they had matured. 
31% of rejectees were unemployed (a figure four times that of the 
average 18 year old male), and those who did work held low-skill, low- 
payingjobs.68 Rejectees earned almost one-third less than the average 
income of all those in their age group; they had an annual income of 
$1,850 while their peers earned an average of $2,656 a year.69 Based 
on these figures, the Task Force concluded that those who failed to 
qualify for the Armed Forces had a high chance of falling in other areas 
of life.
Altogether, including those disqualified formental and physical 
reasons, 49.8% of men tested in 1962 failed to meet Armed Forces 
standards. Of those men who took the AFQT in 1962, 306,073 failed 
the Intelligence tests: “It was determined that they lacked the mental 
equipment to be able to absorb military training within a reasonable 
time. The most common deficiency was apparently that they could not 
read or do simple arithmetic.”70
In addition to these depressing statistics, the report gathered 
some hopeful figures. Of the 2500 rejectees polled in 1963, the 
majority of both employed and unemployed men expressed a willingness 
to obtain additional training and education, even if they had to leave 
home to obtain it. The rate of willingness of black men greatly exceeded 
that of whites, with 78% of working black men, and only 56% of white 
men, desirous of more education. 85% of black men looking for work 
wanted training and remedial education, while only 74% of their white 
peers wanted these opportunities. Even among those not actively 
seeking employment, 79% of blacks and only 59% of whites were ready 
to leave home to receive training. A  nationwide survey of rejectees 
found 96% of nonwhites desirous of basic education and job training.71
The Task Force suggested that: “The President should
announce a Nationwide Manpower Conservation Program to provide 
persons who fail to meet the qualifications for military service with the 
needed education, training, health rehabilitation, and related services 
that will enable them to become effective and self-supporting citizens.”72 
Three years later, the Marshall Commission echoed the Task Force's 
call for national programs to help rejectees, but it gave the job of 
manpower conservation to the Pentagon. While educational and 
training programs for these men were included in the Task Forces’ 
initial recommendations, these programs were not the primary goal 
of the Marshall Commission’s plan. Its goal had shifted from assisting
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rejectees to achieving “the objective, insofar as it proves practicable, 
of accepting volunteers who do not meet induction standards but who 
can be brought up to a level of usefulness as a soldier, even if this 
requires special educational and training programs to be conducted 
by the Armed Services.”73
The National Advisory Commission report offered no less bleak 
an image of American rejectees than its predecessor. Figures published 
in 1965 showed that 62% of rejectees failed for physical and mental 
reasons, while 38% failed because they were not judged to meet a 
vague and flexible “moral”74 standard. Marshall Commission race- 
based statistics agreed with those of the earlier report: 49.7% of black 
men and 24.7% of white men in the 26 to 29 year old age bracket were 
judged unfit for service.75 The National Advisory Commission report 
also found that low income slum areas had the largest percentages of 
rejectees and the least percentages of student deferments.76
The Marshall Commission generalized its conclusions, and 
predicted that a man was likely to fail the AFQT if he had less than an 
eighth grade education, or if he was a black high school dropout. The 
report cited the fact that so many American men failed the AFQT and 
other minimum standards tests as a “national security risk” and 
emphasized that unfitness was a result of “the years of their youth and 
development, in conditions of poverty and discrimination, inadequate 
education, and poor medical facilities.”77 The Commission’s 
investigations had begun months before McNamara made public his 
plan for Project 100,000, but the report was released seven months 
after the announcement. The report strongly supported the DOD’s 
new program, claiming that it would train men and Improve their 
condition once they had entered the service.
The Commission tendered suggestions which directly 
contradicted the conclusions of Ginzburg’s 1950 report. The Ineffective 
Soldier—a report taken very seriously by the post-World War 2 
military, and which had originally spurred the Armed Forces to adopt 
the AFQT. The AFQT was designed to measure mental ability, and to 
screen out men unable to acquire military skills. If a man scored in 
the passing range on the 100 point test, and he qualified for no 
deferments, he was ranked 1-A. Those who failed the test, but scored 
between 10 and 30 received the ranking of 1-Y, and were placed in 
Category 4. (Categories 1,2, and 3 automatically qualified for service. 
Category 4 was marginally qualified, and Category 5 was automatically 
disqualified.) Most Category 4 men were disqualified from service 
during periods of peace, since the Armed Forces could then afford to 
be discriminating. During periods of conflict, however, men who had 
received a 1-Y ranking had a good chance of being accepted by the 
military, since SS had to expand the pool of qualified men in order to
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meet military manpower needs.
Historically, Armed Forces admission standards have fluctuated 
with the manpower demands of wartime and peacetime. The AFQT 
was designed as a measuring device; a way to classify men for military 
induction. For example, during World War 2 and the Korean War, 
when available men were scarce, the overall military rejection rates 
were 30% and 37% respectively. During the peaceful period in the 
early 1960s, before the US had committed its forces to Vietnam, 
rejection rates rose from 49% in 1961 to 57.9% in 1964.78 By December 
1966, the preinduction rejection rate had dropped to 34%.79
During the late 1950s and early 1960s, the military made a 
great effort to prevent the enlistment of men who could potentially 
cause disciplinary problems, have psychiatric disorders, or might 
otherwise fail to meet the Armed Forces’ rigorous mental and physical 
demands. The number of men in the Armed Services with 5 to 8 years 
of education dropped from 23.6% in 1953 to 10.8% in 1959, while the 
percentage of men with 12 years of education rose from 35.3% to 53%. 
Department of Defense officials explained the changes:
This raising o f intellectual standards can be regarded as an 
important factor in decreasing non-effectiveness, since in the 
past the prisoner group contained three times the proportion 
of individuals with an eighth grade or less education than the 
general troop population. Also it is a reasonable assumption 
that individuals with lower intellectual capability have greater 
difficulty in adjustment than persons o f average intelligence 
and thus more frequently become psychiatric problems or 
disciplinary offenders.80
During this same period, the Armed Forces maintained a high rate of 
less than honorable discharges, as it eliminated men who had 
disciplinary problems and were not needed during peacetime. A  study 
by Army psychiatrists explained the rationale for these higher rejection 
and discharge rates: “The smaller and cadre-type Army in peace time 
has less opportunities for the utilization of marginal personnel.”81
1965 was the first year in more than a decade to see military 
rejection rates fall. In this same year, many began to question the 
validity of the AFQT. “Perhaps the military criteria for physical and 
mental fitness,” conjectured one congressman, “is simply a more 
convenient way for them to eliminate the numbers subject to the draft 
which is in excess to their needs."82 Other critics expressed indignation 
at the falling rates, insinuating that during times of low manpower 
needs, the Armed Forces denied rehabilitation and training to men 
with limited skills and physical ability, but during times of high need—
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wartime—these same men were inducted, enlisted, and hastily trained 
for combat. When SS devised the 1-Y classification in 1962, General 
Hershey defined 1-Y men as “not too objectionable for war, not perfect 
enough for 1-A in peacetime, but acceptable in an emergency.”83
Conclusion
McNamara’s goal when he founded POHT was to admit 40,000 
former rejectees in 1966, and 100,000 more each year. More than
300.000 men joined the Armed Services as New Standards admittees 
between 1966 and 1971.84 Because most of these men could not attain 
the skill level for special technical training, over 40% of them were 
assigned to combat units, and in the Army and Marines, over 50% of 
them went to Vietnam.85 An estimated 10% of New Standards men 
were killed, wounded, or dishonorably discharged in the first eighteen 
months of their service.86 Although the whole premise of the Project
100.000 program was to provide education and training for these men, 
only 7.5% of them received any remedial education and skills training.87 
In 1971, because of high costs, waning manpower needs, and de- 
escalation in Vietnam, Project 100,000 ended.
Proj ect 100,000 assumed the guise of a social program with the 
primary goal of helping black youth and reconstructing “the fabric of 
black society.”88 In reality, the Johnson administration, the DOD, and 
the Armed Forces used Project 100,000 to further their own agenda by 
sending over 100,000 NSM (about 50,000 of them black) to fight and 
die in Vietnam. The Administration had little time and money to devote 
to the war against poverty and the campaign for civil rights. But by 
adopting the paternalistic hypotheses of selected government reports, 
Johnson and McNamara constructed the pretense of Project 100,000. 
Not only would the program provide soldiers to produce the body 
counts on which the Vietnam War focused, it would also temporarily 
eliminate pressure on the administration to show its support for civil 
rights.
The past and present discrimination experienced by blacks in 
the military might have indicated that the Armed Forces were not the 
ideal environment in which to nurture a new generation of black men. 
The Ginzburg study had revealed that rejectees would not be soldiers 
of great potential and ability. And already, disproportionate numbers 
of blackmen served, fought, and died in Vietnam (along with poor men 
of all races). The Ineffective Soldier should have served as a warning to 
the National Advisory Commission on Selective Service that if it 
focused on the mentally and socially disadvantaged it would not find 
a reasonable and just answer to the question “Who shall serve when 
not all shall serve?”
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After POHTs inception, the DOD should have discerned that 
the program would not be successful. Repeated cases of desertion, 
disciplinary problems, mental incompetency, and physical incapacity 
should have alerted the DOD to the fact that POHT was not an 
overwhelming success. But as long as the Vietnam conflict required 
troops, the Pentagon persevered in its insistence on the program’s 
soundness.
Project 100,000 also played an important political role for the 
Johnson Administration. By enlarging the pool of prospective draftees, 
the Administration could continue the war in Vietnam without calling 
in the reserves or drafting college students. Since college students 
served as the voice for anti-war protest, POHT permitted Johnson to 
avoid arousing increased protest from that group. NSM were neither 
vocal nor politically inclined, and many of them welcomed the Armed 
Forces’ guarantees of training, education, and excitement.
Project 100,00, although profitable to the Administration, 
benefitted none of those whom it professed to help. As the Marines’ 
self-imposed release rate of POHT men and the antagonism on the part 
of career officers illustrates, NSM were more often a nuisance than a 
benefit to the military. Nor did most of the poor and uneducated 
minorities recruited by the program come home better educated or 
more self-confident. Black POHT veterans returned from Vietnam to 
the same poor conditions as other Vietnam veterans.
By making the black family the scapegoat for America’s racial 
problems, Moynihan had given the administration an excuse to send 
unreasonably high numbers of black men to war. Moynihan’s theory 
provided Johnson with a way to avoid implementing more practical, 
useful, and fair methods for alleviating black poverty. Many of the 
black families whom Moynihan claimed POHT would benefit had to 
contend, during and after the war, with the grief of losing family 
members, emotional traumas caused by combat, injuries, 
unemployment, and social instability, in addition to the trials of 
poverty and American racism. Project 100,000 did not help to solve the 
problems of poor black Americans: it compounded old problems and 
created new ones. 1
1 The basic foundation upon which this decision rested was the January 
1964 report, One-Third o f a Nation: A Report on Young Men Found Unqualified 
for Military Service, prepared by the Presidential Task Force on Manpower 
Conservation, which was headed by Assistant Secretary o f Labor Daniel 
Moynihan. The report stated that every year almost 600,000 young men, or 
about one-third o f the 1.8 men eligible for service, were found “unfit" because 
they failed the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT). The report also found
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that a high proportion of these men belonged to minority groups. In 1965, 
DOD records reported that 56% of all black men failed the AFQT. One Third 
of a Nation concluded that Black men failed the AFQT primarily because they 
suffered from educational disadvantages. This argument was logically extended 
in the 1965 Moynihan Report on the black family. Assuming that poor 
education and academic performance on the part o f many black men was only 
a symptom of a disturbance in “normal" family relations, the Moynihan Report 
hypothesized that service in the Armed Forces represented the best way to 
boost the self-esteem and confidence of black men. Under a section headed 
“The Armed Forces’ , the authors o f the 1965 report stated:
Service in the United States Armed Forces is the only experience 
open to the Negro American in which he is truly treated as an 
equal.... it is an utterly masculine world. Given the strains o f the 
disorganized matrifocal family life in which so many Negro youth 
come of age, the Armed Forces are a drastic and desperately 
needed change: a world away from women, a world run by strong 
men of unquestioned authority, where discipline, if harsh, is 
nonetheless orderly and predictable, and where rewards, if 
limited, are granted on the basis of performance. The theme o f a 
current Army recruiting message states it as clearly as can be: “In 
the U.S. Army you get to know what it feels like to be a man.’
[The President’s Task Force on Manpower Conservation. One Third o f a Nation: 
A Report on Young Men found Unqualified for Military Service (Washington, DC: 
US Government Printing Office) January 1964: 2. And, Office o f Policy
Planning and Research, US Dept, o f Labor, The Negro Family: The Case for 
National Action (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office) March 
1965.)
2 Lawrence M. Baskir & William A. Strauss. Chance & Circumstance: The 
Draft, the War and the Vietnam Generation (New York: Vintage) 1978: 126.
3 Ibid.
4 Robert S. McNamara, “Social Inequities: Urban Racial Ils," Vital Speeches 
of the Day, 34: 4(1967): 98.
5 At a planning conference for a study on black Americans, sponsored by 
Daedalus and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Moynihan made 
known his opinions on the state of black America: “I think the problem of the 
Negro family is practically the property o f the American government. I mean, 
we spend most o f our money on this... in health, in welfare, and on 
employment, and yet we know nothing about it.’  [Rainwater, Lee & William L. 
Yancey. The Moynihan Report & the Politics of Controversy (Boston: MIT Press) 
1967: 75.) In March 1965, Moynihan produced his controversial report, The 
Negro Family: The Case for National Action. The report concluded that, 
because o f a history o f discrimination and lack o f opportunity, the black 
American family was deteriorating. This breakdown, said the report, resulted 
from the fact that American society disempowered black American men, who 
consequently could not support a typical patriarchal family. Moynihan, in 
different sections o f the report, summarized the situation:
At the heart o f the deterioration of the fabric o f Negro society
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is the deterioration of the Negro family. It is the fundamental 
source o f the weakness of the Negro community at the 
present time.... In essence, the Negro community has been 
forced into a matriarchal structure which, because it is so out 
o f line with the rest o f American society, seriously retards the 
progress of the group as a whole, and imposes a crushing 
burden on the Negro male and, in consequence, on a great 
many Negro women as well.
The report documented the black family’s “instability" by reporting high 
fertility rates, incidences o f teenage pregnancy, welfare dependency rates, 
divorce, separation, and desertion rates, and unemployment rates. Black 
Americans, Moynihan explained, were trapped in a “tangle o f pathology”: high 
crime rates, narcotics addiction, and alienation from white society. As a result 
o f this "unsound" familial and social structure, black children, in Moynihan's 
estimation, lacked proper role models and thus had no aspirations to rise in 
American society. Moynihan contrasted black families with the typical white 
family who, “despite many variants, remains a powerful agency... for 
transmitting... valuable contracts o f the world o f education and work.”
When the Department o f Labor unofficially released the Moynihan Report 
in 1965, both government officials and civil rights leaders hastened to criticize 
it. Citing the report as incomplete and overdrawn, Bayard Rustin o f the A. 
Philip Randolph Institute, Whitney Young of the National Urban League, 
Clarence Mitchell of the NAACP, and John Lewis o f SNCC criticized both the 
report and Moynihan. The report, they complained, focused on socioeconomic 
measures, and not antidiscrimination. Despite the expert status attributed to 
him by the white political and social establishment, Moynihan had few 
contacts with the black community or the civil rights movement. Furthermore, 
he fit the stereotype o f the “white liberal", against which militant and 
separatist groups such as the Black Muslims rebelled. Ignoring the criticisms 
o f many black leaders, Johnson and McNamara embraced Moynihan’s 
conclusions.
The report suggested several solutions to the problem of the black family, 
including universal employment for all black men (which Moynihan proposed 
could be achieved by placing black men into traditionally female jobs). He also 
recommended housing and birth control programs. By focusing on statistics 
and de-emphasizing the continuing impact o f economic and social 
discrimination, Moynihan could maintain his narrow focus on the problems 
of the black family. Accordingly, he also suggested limited solutions. 
Ultimately, his most influential and dangerous suggestion was that the 
position of the black male could be strengthened if he were offered greater 
opportunities in the Armed Forces.
Moynihan’s focus on the Armed Forces as a solution to the problems of the 
black family was not coincidental. The year before the report on the black 
family was issued, Moynihan helped lead the Task Force on Manpower 
Conservation, which produced One Third o f a Nation. Service in the Armed 
Forces, or “The American Miracle", as Task Force Chairman Willard Wirtz 
referred to it. seemed to Moynihan an ideal solution to the poor education.
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employment prospects, and social status o f black men, and to the increasing 
manpower needs ofthe Vietnam conflict. In 1964, black Americans comprised 
11% of the population, but only 8% o f the military. Moynlhan carried his 
proposals further in his 1965 report, stating:
The ultimate mark of inadequate preparation for life is the 
failure rate on the Armed Forces mental test. A  grown man 
who cannot pass this test is in trouble. 56% of Negroes fail it.
This is a rate almost four times that o f the whites.
Military service is disruptive in some respects. For those 
comparatively few who are killed or wounded in combat or 
otherwise, the personal sacrifice is inestimable. But on 
balance, service in the Armed Forces over the past quarter- 
century has worked greatly to the advantage o f those involved.
The training and experience o f military duty is unique: the 
advantages that have generally followed... are singular, to 
say the least.
Despite the fact that by 1966, the number o f black troops in Vietnam was 
commensurate with their proportion of the population. Moynlhan believed so 
adamantly in the advantages o f military service that he advocated even greater 
black participation. The 1960s’ single most important psychological event In 
race relations, he contended in a 1966 New Republic article,
was the appearance of Negro fighting men on the TV screens 
o f America. Acquiring a reputation for military valor is one of 
the oldest known routes to social equality.... Moreover, as 
employment pure and simple, the armed forces have much to 
offer men with the limited current options of, say. Southern 
Negroes. By rights, Negroes are entitled to a larger share of 
employment in the armed forces and might well be demanding 
one. (Rainwater 33-34)
[Office o f Policy Planning and Research, US Dept, o f Labor,
The Negro Family: The Casefor National Action (Washington,
DC: US Government Printing Office) March 1965.] For an 
extended discussion o f black responses to Moynihan, see 
Rainwater and Yancey.
6 McNamara: 101.
7 Many accepted authorities on the Vietnam War, such as Stanley Kamow 
and Gloria Emerson, fail entirely to mention Project 100,000 in their accounts 
o f the conflict. In addition, several authors who do include POHT in their 
studies accept the Administration's line without question. For example. 
Rainwater and Yancey's The Moynihan Report mentions POHT only as a by­
product of the study; they fail to attach any importance to it. Jean Carper’s 
Bitter Greetings considers POHT as an example o f the draft's unfairness and 
does not question McNamara and Moynihan's belief that these men were 
capable o f becoming good soldiers. Baskir and Strauss' Chance and 
Circumstance contained the only in-depth assessment of the motives behind 
POHT. Interpretations critical o f the project are generally found only in books
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and essays dealing with inequities experienced by blacks in the military— 
such as Binkin and Eitelberg's Blacks in the Military.
8 Project 100,000 represented the second attempt o f the Johnson 
administration to create a program with the goal o f inducting under-qualified 
men into the Armed Forces. In late 1964, Johnson directed Selective Service 
to steer pre-induction rejectees into federally sponsored non-military assistance 
programs. This experiment, coined Project STEP (Special Training and 
Enlistment Program) tried to provide remedial job training skills and Job 
referral services, with the goal of raising rejectees to the educational skill level 
o f normal soldiers. Ostensibly, they would receive training, get jobs, and also 
meet military qualification standards. 134,000 men participated in Project 
STEP, which proved a disappointment in three ways. First, o f 134,000 letters 
written to prospective employers by the rejectee group, only 20% were 
answered. Second, the program referred less than 4% of the men for jobs; 
2,200 men eventually got jobs, while only 189 participated in job training 
programs. Third, Congress refused to provide the $10 million which the 
Pentagon requested to fund Project STEP. This program, which used the DOD 
as a tool for implementing domestic social programs, marked the President’s 
first attempt to use the military as a vehicle for his domestic policies. It would 
not be the last time such an attempt failed. [Baskin 125)
9 Jean Carper. Bitter Greetings: The Scandalofthe Military Drajl (New York: 
Grossman) 1967: 158.
10 McNamara made this last requirement impossible to fulfill, however, 
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S o ld A d o s  R a z o s : Issues of R ace iN 
V ietnam! W ar  D ram a
DAvid J. D eR ose
In Vietnam Campesino, Luis Valdez’s 1970 agitprop play, a 
white militarist, satirically named General Defense, rounds up young 
Chicano laborers to fight in Vietnam. He is assisted by his allegorical 
henchman, “El Draft,” a tall figure with a death’s mask, shrouded in 
an American flag. “What’s the matter with you, Draft,” the General 
scolds, “Haven’t I told you to stick to the minorities?”1 Despite his 
reprimand, the General does not appear to need much help from El 
Draft. As he tells one wealthy white father, “Mexicans are pouring into 
the army.” “We just give ’em a pretty little uniform, a few pesos, a 
blessing from mamacita, andwham-o, they're on the frontlines. Those 
boys are dying to show their machismo.”2 Many American racial 
minorities, blacks and Asians, as well as Latinos, joined the armed 
forces during the Vietnam war in hopes of gaining the respect of their 
cultural community, of escaping a life of poverty, or of proving their 
mettle to themselves and to “the Man”. They joined the armed forces 
to become—like the titular hero of another Valdez play—soldados 
rasos.
Soldado raso is the Spanish equivalent of our own “buck 
private". But with not so much as a slip of the tongue, raso becomes 
razo and “buck private” becomes a “soldier of the race”. Minority 
draftees of the Vietnam era learned quickly that they were indeed 
soldados razos, involved in a race war with the white society which 
sent them to Vietnam.
There is a significant body of dramatic literature on the 
Vietnam war which is rarely mentioned in scholarly essays. Written 
by blacks, a few whites, Chicanos, Asians, and Puerto Rican nationals, 
these plays portray a wide spectrum of minority experience, from the 
pre-war enthusiasm of blacks for a newly integrated military, to the 
race riots in Vietnam’s Long Binh Jail, to the betrayal felt by minority 
veterans returning to find that the country for which they fought still 
had no place for them. They explore in microcosm the inequities 
experienced by America’s racial minorities fighting in Vietnam.
Charles Fuller’s A Soldier's Play, written in 1981, but portraying 
the lives of black soldiers in 1944, serves as a history lesson in
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minority attitudes toward the military. In World War 2, the American 
armed forces were still segregated, but the military was nevertheless 
seen by blacks as a place where they could work their way into a 
position of some rank. In A Soldier’s Play, Sgt. Vernon C. Waters, a 
black career soldier and hard-line integrationist, looks upon the war 
as an opportunity for blacks to prove themselves. “When this war’s 
over, things are going to change,” he comments. “The First War, it 
didn’t change much for us. boy—but this one—it’s gonna change a lot 
of things.”3 Waters is referring to the opportunity that blacks (albeit 
only a few) would have in World War 2 to form and fight in combat 
units. “We are men—soldiers,” Waters declares, “and I don’t intend to 
have our race cheated out of its place of honor and respect in this 
war.”4
Attitudes like Waters’—that the military offered blacks greater 
career opportunities than the civilian job market—persisted through 
the 1950s and into the 1960s. A  1968 New York Times article on 
blacks in the military reported that many black soldiers reenlisted 
because civilian employers back home offered “only ‘colored’jobs.. .where 
whites did the same work for higher pay.”5 In August Wilson’s play 
Fences (1986), an unemployed black musician advises his younger 
brother to “Stick with Uncle Sam and retire early. Ain’t nothing out 
here.”6 The unspoken irony of these lines from the final scene of 
Wilson’s play is that the year is 1965, and the young man, a corporal 
in the Marine Corps, will undoubtably be called upon to serve in 
Vietnam.
Although President Hany Truman ordered the military services 
desegregated in 1948. blacks in the Korean war still fought in all-black 
units or in non-combat positions. Vietnam was, thus, the first war in 
which all areas of military service, including combat positions, were 
fully integrated. “For the first time in the nation’s military history,” 
Time Magazine proudly reported in a cover story from 1967, “its Negro 
fighting men are fully integrated in combat, fruitfully employed in 
positions of leadership, and fiercely proud of their performance.”7 
Wallace Terry, Jr., then a junior correspondent for Time, is reported 
as saying, “I have observed here the most successfully integrated 
institution in America.”8 The war in Vietnam was seen by many blacks 
as a great opportunity; according to Time, the black soldier in Vietnam 
“fights for the dignity of the Negro, to shatter the stereotype of racial 
inferiority.”9
Young Latinos also seemed eager to serve their country as a 
matter of racial and communal pride. In Ruben Sierra’s play Manolo 
(1976), about an Latino Vietnam vet turned drug addict, the unfortunate 
protagonist recalls how he brought a halt to his anti-establishment 
protests and enlisted in the Army because he believed his racial
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community expected it of him and would never accept him as a 
community leader if he refused to fight in Vietnam. In Valdez’s 
So Idado Razo, Johnny, a young Chicano leaving for Vietnam, is viewed 
with admiration and envy by family and friends. Johnny’s girlfriend 
dreams of marrying her man in uniform. Her parents loan Johnny 
their family car since “he’s more responsible now that he’s in the 
service.”10 Johnny’s father is proud because his son has become “a 
man”. He looks upon the uniform as a sign of success, and hopes 
Johnny’s younger brother will follow in his footsteps. Johnny’s 
brother is envious of the attention and wishes he were old enough to 
enlist. Johnny basks in his family’s regard. His own thoughts echo 
his father’s: “Ahora si, I’m a man!” He naively fantasizes about proving 
himself to the people of the barrio:
Maybe they’ll feel different when I come back from 
Nam. Simon el War Veteran! Maybe I’ll get wounded 
and come back con un chigatal de medals. I wonder 
how the uatos around here are going to think about 
that?... I might even get killed. I l l  do, they’ll bring me 
back here in a box, covered with the flag...military 
funeral like they gave Pete Gomez...everybody crying...11.
Johnny, of course, receives what he has foolishly wished for. He is 
killed in Vietnam, as are all the Chicano soldiers in Valdez’s three 
antiwar plays.
Muerte, the figure of Death who serves as a narrator in Soldado 
Razo, confirms that Johnny got the funeral he wanted: “Military 
coffin, muchas Jlores, American flag, mujeres llorando, and a trumpet 
playing taps with a rifle salute at the end.”12 Muerte knows that he can 
depend on the Chicano community to continue sending its brave and 
foolish young men to fight and die for a false dream of glory and the 
self-perpetuating stereotype of the Latino male as noble warrior. In 
Valdez’s The Dark Root o f a Scream 11967), a Chicano mother collects 
her third posthumous Medal of Honor, having lost sons in World War 
2, Korea, and Vietnam. The barrio priest assures her that her son has 
sacrificed himself for the sacred Christian cause of democracy. The 
local barrio youths, envious of the admiration inspired by the dead 
soldier, wonder if they, too, should enlist.
Only Johnny, in Soldado Razo, sees the waste of his race’s 
brave young men. He writes to his mother from Vietnam, asking her 
to tell his friends what the war is really about. But the letter is never 
finished. Muerte, who must continue to exploit the naive and heroic 
attitudes of the barrio youths, guns Johnny down with a knowing 
smile.
By 1968, returning veterans were rapidly dispelling any
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romantic attitudes that minorities might have had about the gloiy of 
proving their worth in the American military. Instead of being viewed 
as a great opportunity, the military came to be seen as a last resort for 
unemployed and untrained minority youths in a country which offered 
them few means of advancement. “It’s an awful indictment of 
America," a soldier in the New York Times was reported to say, “that 
many young Negroes must go into the military for fulfillment, for 
status—and that they prefer service overseas to their homeland.”13 To 
a new generation of black soldiers, equal opportunity for status 
became far too great an opportunity for death. This change in attitude 
is dramatically embodied in white dramatist Jonathan Greenberg’s 
Casualties (1987). A  black career officer argues that “We forced them 
to integrate the service! We were at the forefront of the civil rights 
movement!" But his arguments are countered by the ghost of a black 
grunt, killed in combat, who sneers at him, “you’re proud...cuz they 
integrated the fuckin cemetery. Yeah, that’s your Victory’. We all get 
wasted now.”14
When statistics on the racial make-up of combat troops and 
casualties began to appear, it became clear that minorities—especially 
blacks—were taking on more than their fair share of the war. In 1965, 
for instance, 23.5% of all Army enlisted men killed in action were 
black.15 By 1968, blacks accounted for 9.8% of the military forces in 
Vietnam, but in combat units, that figure rose to 20%. and even 25% 
in such elite units as the paratroopers.16 In 1970, black combat deaths 
were “running about one-third above the proportion of blacks stationed 
in Southeast Asia.”17 Casualty rates for Spanish sumamed soldiers 
were also disproportionately high.18
At first the disproportionate number of blacks in combat units 
and subsequent combat deaths were viewed as the result of blacks 
volunteering for elite units as a means of gaining status. In 1967, 
National Urban League president, Whitney Young Jr., reported that:
The reason for the high rate o f negro combat deaths lies in the 
simple fact that a higher proportion o f negroes volunteer for 
hazardous duty. They do so not for the money—which 
doesn't begin to justify the risk—but more from a desire to 
prove to themselves and to their white colleagues that they 
are men capable of as much skill, courage, and sacrifice as 
any man alive.19
While Young’s statement might have been true of blacks who served 
in Vietnam before 1967, by the time these sentiments were quoted in 
Harper’s, a military program had been implemented which would send 
more and more impoverished and unwilling minority draftees into 
combat positions in Vietnam.
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Secretary o f Defense Robert McNamara's Project 100,000 was 
intended, according to its creators, to make more men eligible for 
military service by reducing the mental and physical aptitude standards 
of the armed forces. McNamara claimed that the program would give 
America’s poor an opportunity to serve their country and “an opportunity 
to return to civilian life with skills and aptitudes which for them and 
their families [would] reverse the downward spiral of decay."20 In fact, 
while Project 100,000 lowered admission standards, it did not lower 
similar prerequisites for special training in technical positions within 
the military. The end result was that approximately 40 percent of the 
one hundred thousand “New Standards Men” being accepted for 
military duty each year were used as combat troops.21 Few gained the 
skills and aptitudes promised by McNamara. And since Project 
100,000 reduced standards for draftees as well as enlistees, the draft 
was able to dig deeper into ghetto communities and rural areas of the 
deep South to fill combat units with the poor and underprivileged 
while continuing to give educational deferments to college students. 
Later figures confirmed that 41% of all Project 100,000 men were 
black.22
In a 1970 article for The Black Scholar, Wallace Terry Jr. 
describes a dramatic reversal in black attitudes toward the military 
and the Vietnam war. Unlike his 1967 Time report, which proclaimed 
the successful integration of the military, his Black Scholar essay 
confirmed that blacks had begun to view the military as a deadly 
extension of civilian discrimination. “Among all black enlisted men 
surveyed, “ Terry notes, “nearly half believe that blacks were assigned 
more dangerous duty than whites. Even some whites agree." One 
white sergeant told Terry that “you honestly have to say that the black 
man in our brigade... has almost no chance of getting a support job."23 
Terry also contradicts the 1967 claim made by Whitney Young Jr. that 
blacks in Vietnam were the “cream of the crop of the Negro community. ”24 
Terry declared that some of the so-called “volunteers” he spoke with 
had either enlisted to avoid the draft, or were escaping jail terms— 
often for arrests made during ghetto uprisings.25
One such ghetto dweller is portrayed in white veteran David 
Rabe’s Streamers (1976). Carlyle is a black draftee; uneducated and 
unskilled, he knows he has been written off as cannon fodder by the 
military. “You got it made,” he tells three other draftees, all with 
clerical skills and special assignments. “I don’t got it made."
You got jobs they probably ain't ever gonna ship you out, you 
got so important jobs. I got no job. They don't even wanna 
give me a job. I know it. They are gonna kill me. They are 
gonna send me over there to get me killed, goddammit....
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I don't wanna be no DEAD man. I don’t wanna be the one they 
all thinkin’ is so stupid he’s the only one’ll go, they tell him; 
they don’t even give him a job. I got thoughts, man, in my 
head; alia time bumin', burnin' thoughts a understandin’.26
Carlyle’s fatal sentiments are an accurate reflection of the feelings of 
blacks interviewed by Terry in Vietnam. Terry quotes one black 
paratrooper as he prepared to jump into the Ashau Valley: “I was a 
dead man when they told me I was going to Vietnam.... I have nothing 
to lose here or back home. The white man has told me to die."27 The 
promise of a military organization where “the only color is olive drab” 
had proven hollow.
The outrage of blacks in Vietnam reached crescendo pitch in 
1968. The Tet Offensive in January of that year meant an escalation 
in fighting and thus in drafting new combat troops—a disproportionate 
number of whom were black. The assassination of Martin Luther King 
in April 1968 brought out the ugliest side of white racism in Vietnam, 
and sent blacks into paroxysms of violence. In the wake of King’s 
murder, whites burned crosses at Cam Ranh Bay and flew Confederate 
flags over bases at Da Nang.28 Rumors spread among both black and 
white soldiers that an all-out race war was underway back in the 
States.
Blacks in large numbers were questioning their participation 
in the Vietnam war. Many draftees of this period had spoken with 
returning veterans about conditions in Vietnam. Others were witnesses 
to, and often participants in, the racial violence of stateside civil rights 
battles and ghetto riots. These men had very little desire to fight or die 
for a country which had declared war on them. In a New York Times 
article from July 1968, black veterans expressed a growing opposition 
to the war. “We shouldn’t fight for this country until it’s worth fighting 
for,” declared one black vet. “The rights we fought for [for] somebody 
else just don’t exist for us," says another.29 These sentiments are 
echoed by the character Carlyle In Streamers, who declares that “It 
ain’t our war nohow because it ain’t our country.”30
Vietnam became the first war in American history in which 
black national leaders did not urge black youths “to take up arms in 
support of American policy to improve the lot of the black man in the 
United States.”31 Before his death, Martin Luther King Jr. was one of 
several black leaders to condemn the presence of blacks in Vietnam. 
His speech in New York City’s Riverside Church in April of 1967 
proclaimed:
We are taking the young black men who have been crippled 
by our society and sending them 8,000 miles away to
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guarantee liberties in Southeast Asia which they had not 
found in Southwest Georgia and East Harlem. So we have 
been repeatedly faced with the cruel irony o f watching Negro 
and white boys on TV screens as they kill and die together for 
a nation that has been unable to seat them together at the 
same school.32
Blacks stationed in Vietnam were at first confused and frustrated 
when leaders as ideologically dissimilar as Stokely Carmichael and 
Martin Luther King Jr. labeled Vietnam a race war and encouraged 
blacks not to fight. But many black soldiers soon saw the sense in the 
arguments of American black leaders, and adopted an antiwar stance. 
At the time of King’s murder in 1968, he was held in high esteem by 
black GIs, as were other antiwar black activists such as Carmichael, 
Cassius Clay, and Julian Bond.33 Black GIs began to view the war as 
an example of the oppression of a nonwhite people by the white 
American establishment. Stated one black veteran: “We’re not
fighting for the freedom of the Vietnamese, but rather to oppress them. 
The Vietnamese are fighting for self-determination the same as black 
people here.” Another veteran concluded that "We [are doing] to the 
yellow people what whites do to us."34
Other racial communities whose young men were fighting in 
the American military expressed similar emotions. In Jaime Carrero’s 
play "Flag Inside" (1966), a Puerto Rican family laments the loss of 
their son in a war waged by imperialist America against a small non­
white nation much like their own. In Honey Bucket (1976), Filipino 
veteran and playwright Melvyn Escueta examines what it meant to be 
“a gook killing gooks.”35 His young Filipino hero, Andy, is haunted by 
images of Vietnamese peasants who, noting his Asian features, tell 
him “same-same, Viet-Me.” At first Andy rejects his connection to 
these people, but eventually he finds that “We were cousins under the 
skin.” When a white lieutenant is disgusted by the “crap” in an old 
woman’s mouth, Andy impatiently explains that she is chewing betel 
nuts and that his grandparents “chew that ’crap’.” On another 
occasion, he shares a bowl of rice and nuoc mom (fish sauce) with a 
Vietnamese girl, trying to explain to her that it is much like the Filipino 
dish bagoong. The smell, he says, “reminds me of home.” When two 
white soldiers enter the scene, they complain about the stench, 
commenting that the fermented fish smells like “something crawled up 
somebody’s ass and died.” Andy’s anger about such slurs against 
Asians is so great that five years after his return from Vietnam, he still 
cannot help but feel that in America “anyone not white is a gook.”
Luis Valdez expresses much the same sentiment on behalf of 
the Chicano community with Vietnam Campesino (1970) in which
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Chicano campesinos (farmworkers) are shown the similarities between 
their plight and that of farmers in Vietnam. Valdez depicts both the 
migrant campesinos, and the Vietnamese peasants as simple agrarians 
who wish to escape a capitalist society in which their lives are 
controlled by wealthy landowners. Several parallels are drawn 
between the two groups and their relationship to the American 
capitalist establishment. The campesinos wish to unionize; the 
Vietnamese wish to socialize. In both instances, white Americans in 
power encourage the farmers to ignore their own leaders (Ho Chi Minh 
and Ceasar Chavez) and support puppet leaders backed by the 
American government and wealthy capitalists. Valdez compares the 
actions of agrobusiness executives who order pesticide spraying while 
farmworkers are still in the fields to the actions of US government 
officials who order soldiers to bomb Vietnamese villagers. (Ironically, 
Valdez was unaware of the fact that both Chicanos and Vietnamese 
were being drenched with Agent Orange at that time.)
The Vietnamese Communist Party was quick to capitalize on 
the racial ambiguity of the US government’s foreign and domestic 
policy stance. According to Whitney Young, “one of the favorite 
propaganda exercises of the Vietcong is to drop leaflets explaining the 
race issue to the American Negro. These thoughtfully remind the 
Negro troops of their own period of slavery and ask for what purposes 
they are in Vietnam helping the whites oppress a colored people.”36 As 
one veteran tells, blacks quickly got the feeling that they had been 
“seduced and abandoned by the man.”37
Three plays by black veterans, set in-country during the peak 
of racial tensions in 1968, dramatize the anger and the frustration of 
black soldiers who consider themselves patriotic Americans, but who 
find themselves at odds with the society for which they are fighting. 
Fred Gamel’s Wasted (1984) involves a fragging plot on the night that 
troops in Vietnam leam of Martin Luther King Jr.’s assassination. 
Charles Michael Moore’s The Hooch (1978) takes place several weeks 
after King’s death, as inter-racial tension between bunkmates builds 
toward violence. Jamal’s LBJ (1986) recreates one of the most 
infamous prison riots in Army history in which 200 black inmates 
gained control of Long Binh Jail and injured scores of white prisoners.
In all three plays, black moderates are tom between a moral 
vision of racial tolerance and an emotional bond with their militant 
brothers. In Wasted, a black sergeant named Bassett must decide 
whether or not he will conceal a plot by one of his men to frag a white 
“nigger-hating” sergeant in symbolic retaliation for the death of Martin 
Luther King, Jr. In a climactic scene, Bassett vents the frustration of 
a moral man and a loyal citizen fighting in a war he knows is no longer
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his own:
What’s supposed to be eating me...a leader o f my people gets 
wasted in the land of the PX, nobody even sends word of it to 
us at the flrebase...we get a deadhead nigger-hater for a 
platoon sergeant.... I’m fighting a war for a country where I’m 
a second-class citizen...and I'm supposed to sail on like 
nothing’s ever been wrong in my life.38
Although Bassett remains reluctant to halt the fragging of a white 
racist, he must eventually shoot a black soldier to end the escalating 
tension on the base camp.
Charles Michael Moore’s The Hooch is also set within a 
basecamp tense over racial issues, where black grunts guard a 
military radar unit controlled by while technicians. The symbolic 
significance of this hierarchy is unveiled late in the play when a black 
soldier discovers that the equipment on the hill, which the whites have 
carefully hidden and which the blacks are expected to give their lives 
to protect, is a worthless invention which has never worked and which 
the white technicians do not know how to repair. The radar unit on 
the hill, like America’s involvement in Vietnam, is unveiled as a white 
man’s cause, and a worthless one at that, for which blacks are 
expected to die.
The black soldier who discovers this folly is a radar specialist— 
the first black to hold such a position on this base. His name is 
Corporal Promus (i.e.. Promise), and he is a redemptive figure of high 
moral fortitude, racial tolerance, and intelligence. In revealing the 
false god on the hill, he manages to disarm the aggression building 
between blacks and whites in camp. His philosophy is a simple one: 
“What goes around, comes around.” He convinces a fellow black 
soldier not to sink to the level of the white racists by shooting a white 
corporal who they believe has killed one of the black grunts.
In Jamal’s LBJ, an unlikely inter-racial trio of prisoners band 
together in the face of certain death by rampaging black inmates. 
Wade is a level-headed but independent-minded black who has made 
an enemy of Big Man, the dangerous leader of the rioters. Wade is 
forced to share a hiding place with Chacon, a Chicano who is generally 
friendly with neither whites nor blacks, and Christopherson, a white 
pacifist. These three are trapped together inside Long Birth Jail during 
the race riots of 1968. By calling an end to their petty differences and 
combining forces, they defeat Big Man and his murderous cohort. 
Weasel. The message, as in The Hooch and Wasted is one of inter­
racial solidarity and tolerance as an alternative to white or black 
extremism.
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Juxtaposed against the moderate protagonists in all three of 
these plays are black militants who find themselves driven to acts of 
violence against whites by a system which refuses to recognize their 
rights. “They make you prove it to them, Bro,” Chacon laments in LBJ. 
“They hate to give you your respect."39 In Wasted, the hot-headed 
Spider Evans, who joined the military in lieu of a prison sentence for 
assault, plots against the white sergeant who has made his distaste for 
blacks well known. In The Hooch, short-timer Horus Brown plans to 
kill a white soldier who he believes has murdered one of his men. 
Brown looks upon relationships with whites in terms of war. He tells 
Promus he wants blacks to “infiltrate" all areas of white military duty 
because, in his words, “this is war.”40 His white counterpart, Seebold, 
believes that the army is training blacks to kill whites. “These people 
are at war with us,” he tells another white technician.
These images of races at war accurately reflect the conditions 
in Vietnam as described by numerous veterans in interviews between 
1968 and 1973.41 Some veterans expressed the concern that blacks 
in Vietnam saw the real war as one they would fight, with their new and 
deadly skills, on the streets of America. “The big question," one black 
GI told the New York Times, “is whether the black cat can walk like a 
dragon here in South Vietnam and like a fairy back in the land of the 
big PX.”42 In LBJ, Big Man claims that the war “has been giving the real 
brothers the experience they'll need when they get back home."
Vietnam is giving me an education: a chance to leam about 
life. Ain’t my fault the man turned loose the beast over here.
You, me, Weasel and 500,000 more. He thought he would 
ride the back o f this beast making it do his killing, blindly, 
obediently. And he’s been riding it into the ground. B u t- 
then he forgot something...one day he had to get off that 
beast's back and when he does...(laughs] The beast would 
still be hungiy and the man would be devoured.
Wallace Terry, Jr. notes, as does Thomas Johnson in the New York 
Times, that black militant groups were not uncommon in Vietnam. 
The Black Panthers, the JuJus, the MauMaus, and the Zulu 1200s 
were all represented. “I dig the militant brothers,” one black soldier 
told Terry. “Non-violence didn't do anything but get Martin Luther 
King killed."43
Many black veterans returned from Vietnam to communities 
where the rate of unemployment for blacks was “at least three times 
the national average” and where the unemployment rate for blacks 
between 20 and 25 (the age of most veterans) “was likely to be eight or 
nine times the national average.”44 In the words of playwright Tom
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Cole’s Medal of Honor winner, DJ, the average black veteran became 
“just another invisible Nigger, waiting on line and getting shit on just 
for being there."45 Many black vets, like Spec 4 Anthony Brazil in 
Stephen Mack Jones’ Back in the World (1984), found that Vietnam 
had trained them for one job only:
So here I am. right? At home. Back in Indianapolis. Back 
in the world. If you can call Indianapolis “the world." And all 
I'm trained to do is kill. Twenty years old now and that's all 
I know how to do. Not exactly the kind o f thing you put on 
a resume....
Two months later. I re-up. Four months, I'm back in 
the ‘Nam. Don't need no resume. No references.46
Combat veterans could expect to be pressured about reenlistment 
while still in Vietnam, or approached back in the States by National 
Guard or State Police forces who hoped to use them as riot control 
troops. Although many veterans accepted service with these 
organizations, the outcome was often further racial confrontation. 
Wallace Terry, Jr. cites at least one instance in which 43 black soldiers 
from Fort Hood. Texas, refused an assignment at the Democratic 
National Convention for fear of being ordered to battle the black youth 
of Chicago.47
Black vets were also solicited by militant groups eager to 
capitalize on their battle training and their escalating resentment of 
white America. In 1968, Bobby Seale said veterans had been steadily 
joining the ranks of the Oakland Black Panthers: that same year, 
Clarence Guthrie of the Zulu 1200s estimated that about one-third of 
his members were vets. The majority of black vets interviewed by the 
New York Times said they were opposed to the war. Many said they 
would never fight for the United States again. One black vet expressed 
the intensity of the rage felt by many of his brothers: “I find myself 
hating this [white] man so much that [Uncle] Sam couldn’t kill me, 
melt me, or pour me back into the Army or back into the Nam."48 
Despite such sentiments, there were only scattered incidences of 
“insane veterans’ militancy" in the wake of the war, and most of the 
violence came, not from black veterans, but from right-wing white 
mercenaries and KKK veterans.49
Two plays, both by non-veterans, directly address the 
helplessness, rage and resentment experienced by black veterans 
upon their return to civilian life. Black playwright Adrienne Kennedy’s 
AnEvening withDeadEssex{ 1973) and Tom Cole’s Medal o f Honor Rag 
(1975) are both based on true stories of black veterans who met with 
violent ends after their return to the United States.
Kennedy’s play recounts the death of 23-year-old Mark Essex
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in Januaiy 1973. Firing his high-powered rifle from the roof of a New 
Orleans Howard Johnson, Essex carried on a 32 hour shooting spree 
in which seven people were killed and 21 others wounded. He was 
eventually overcome by 40 police sharpshooters and a military 
helicopter; over 100 bullets were found in his body.
In what amounts to more of a memorial service or documentary 
than a conventional drama. An Evening with Dead Essex attempts to 
reach a sympathetic understanding of the events which led a young 
black man of highly spiritual upbringing to randomly gun down 
passers-by from the roof of a hotel. A  company of black actors use 
quotations from Essex’s family and friends, stories of his youth and his 
military service, pictures from his life and from the day of his death, 
and fabricated testimony to summon the spirit of dead Essex.
Essex is revealed as an innocent Kansas youth, deeply religious, 
who believed in the benevolence of his white neighbors and in the 
goodness of God and country. While serving in the Navy, Essex’s 
profound faith was shattered by the cruel bigotry of the white military 
hierarchy. Kennedy’s play relates how Essex comes to believe that 
white men are his enemy, that America is the white man’s country, and 
that Christianity is a “white man’s religion.” According to Kennedy, it 
is the subversion of Essex’s faith which makes him pursue, with 
religious zeal, the destruction of the society which has brutally 
betrayed him.
Although Essex served in San Diego, not Vietnam, his death is 
presented by Kennedy (as it was viewed by the American press in 1973) 
as an emblem of the brutality which the Vietnam war had brought to 
America’s streets. Kennedy illustrates the militarization of civilian 
culture with two news clippings, recited in sequence by an actor:
1972—B-52 bombers made their biggest raid on the Vietnam 
war demilitarized zone to date dropping nearly 200 tons of 
bombs. 1973—at 9:25PM the helicopters lumbered past 
again.
(Pause]
When the sharpshooters opened fire, a slight figure, rifle in 
hand, bolted into the open. Trapped in a withering crossfire 
between the helicopter overhead and marksmen in two 
adjacent buildings, Jimmy Essex was literally ripped apart 
by at least a hundred bullets. The police kept firing even after 
he went down, his body twitching with the impact o f each slug 
and his rifle shattered beside him.50
Because the actor finishes the first quotation and begins reading the 
second before pausing, the distinction between the two events—the
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bombing in Vietnam and the violent death in New Orleans—is blurred. 
As one of the actors comments, the two events “very much continue 
into each other”51 and the war in Vietnam becomes indistinguishable 
from the violence on America’s streets.
Elsewhere in the play, one of the actors speaks with shocking 
directness on the significance of Mark Essex’s death to the black 
community. He speaks for a generation of black veterans, many of 
whom feel betrayed by their country, and who see Essex as a 
spokesman and a martyr:
About a year ago five o f us ex-G.I.s were arrested.... They said 
we had a plot to kill all white people. We didn’t. But we did 
meet in the cellar almost every day and talk, just talk. We 
wished we had a plot to kill white people—we had a lot to say 
to each other—about our confusion about the deep racial 
significance o f the war between the U.S. and Viet Nam. white 
against non-white—about our joblessness—we did want to 
kill but we had no plot—we had a lot to say and we still have 
a lot to say—about Mark Essex—to us he is a hero—we 
believe he was carrying a banner—we believe he saw himself 
as a soldier o f mercy—we have a lot to say about dead 
Essex.52
While few would readily recognize a sniper, randomly firing at 
pedestrians, as either victim or martyr, Adrienne Kennedy’s play 
draws attention to the tragic stature of the “slight figure” on the roof. 
She successfully creates a documentary image of an innocent young 
man from Kansas who enters the Navy in order to serve his God and 
his country, and who is transformed into a genocidal killer by the 
bigotry and racial hatred he finds there.
Mark Essex’s acts of violence and racial hatred may have made 
him an unlikely subject for sympathetic dramatic portrayal. By 
contrast, Dwight Johnson, fictionally characterized as DJ in Tom 
Cole’s Medal o f Honor Rag, immediately captured the sympathy of the 
American public in 1971 when he was shot to death while robbing a 
grocery store in his home town of Detroit. Unlike Essex, who chose 
violence to express his personal sense of rage, Johnson ran from the 
rage he had found within himself in Vietnam.
Johnson returns from Vietnam to find he is unemployable. 
Trained to kill, he feels roughly discarded alter his service to his 
country. As recounted in the play, DJ's tour of duty in Vietnam ends 
suddenly and dramatically with a firefight in which he single-handedly 
wipes out an entire North Vietnamese unit after witnessing the deaths 
of his closest friends. In a mortal frenzy, DJ is dragged from the scene
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of the battle and tranquilized. Within 48 hours, he is on a plane 
headed for Detroit with a medical discharge. Several months later, two 
MPs suddenly appear at DJ’s door and question his mother about his 
activities. He is asked to take another sudden plane ride, this time 
from the Detroit ghetto he calls home to the White House, where he is 
awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor. DJ expresses the bitter 
irony of his country's treatment of him: "Yesterday afternoon for all 
they knew I was a junkie on the streets, today the President of the 
United States can’t wait to see me....”53 The country that exploits his 
services as a trained killer, then throws him back into the ghetto, now 
needs him again. DJ becomes the token black hero at an awards 
ceremony conceived of by the Johnson administration to counteract 
the war's bad press.
Despite the obvious status and social mobility which the medal 
offers DJ, he cannot help but see it as a reward for acts of violence 
which he considers heinous. “I got that medal,” he tells his psychiatrist, 
“because I went totally out of my fucking skull and killed everything 
in sight.”54 He fears that he may again lose control of himself and 
repeat his violence in his home town. “Man, if I lose my cool again— 
just, freak out,” DJ asks, “what’s to stop me from going up and down 
the streets of Detroit killing everything I see?”55 Though DJ feels that 
the medal brands him as a crazed killer, he cannot reject it without 
disgracing his family, his community, and the black race. The prestige 
which accompanies the medal reflects not only on DJ, but on the 
community at large:
I am an authentic hero, a showpiece. One look at me, 
enlistments go up two hundred percent.... I am a credit to my 
race. Did you know that? I am an honor to the city o f Detroit, 
to say nothing of the state o f Michigan, o f which I am the only 
living Medal o f Honor winner! I am a feather in the cap of the 
army, a flower in the lapel o f the military.56
In need of someone to pass judgement on him, DJ enters a grocery 
store in a white section of Detroit. He has a pistol, but never fires it 
as the white cashier pulls his gun from behind the counter and shoots 
him repeatedly. In the words of the real Dwight Johnson’s mother, he 
“tired of this life and needed someone else to pull the trigger.”57
Medal o f Honor Rag and An Evening with Dead Essex were 
written at a time when the Vietnam war was still a gaping wound in the 
lives of most veterans. In the early 1970s, the vast majority of vets did 
not dare to speak of their war experiences, let alone express their 
confusion and hatred on the stage. Among veterans of this period, only 
David Rabe chose the stage as a means of openly venting his anger. His
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vitriolic anti-American plays. Sticks and Bones and The Basic Training 
o/Pavlo Hummel raised great controversy and resentment when they 
were produced in 1971, alienating farmore people than they converted. 
But Rabe was the exception, and several years passed before other 
veterans took to the stage.
Of the veteran plays discussed in this essay. Sierra’s Manolo 
and Escueta’s Honey Bucket (both produced regionally in 1976) were 
the first to appear. These works portray Vietnam veterans who survive 
the war only to self-destruct after returning to their homes. Manolo is 
a crime-world melodrama in which a Latino soldier returns unscratched 
from Vietnam only to find that his mother has died in his absence and 
that his little brother has been stabbed to death by a neighborhood 
pusher. Manolo dies taking his revenge on the pusher who would 
never have come to power in his neighborhood if Manolo had not been 
sent to Vietnam. Andy, the veteran protagonist in Escueta’s Honey 
Bucket, finds his recurrent flashbacks of Vietnam far more vivid than 
his real life. He is haunted throughout the play by the ghosts of his 
friends who died in battle. At the end of Honey Buckel Andy, alienated 
from his wife and family, speeds out of control on his motorcycle while 
his dead companions encourage his suicide with screams of “Come on 
home,” and “You’re better off with your buddies." Both Escueta and 
Sierra make it clear that death could seem the only way out for 
troubled minority veterans of this period.
Plays by black veterans from the late 1970s and into the 1980s 
still express the anger and despair of the immediate postwar years. 
But the sense of hopelessness and of hatred, directed both at whites 
and inward at the self, has evolved in these plays into a positive, 
sometimes therapeutic energy. The Hooch, Wasted, and LBJ advance 
the portrait of a protagonist who transcends the racial hatred of his 
companions, black and white, and offers hope of tolerance and racial 
harmony. The placement of this type of character at the heart of these 
plays suggest that veteran playwrights are attempting to instill their 
Vietnam experience with a sense of redemption in order to leave 
behind their lingering rage.
The evolution of Escueta’s Honey Bucket offers an excellent 
example of the conversion of anger and hopelessness into therapeutic 
regeneration. After the first production in 1976, Escueta frequently 
revised the play until in 1982, having determined that isolation and 
death were not the only way out for his veteran protagonist, Escueta 
rewrote the final scene so that Andy lives. Instead of urging Andy 
toward suicide, the ghosts of his dead comrades cease to haunt him, 
granting him permission to start living again. The play in its revised 
form still contains a strong message about a Filipino veteran’s anger 
at America’s treatment of minorities, but Honey Bucket is now
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therapeutic rather than destructive. Instead of promoting the image 
of an inevitable dead-end. the play speaks of a veteran making the long 
mental journey back to the World.
That same therapeutic journey and re-emergence can be found 
in Jones’s Back in the World. (1988). In a series of monologues, much 
like a veterans’ rap session, five black vets tell their stories in turn 
while the others listen and occasionally comment. Some part of each 
of these characters is still trapped in Vietnam. Among them are the 
man who refuses to believe the war is over, insisting it could still be 
won if ignorant liberals would not interfere; the soldier who searches 
photographs of Saigon for the Vietnamese wife and child he was forced 
to leave behind; and, the exile who lives in Belgium with his white wife 
and his children. In each of these characters, one can sense a powerful 
desire to “come home”. Sharing their stories, they help each other 
approach that end. Aletterfrom a stateside friend (a disabled veteran), 
read by the exile, expresses this common desire: “I wish to God you’d 
save me some postage and come home. For better or worse, America 
is home, James. And if you can’t stand proud at home, it’s hard to do 
it anywhere else in the world.”
While the individual monologues all conclude on a similar note 
of longed-for homecoming and healing, the play is open-ended. The 
final lines are spoken by the one character who will never be able to 
return to the World. He is a homeless veteran, known only as TheMan, 
who is first seen curled up with his radio in an alley. He lives on the 
edge, struggling each day with the flashbacks that send him screaming 
for cover. He tells us that he works occasionally with “black kids off 
the street” at a local community center: “Trying to help 'um, you know, 
make somethin’ outta theyselves." He wants the present generation 
of young ghetto dwellers—a generation facing an all-time high 
unemployment rate for black youths58—to see what has happened to 
him, and to be sure that they never allow themselves to be swept 
without question into war by a government promising to reverse “the 
downward spiral of decay” for minorities.
The Man’s message to the present generation of draft-age 
minorities recalls young Johnny’s words to his Vietnam era friends: 
“Please,” Johnny writes to his mother, “tell Sapo and all the vatos how 
it’s like over here. Don’t let them...”59 But his warning is cut short by 
a bullet to the head, fired by the gleeful figure of Muerte as he sings the 
ballad of “El Soldado Razo.” 1
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FORQOTTEN WARRiORS: AlMERiCAIN iNdiAN 
SERViCEMEN iN ViETNAIVI
Toivi Holivi
During the Second World War, whites in the United States 
were presented with a new image of American Indians to contemplate 
and finally to accept as truth. When the United States entered the war. 
Native Americans seemingly flocked to the enlistment stations and 
draft boards, volunteering for the armed forces in numbers far out of 
proportion to their actual population. The poverty-stricken reservations 
not only provided human resources but donated money and land to 
the crusade against the Axis powers.1
From the outset of the war, the media paid a great deal of 
attention to the American Indian contribution. Popular magazines 
like the Saturday Evening Post Collier’s, New Republic and Reader’s 
Digest reported with a great deal of satisfaction that American Indians 
were not only giving all they had to the war effort but were uniquely 
valuable to the military. Typical of the images conjured up of Indians 
was Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes’ description of American 
Indian “inherited talents" for Collier’s in 1944. According to Ickes, the 
Native American fighting man had:
endurance, rhythm, a feeling for timing, coordination, sense 
perception, and an uncanny ability to get over any sort o f 
tenrain at night, and, better than all else, an enthusiasm for 
fighting. He takes a rough job and makes a game o f it. Rigors 
o f combat hold no terrors for him; severe discipline and hard 
duties do not deter him.2
Even the motion picture industry, perhaps the most powerful 
medium for creating stereotypes, began subtly to change its image of 
American Indians. Hollywood “horse operas” tended to glorify the 
American expansionist past. Indians, a non-Indian idea in the first 
place, were depicted as barriers to American progress. On the screen, 
Indians raped and pillaged without conscience. But contemporary 
Westerns began to portray, more and more, the “Indian companion” 
character who. just as he had in the war, aided whites in a crusade 
against injustice. War movies exploited this new image of Indians even 
further. Soon the steely-eyed, stoic Indian member of the All- 
American platoon, who was willing to die for his non-Indian comrades.
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became an American cinematic cliche.3
The new stereotypes could only have gratified both the state 
elites and the larger American public. The image of Indians as loyal, 
brave, trustworthy fighters, dedicated to the American cause, boosted 
morale and validated the American sense of mission. To most 
Americans the war was a duel to the death between righteous 
democracy and facist injustice. It was a war to free the people of the 
world from the clutches of totalitarianism. American Indians, in 
throwing themselves so unflinchingly and wholeheartedly into the war 
effort, appeared to be seeking to share in the victory, legitimizing 
themselves as American citizens. Indians had been treated miserably 
but they were committed to the American crusade.
According to one young Columbia River tribal member who 
was quoted in a national magazine, even though his people had been 
treated badly by the United States, Hitler would be much worse: "We 
know that under Nazism we should have no rights at all; we should be 
used as slaves.”4 If an oppressed people such as the Indians sided with 
the United States then logically the American crusade was a just 
cause. Moreover, the media gave the impression that Indians were 
fighting in order to become assimilated into the body politic. Indians 
had been transformed, unlike blacks. Latinos, and Asians, into a 
“safe” (meaning politically reliable) minority.
In marked contrast to the World War 2 media attention given 
to their fathers, American Indians who fought in Vietnam have 
received little or no notice. American Indians, for example, have not 
been included in a single general study of Vietnam veterans. Regarded 
as an “insignificant population,” Indian veterans of Vietnam were only 
accepted as a group worthy of mention after the passage of Senate Bill 
2011, requiring the Veterans Administration: “to carry out a
scientifically-valid study of PTSD. ...among Asian-American, American- 
Indian, Native-Hawaiian, other Native-American Pacific-Islander 
(including American Samoan Native) and Alaska Native Vietnam 
veterans. ”s
Despite the differences in media coverage of Indian servicemen 
between the two wars, there is every reason to suspect that Native 
American enlistment rates and numbers of draftees were relatively as 
high—compared to the total United States population—as those 
during World War 2. It has been estimated that over 42,000 American 
Indians served in Vietnam between 1966 and 1973.6 This number is 
more than likely a tribal estimate arrived at by adding together the 
numbers of veterans from each of the different reservations. That 
being the case, the estimate might not include some American Indians 
from urban or non-reservation rural areas, members of tribes that are 
not recognized by the federal government and those people of less than 
one-fourth Indian blood.
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There is, simply put, no way of obtaining a completely accurate 
count of American Indians who served in Vietnam. Enlistment and 
draft contracts of the period contained no “American Indian” racial 
category, and recruiters habitually assigned racial categories to 
individuals rather than asking them to what group they belonged. 
Consequently, Indian veterans report that they were listed as being 
anything from Caucasian to Mongolian to “Other”. It is also very likely 
that a number of the people listed as Hispanic are tribal Native 
Americans. Many Apaches and Navajos and practically all of the 
Pueblos and Tohono O’odam have Spanish surnames.
Even if the number of American Indians in Vietnam is accepted 
to be 42,000 it is exceptionally high. During the Vietnam war the total 
Indian population of the United States was less than one million. 
American Indians thus made up at least 1.4% of all the troops sent to 
Vietnam, while Indians in general never constituted more than 0.6% 
of the total population of the US in the same time period. Approximately 
one out of four eligible Native Americans served, compared to one out 
of 12 in the general American population. In other words, Indians, like 
other minority groups, bore a disproportionate share of the war.7
The explanation for the relatively high numbers of American 
Indian servicemen in Southeast Asia during the war is complex. A 
study of 170 American Indian veterans conducted by Robin LaDue, 
Harold Barse, Frank Montour and myself between 1985 and 1988 
reveals that not only were Indians recruited heavily, but they were 
often very willing to serve. The study group, although fairly small in 
number, was extremely responsive. It was culturally diverse, 
representing 77 tribes or combinations of tribes: Kiowas and
Comanches from the southern plains; Cherokees, Creeks and Seminoles 
from the southern woodlands; Sioux and Blackfeet from the northern
TAblE 1:
A merican hdiAN V ietnam Veterans. R easons For Enterinq 
Service or A cceptInq Conscription
Veiy
Important
Somewhat
Important
Not Too 
Important
Not Important 
At All
Financial Security 20.6% 29.4% 27.6% 22.4%
To Gain Respect 
from Indian People 35.3% 27.1% 17.6% 20.0%
To gain Acceptance 
by Non-Indians 15.3% 23.5% 25.3% 35.9%
Family Tradition 51.2% 24.1% 11.8% 12.9%
Tribal Tradition 43.5% 31.8% 12.9% 11.8%
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plains; Chippewas, Sac and Fox, and Menominees from the Great 
Lakes; Navajos, Apaches, Tohono O'odam and Hopis from the 
Southwest: Colville, Shoshone from the northwest plateau; Tlinget 
and Haida from the northwest coast; Iroquois from New York, and 
Inuit from Alaska. Most were bom between 1944 and 1952, and all 
entered the military between the ages of 17 and 21. Nearly half of them 
now live in urban areas, but only about one-fourth of them actually 
grew up in large population centers. In other words, they were 
representative of the demographic trends among all Indians of their 
age group. On the whole, their educational levels were high for 
American Indians, but most said that these levels were attained only 
after their military service.
Even though the media focused little attention on Indians 
during the 1960s, Native Americans were heavily recruited by the 
military. To the general public and to military elites, Indians were still 
a “safe” as well as a “martial" race. According to several participants 
in the study, military recruiters constantly emphasized that Indian 
people were natural fighters and military men. Also, American Indians 
were a youthful population, averaging between ages 18 and 22. 
Theoretically, a large portion of the Native American population were 
prime candidates for military service in the first place, and would have 
been recruited and drafted in disproportionate numbers compared to 
other, older groups.
Besides being recruited and conscripted in relatively large 
numbers, Indian males in the 1960s had their own reasons for 
entering the service and specifically for seeing combat in Vietnam. In 
general, American Indians in the United States live on reservations, in 
rural non-reservation areas, or in low-income sections of large 
metropolitan centers. The lack of employment, even during the 
prosperous 1960s, was marked in all three locales. During the period, 
a number of Indian communities in several states were involved in 
confrontations with whites over hunting and fishing rights and land 
and water disputes. Opportunity was nil, education was limited, and 
poverty was rampant. Military service, according to most of the 
Vietnam veterans who took part in the study, offered at least some 
degree of financial reward.
There were, in addition, some cultural and social reasons for 
young Indian males to make the decision to leave their home 
communities. Many traditional Indian communities simply have very 
little room for young males. Older males in these communities 
traditionally control the economic and religious aspects of life, while 
females are often the arbiters of a community’s social arrangement. 
American Indian males between the ages of 18 and 25 are almost 
expected to leave the community for a period of time in order to mature 
and gain outside experience. Some Indian elders believe that this
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situation is a holdover from the times when young men prepared for 
and went off to war. When young Indian males leave their home 
communities there is very little opportunity outside of joining the 
military service.8
Within the last seventy years, a number of tribes have built a 
tradition around service in the United States armed forces. This 
development is ironic to be sure and somewhat complex, but basically 
rooted in individual tribal cultures. Several members of the study 
group stated that they had taken part in tribal ceremonies related to 
warfare. Historically, some tribes had lived under the constant threat 
of attack by enemies and felt that unless the military dimension of life 
was placed in a ritual context, it might well permanently dominate all 
other considerations. Other tribes viewed warfare as a disruption in 
the natural scheme of things—a disruption great enough to cause 
disharmony, sickness and social disintegration. In either case, the 
tribes developed ceremonies to cross over the line from peace to war 
and back again. Warriors were ritually prepared for war and offered 
protective medicine to assure their safe return to the community. In 
addition to the rituals for war, many tribes devised purification 
ceremonies to restore individual warriors, as well as the community, 
to a harmonious state. Unless the returning warriors were purged of 
the trauma of battle, it was felt they might bring back memories of 
conflict to the tribe and seek to perpetuate patterns of behavior 
unacceptable to the community in its ordinary functioning. All these 
ceremonies were thought necessary to maintain a tribe’s continued 
harmonious existence with its environment.9
Despite bureaucratic complaints and government prohibitions, 
many tribes maintained a variety of war-related ceremonies. In 1919, 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs Cato Sells expressed his irritation at 
the fact that dances and ceremonies were being conducted among a 
number of tribes for the Indian soldiers who had j ust returned from the 
trenches in France.10 Ceremonies to honor and purify Indian veterans 
also followed World War 2 and the Korean War, despite the widespread 
(and erroneous) idea that Indian soldiers would refuse to take part in 
“yesterday’s culture."11 The Sioux held victory ceremonies; Kiowas 
took part in soldier dances; Cherokees were ritually cleansed of the 
taint o f battle by medicine men; and Navajos went through elaborate 
“Enemy Way” ceremonies to restore returning veterans to a harmonious 
place in the community.12
All of these ceremonies help keep intact a tribe’s identity. 
Along with language, a sacred history and the knowledge of a specific 
homeland or holy land, particular ceremonies maintain group cohesion 
and distinction. In short, they keep alive a group’s sense of peoplehood. 
Since most tribal societies in the United States are based on kinship, 
the continuity of family tradition is extremely important. An
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overwhelming majority of veterans who took part in the study said that 
they entered the military to retain the respect of their own people and 
to carry on family or tribal traditions. Rather than joining the military 
in an attempt to become part of the American mainstream. Native 
Americans seemed primarily interested in remaining a distinctive 
people. Military service, simply put, is one thing that Indian males do.
Several tribes in the United States—the Kiowas and Comanches, 
the Cheyennes, and to a certain extent the Winnebagos, the Sioux and 
the Chippewas—have syncretized service in the American armed 
forces with their own tribal customs. For these tribes there are certain 
functions that can only be performed by veterans. At pow-wows, for 
example, if a dancer drops an eagle feather, it can only be retrieved by 
a veteran. At some tribal gatherings, veterans are still asked to “count 
coup”, or tell a war story, before any ceremonies can begin.
There is also a certain amount of status to be gained in several 
Indian communities by fighting in a war. Traditionally, most tribes in 
the United States were gerontocracies. That is to say, elderly people 
took leadership roles because of their experience. Age and experience 
were equated, in most cases, with wisdom. Warfare was considered 
a life experience and, in fact, most tribal civil chiefs had good war 
records. War was not necessarily a positive experience but it was one 
that gave the participant a firsthand look at human suffering and 
death. As a Winnebago elder remarked before the performance of a 
veteran’s honor song during a pow-wow in Wisconsin, "We honor our 
veterans for their bravery and because by seeing death on the 
battlefield they truly know the greatness of life.”
Once in the military during the Vietnam conflict. American 
Indians typically were assigned to combat military occupational 
specialties (MOS)—infantry, airborne, tanks, artillery, gunships. 
Rangers, combat engineers. It has been demonstrated that recruits 
and inductees from the lower socioeconomic strata were more likely to 
be assigned to the infantry and to actually see combat. Studies made 
since the close of the Vietnam war indicate, in fact, that these men 
were twice as likely to find themselves in combat in Southeast Asia as 
soldiers from either the middle or upper classes.13 Historically, 
Indians were crushed by United States military might, forced to 
abandon many of their religious ceremonies, stripped of numerous 
tribal institutions, and left as one of the poorest economic groups in 
the nation. Low economic and educational levels (some reservations 
have reported unemployment rates as high as 80% and education 
averaging out at the eighth grade level) virtually assured that most 
Indians would be assigned to non-technical combat duties. Indians 
also seemed to have volunteered for combat assignments in relatively 
large numbers. Combat duty appears to have been a mark of 
distinction within several American Indian communities. As one
62 V ietnam Generation
Cheyenne veteran remarked: “I’m proud of our warrior status.”
The lack of media attention given to American Indian servicemen 
in Vietnam did not curb or in any way put an end to the old stereotypes 
that had followed World War 2 Indian veterans. The old stereotypes, 
in fact, followed American Indian fighting men into thejungles and rice 
paddies of Vietnam. It became all too clear that many small unit 
commanders were still infected with the “Indian Scout Syndrome”, 
which lasted for the duration of the war. In general, there was an idea 
that Indians were more attuned to nature than their fellow soldiers 
and were thus able to pick up signs of the enemy quickly and easily. 
The stereotype also included a notion that Indians were more stealthy 
and could utilize their senses of sight, smell, touch, and hearing better 
than non-Indians. These notions would seem laughable had they not 
forced Indian troops into some perilous duties. It was typical for 
Indians in Vietnam to be assigned to walk point on patrols and in large- 
scale troop movements.
Troops in Vietnam considered walking point extremely 
dangerous because the point man walked ahead of the main body of 
soldiers. In some units, the assignment was given to a new man who 
was considered expendable. In other units, point became the duty of 
a veteran who not only knew the enemy but the lay of the land. 
Generally, the danger of the position had to do with the topography or 
the flora in an area of operations. If a unit was moving through tall 
elephant grass, for example, the point man could literally walk into a 
concealed enemy position. He would also be in the position most 
vulnerable to booby traps and mines.
A  number of the veterans who took part in the survey stated 
that they walked point more than any other member of their respective 
units. A  Menominee from Wisconsin related that his platoon 
commander thought that since Indians “grew up in the woods" they 
should know how to track and generally “feel” when something in the 
immediate area of operations was disturbed or out of place. “Old 
Snoop and Poop” was the name given to a Cherokee marine who 
seemed to draw the point position more often than not. The phrase 
was used in the Marine Corps to designate a man who was a careful 
and enemy-wise scout. Another veteran, a Navajo from Arizona, 
concurred with the judgement that Indians had been falsely labelled, 
and stated that it had made the war somewhat more dangerous for him 
personally. He said that he was “stereotyped by the cowboys and 
Indian movies. Nicknamed “Chief right away. Non-Indians claimed 
Indians could see through trees and hear the unbearable. Bullshit, 
they believed Indians could walk on water.”
Along with walking point, other assignments became fairly 
routine for American Indians in Vietnam. The veterans involved in the 
study were regularly assigned to daytime outposts (OPs) and nighttime
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listening posts (LPs) to take advantage of their supposed natural 
talents. But perhaps the most disturbing and dangerous assignment 
some of the men talked about was being selected as members of “killer 
teams." A  killer team was a small patrol sent into an enemy-controlled 
area to conduct hit and run raids. Sometimes dressed in conical hats 
and Vietnamese clothing, killer teams were utilized tactically to harass 
enemy sympathizers and to disrupt enemy troop movements. The 
teams were exposed to several dangers, not the least of which was 
being sighted and attacked by an American or a South Vietnamese 
unit.
The composition of killer teams was frequently based on race. 
In order to penetrate enemy territoiy, the killer team was supposed to 
“look” Vietnamese. The selection of individuals for the teams narrowed, 
according to several veterans, to Indians, dark-skinned Latinos, 
Asian-Americans, Pacific Islanders and lighter-skinned blacks. 
(Ironically, enemy-controlled areas, where the killer teams worked, 
were more often than not referred to as Indian Country, in obvious 
mimicry of the old Cavalry versus Indian films.)
American Indians performed other duties while in Vietnam. 
Some were truck drivers, clerks, and supply personnel. But their 
numbers appear to be comparatively very small considering the fact
TaWe 2:
iNdiAN Vietnam Veterans. THe UnIts tHey SERved In
Percentage of Indians in Survey 
who Served in Unit
Infantry 41.8
Airborne 8.2
Artillery 82.
Air-Helicopter 7.7
Air-Fixed Wing 5.1
Tanks 4
Communications 3
Engineer/Combat 3
Medical Unit 3
Ship 3
Classified 2
Combined Action Group-Infantry 2
Gunboat 2
Intelligence 2
Military Police 1
Special Forces 1
Ranger 1
POW-Infantry 1
Seabee 1
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that in all modem armies logistics and support personnel always 
outnumber combat troops. The following table shows the units that 
Indian veterans who took part in the survey had served in while in 
Southeast Asia.
Because of their duties and apparently high rate of infantry 
service, American Indians garnered a number of combat decorations 
and also suffered considerable casualties. The 170 members of the 
study group, for example, were awarded 38 decorations for personal 
valor. The physical cost was high, for over 30% of them were wounded 
in action. For the same reasons that hamper the efforts to gain an 
accurate count of American Indian servicemen in Vietnam, the 
number of Indians killed in action in Southeast Asia may never be 
known with certainty.
The emotional trauma of combat in Vietnam was as great as 
the physical cost. Stressful combat experiences were compounded by 
a general dissatisfaction with United States Indian policies. Native 
American soldiers found themselves in the ambiguous position of 
fighting a white man’s war while the whites themselves suffered little, 
and at the same time white men carried out policies designed to 
disrupt tribal cultures and remove rights that the tribes had historically 
possessed. Said one veteran: “The white dudes stayed in school, you 
know, and we fought the war. They don’t know nothing about 
anything except what they get out of a book. But they get the jobs...” 
A  number of the veterans surveyed j  oined Indian political organizations 
such as the American Indian Movement and the National Indian Youth 
Council after their periods of service and took part in protests against 
federal policies and local racism directed at Indian people.
TAble 5:
A merican IncHan V ietnam Veterans. TypES o f Combat Experience*
Heavy 36.5%
Moderate 27.6%
Light 18.8%
None 17.1%
•Criteria used: Wounded in action, number of days in combat, close contact with 
enemy, seeing battle deaths, actually returning fire, etc.
Even while they were in Vietnam several of the veterans realized that 
the federal government’s wartime policies conflicted with their own 
cultural training and notions of j ustice. One man was made painfully 
aware o f the differences between his own tribal culture and military 
tactics:
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We went Into a ville one day after an air strike. The first body 
I saw in Nam was a little kid. He was burnt up—napalm—and 
his arms were kind of curled up. He was on his back but his 
arms were curled but sticking up in the air, stiff. Made me 
sick. It turned me around. See, in our way we’re not 
supposed to kill women and children in battle. The old people 
say it’s bad medicine and killing women and children doesn’t 
prove that you’re brave. It’s just the opposite.
Another veteran saw striking similarities in the condition of the 
Vietnamese peasants and his own people “back in the World" [the US]:
We went into their country and killed them and took land that 
wasn’t ours. Just like what the whites did to us. Ihelpedload 
upville after ville and pack it olfto the resettlement area. Just 
like when they moved us to the rez [reservation]. We 
shouldn’t have done that. Browns against browns. That 
screwed me up, you know.
Still another veteran was forced to take a hard look at the racial 
aspects of the war. During a search and destroy mission, this 
particular man was approached by one of the Vietnamese whose home 
had just been burned to the ground. The old farmer looked at the 
Indian soldier, compared their skin and hair color and said, as if 
confused, “You...me, same-same.”
For a significant number of Indian veterans the return to the 
United States was not what they had expected. If they sought 
acceptance by the whites they were disappointed. If they had thought 
that service in the military would bring them opportunity.they 
discovered that it had only lowered their status within the American 
mainstream. It seemed as if American society, of which they were only 
a peripheral member, had sent them to war and then rej ected them for 
actually serving. One man described his arrival back in the World with 
a great deal of bitterness: “We fought a white man’s war, you know, 
and the first thing that happens when I get back is that some white kid, 
a girl, at the LA airport spits on me."
Given their combat experiences and their lack of acceptance by 
the general public, it is understandable that fully 80% of the veterans 
in the study admitted that after returning home they suffered from one 
or more of the symptoms associated with post traumatic stress and 
post traumatic stress disorder. Generally, the symptoms include 
frequent inexplicable headaches, flashbacks, depression, severe 
alienation, sleep intrusions, extreme nervousness, and a heightened 
startle response. The disorder is often manifested in antisocial 
behavior, chemical abuse, chronic unemployment, or the inability to 
maintain close personal relationships with friends or family members.14
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TaM e 4:
A merican IncHan V ietnam Veterans. PTSD Sym ptom s  by 96.
Despite their problems, few American Indians seem to seek 
help from the government. The Veterans Administration Advisory 
Committee on Native American Veterans (formed in 1987) found that 
Indian veterans underutilize VA benefits and health care services and 
cite several reasons:
Underutilization is related to several geographic factors such 
as distance and topography: unavailability o f resources 
including transportation; cultural values: eligibility for Indian 
Health Service Programs: and the lack of coordination among 
federal agencies, especially between the Veterans 
Administration and the Indian Health Service.15
On the other hand, a number of the veterans have sought and 
found relief in their own tribal ceremonies. According to a Navajo 
veteran: "When I got back I had a lot of trouble. My mother even called 
in one of our medicine men. It cost them but my folks had an “Enemy 
Way” done for me. It’s a pretty big thing.... It snapped me out of it.” 
In the same vein, a Kiowa veteran related:
My people honored me as a warrior. We had a feast and my 
parents and grandparents thanked everyone who prayed for 
my safe return. We had a "special” and I remembered as we 
circled the drum I got a feeling o f pride. I felt good inside 
because that's the way the Kiowa people tell you that you've 
done well.
Increasingly, Indians who fought in Vietnam have begun to seek 
support and healing among their own people.
Since the end of the Vietnam war. some attention has been 
focused on the representation of minority or ethnic personnel in 
national military services. One of the most insightful studies of 
minority-to-military relationships can be found in Cynthia H. Enloe’s 
Ethnic Soldiers (1980). As part of a larger hypothesis, she suggests 
that militaries not only provide security for the horizontal nation 
against foreign enemies but are the protectors of hierarchical state 
institutions. Enloe demonstrates that state elites—those in control of 
the autonomous structure of public authority—normally have a clear
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idea of “what pattern of interethnic relations best insures the state’s 
survival.” 16 These elites do not ignore ethnic patterns, nor do they 
work to ensure that the military service reflects the nation’s ethnic 
mix. Rather, these elites judge the political reliability and military 
competence of different groups and assign minority troops to military 
occupations according to these criteria, thus assuring that politically 
unreliable groups are strictly controlled or unarmed.
State elites would prefer to arm minorities who have a propensity 
for soldiering and are politically safe. But recruiting even safe 
minorities for military service is a double-edged sword. Though it 
saves the elite from having to expend its own sons in a war, there is 
always the risk that the safe minority will figure out that it is being 
taken advantage of, and begin to turn the guns around (as did a 
number ofblack soldiers in Vietnam).17 Additionally, such employment 
of ethnic forces puts the elite under a moral obligation to the minority 
group that suffered on the battlefield. In some cases the state 
recognizes the obligation, in others, it does not.
During the Vietnam era, American Indians were considered 
politically safe. For well over forty years they have been stereotyped 
as tenacious, well-disciplined, stealthy, courageous, and knowledgeable 
fighters. The Indian population has been relatively small and remained 
politically quiet until the late 1960s. In fact, between the early years 
of this centuiy and the adoption of more militant political tactics—the 
fish-ins in Washington state (1965-1967), the occupation of Alcatraz 
(1969), the takeover of the Bureau oflndian Affairs in Washington, DC 
(1972), and the occupation ofWounded Knee, South Dakota (1973)— 
Indians typically worked within the structure of the state (bringing 
court cases, lobbying, etc.) to redress their grievances. In addition, 
Indians had not yet adopted a supratribal political organization willing 
to rattle the Status Quo until the formation of groups like the National 
Indian Youth Council and the American Indian Movement. The federal 
government, in turn, simply focused attention on tribal governments 
and worked to create and image of the supratribal groups as being 
non-tribal and, therefore, non-Indian. By the time Indian activism 
reached its zenith, the war was already winding down. The late start 
of Indian activism and the rather easy way the federal government 
successfully applied divide-and-rule tactics to suppress supratribal 
militancy made sure that Indians continued to be a relatively safe 
political group.
The American state apparatus has recognized an obligation to 
Indian veterans, but only to a degree. Indian veterans are eligible for 
benefits, but as the recently formed Indian Advisory Committee to the 
Veterans Administration has pointed out, these benefits and services 
have not been utilized to any great extent. In a larger sense as well, 
the state obligation to Indians in general has yet to be fulfilled. The
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American Indians who fought and died in Southeast Asia have been 
neglected and all but forgotten by the state they served.
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P erceptions of R ace ANd CLass A m o nq  
C hiCANO ViETNAM VETERANS
Lea YbARRA
“La Batalla Esta Aqui” was a rallying cry in the 1960s and 
1970s for those within the Chicano community who opposed the 
Vietnam War. They held that the real battle was in the United States, 
not in Vietnam, and that the billions of dollars that were being spent 
on the war abroad were needed for the war against poverty at home. 
They felt that money which was going to support the war could be 
better used improving medical care, housing and educational 
opportunities for Americans:
With that money we could have built eight million new 
homes, worth $25,000 each—wiping out our slums. Every 
time we blow up a village in Vietnam we are spending enough 
money to build a new hospital or library here. While our 
bombers tear apart Vietnam, this war also tears apart our 
own nation—because there is not enough money to wage war 
and also deal with drugs, slums, medical care, and housing.
The poor and unemployed, the Chlcanos, Blacks and Puerto 
Ricans—these have paid the price of this war.1
Others within the Chicano community, however, felt that this was a 
price worth paying. Thousands of young Chicanos volunteered for 
military service during this period. Many felt it was an honor and a 
duty to serve their country. The ideology within the Chicano community 
reflected that of the larger society, between those who opposed and 
those who supported US involvement in Vietnam.
This paper presents Chicano veterans, perceptions of the 
Vietnam war and the race and class issues it engendered—particularly 
as they relate to ethnic identification, national loyalty, cultural and 
political socialization, and discriminatory attitudes and practices. 
The testimony of the veterans themselves, regarding their experience 
during and after the Vietnam war, provides the basis for discussion of 
these issues.
The issues of race and class have been discussed previously in 
research literature on the topic of Chicanos and the war. Robin F.
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Scott (1971) stated that discriminatory practices were built into the 
Selective Service Act of 1940. Mexican Americans in the United States 
were drafted while the United States government imported workers 
from Mexico to replace them.2 Scott concluded that despite the large 
numbers of Mexican Americans who fought in World War 2: “The 
American of Mexican ancestry returned to the United States to find the 
same old prejudices on the home front: certain restaurants still would 
not serve him. swimming facilities were barred to him, and his children 
or brothers and sisters were still being segregated in the schools.”3 
In 1971, Dr. Ralph Guzman brought the issue of race and war 
to the forefront and confirmed what many people in the Chicano 
movement had suspected. In his short but powerful article, “Mexican 
American Casualties in Vietnam," Dr. Guzman cited statistics which 
verified that Mexican American military personnel had higher death 
rates in Vietnam than all other servicemen. His analysis of casualty 
reports from January 1961 to February 1967, and December 1967 to 
March 1969, showed that a high percentage of young men with 
Spanish surnames were killed in Vietnam, and that a substantial 
number of Latinos were involved in high risk branches of the service, 
such as the US Marine Corps. Chicanos accounted for approximately 
20% of US casualties in Vietnam, while they made up only 10% of this 
country’s population.4
According to Dr. Guzman, Chicanos were under pressure to 
enlist because they have too often been considered foreigners in the 
land of their birth, and feel they must prove their loyalty to the United 
States. Organizations like the GI Forum have long proclaimed the 
sizeable contribution of the Chicano soldier and point to impressive 
records of heroism in times of war. Dr. Guzman emphasized that there 
was “a concomitant number of casualties attending this Mexican 
American patriotic investment.”5 There was also the desire for status 
that military life seemed to offer, and a strong economic incentive, 
since many Chicanos help their families by sending them money from 
their service allotments. Relatively few Chicanos avoided the draft by 
obtaining the college deferments available to students in the Vietnam 
era. Dr. Guzman concluded:
Other factors motivate Mexican Americans to join the Armed 
Forces. Some may be rooted in the inherited culture o f these 
people, while others may be imbedded in poverty and social 
disillusion. Whatever the real explanation we do know that 
Mexican Americans are overrepresented in the casualty 
reports from Vietnam and underrepresented in the graduating 
classes o f our institutions of higher learning.6
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The Guzman article served as a manifesto for the growing 
antiwar movement in the Chicano community. This movement 
demonstrated its opposition to the war by holding moratoriums, 
marches and demonstrations which took place throughout the 
Southwest, and in which thousands of Chicanos participated. This 
protest movement was most forcefully illustrated by a statement 
called “Chale Con El Draft” (No to the Draft), written by Rosalio Munoz 
in Los Angeles:
Today, the sixteenth of September, the day of independence 
for all Mexican peoples, I declare my independence of the 
Selective Service System. I accuse the government o f the 
United States o f America o f genocide against the Mexican 
people. Specifically, 1 accuse the draft, the entire social, 
political, and economic system of the United States o f America, 
o f creating a funnel which shoots Mexican youth into Viet 
Nam to be killed and to kill innocent men, women, and 
children...and of drafting their laws so that many more 
Chicanos are sent to Vietnam, in proportion to the total 
population, than they send of their own white youth....7
The ideas of unquestioning loyalty to the United States and of doing 
one's duty as a patriotic citizen were also challenged in an increasing 
number of publications, including Chicanos and the War (1972):
Historically, Chicanos have played major heroic roles, 
particularly during World War II and the Korean War, where 
there were a great number o f Chicano war veterans who were 
heroes. But for every Chicano hero that made it home alive, 
there were a great many more Chicanos who died in battle.
Today, with the Viet Nam war, Chicanos are still fighting and 
dying to become war heroes, many because o f the influence 
and pressures put upon them by their own families to 
continue the tradition that their fathers and uncles initiated 
20 and 30 years ago. It is time that Chicanos begin to realize 
that our sons and brothers, husbands and boyfriends, 
cousins and nephews are the ones being used to fight a war 
from which La Raza gains nothing. We only lose....8
Charles Ornelas and Michael Gonzalez (1971) conducted an 
opinion survey among the Chicano community in Santa Barbara. 
Their results suggested that Chicanos were more troubled by the war 
than Anglo Americans, and that their worries matched those of other 
non-white communities. Chicano antiwar protests seemed to be more 
reflective of community sentiment than was generally accepted by 
critics. Chicanos expressed strong feelings against US involvement in
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Southeast Asia, as well as against the war policies of President Nixon. 
There was also dissatisfaction with the draft.9 At the time the poll was 
taken, almost half of the respondents considered the Vietnam conflict 
as the single most important problem facing the nation. Sixty percent 
agreed with the statement that the US should “withdraw from Vietnam 
as fast as we can pull out the troops."10 Only 11% of the males, and 
4% of the females polled stated that we should “send more troops and 
step up the fighting till we win."11 The majority of the Chicanos polled 
also voiced disapproval of the way President Nixon was handling the 
Vietnam situation, with only 20% of the adult males and 12% of the 
adult females approving of his policies in Vietnam. Ornelas and 
Gonzales found that the level of support for Nixon was lower than that 
offered by the combined non-white populations in an August 1970 
Gallup poll, and was substantially less than the support given Nixon 
by the general public. The study also found that a majority of adults 
and two-thirds of youth would not encourage their sons to join the 
service. Although the majority of the respondents disapproved of 
violence and rioting, 60% did approve of some forms of protest against 
the war, including protest marches.12 Ornelas and Gonzales concluded:
It ought not to be surprising if Chicanos speak out against the 
Aslan conflict and relate it to problems at home. The impact 
o f the war is not limited to the disproportionate higher 
casualty rate suffered by the Spanish-sumame in comparison 
with the national average. Conditions in the barrios are 
aggravated by the inflationary war economy that strikes 
hardest at the many families with incomes below the poverty 
level. Funds for poverty programs and educational 
opportunities have been sacrificed for military spending and 
other priorities.... The nation’s preoccupation with the 
conflict abroad has slowed down progress in the area o f civil 
rights. It was the continuing bigotry experienced by him and 
other Chicanos that moved WW II hero Guy Gabaldon to 
return his Navy Cross to President Nixon.... It is because 
barrio conditions were here before Vietnam and because they 
will not disappear with the end to the fighting, that the 
Chicano Moratorium efforts have been increasingly linked to 
grievances attributed to internal colonialism and cutbacks in 
domestic programs. The war in Vietnam may fade away, but 
the struggle in the barrios will go on.13
Since these early studies, relatively little work has focused on 
Chicanos and the military, or more specifically on the subject of 
Chicano involvement in the Vietnam war and antiwar movement. 
There have been some personal accounts, such as Benavidez’s The 
Three Wars o f Roy Benavidez14. There is also some recent data
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available on Hispanic* veterans, of all war eras. The Chart Book on 
Black and Hispanic Veterans [ 1985), comprised of data from the 1980 
census, provides a general portrait of Hispanic veterans in the US. As 
of March 1980, there were 888,100 Hispanic veterans in the US. Of 
these, five percent were women. Hispanic veterans possessed certain 
group characteristics: they were generally younger than their non- 
Hispanic counterparts (56% were under 45 years of age as compared 
to 39% among non-Hispanics); they had less formal education; there 
was slightly higher representation of Hispanic veterans among the 
unemployed; and, income levels were consistently lower than their 
non-Hispanic peers throughout virtually the entire age spectrum.15
The states in the Southwest and the West had the highest 
percentage of Hispanic veterans. New Mexico had the highest proportion 
of all—one out of every four veterans there is Hispanic. Five other 
states had populations of Hispanic veterans which comprised at least 
5% of the whole; Texas (10.8%), Arizona (9.4%), California (8.8%), 
Colorado (7.7%), and Hawaii (5%). New York, Nevada, and Utah were 
the only other states with concentrations of Hispanic veterans in 
excess of 3.1%, the overall national average.16 More Hispanic veterans 
(38%) served during the Vietnam era than during any other single 
period.17
Becerra and Greenblat (1983) conducted a study of veterans of 
all war eras to find out the utilization rate of Veterans Administration 
(VA) health services and the major factors influencing these utilization 
patterns. They stated that the Hispanic veteran was of particular 
interest to the VA because they were a population heavily represented 
during the Vietnam war, and yet they seemed to use VA medical 
services less often than persons belonging to other minority groups.18
Of the Hispanic veterans they interviewed, the majority were 
Army veterans. However, during the Vietnam war, there was a higher 
percentage of Hispanics who served in the Marine Corp. Several 
factors were though to account for that choice, including a greater 
prominence of the Marine Corp during the Vietnam conflict and the 
desire of young men to belong to a “real man’s” outfit.19 60% of the 
Hispanic veterans interviewed had been promoted to the rank of 
sergeant before being discharged.20
In addition to constructing a profile, Becerra and Greenblat 
provided an excellent analysis of issues affecting Latino veterans, 
such as family background, cultural identification, health care
•Since the Chart Book uses the term Hispanic, the author o f this piece has 
decided to use it also, to preserve consistency. The editorial policy o f Vietmam 
Generation is to use the term Latino.
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satisfaction and attitudes toward discrimination. Regarding the issue 
of discrimination, Becerra and Greenblat found that
Vietnam veterans had a significantly stronger sense o f being 
discriminated against than their older peers.... The Vietnam 
veteran was certainly much more vocal in his indignation 
about discriminatory practices probably because his 
consciousness had been raised as the result o f the Chicano 
Movement o f which he was and is a part. The older veteran 
was more likely to accept discriminatory treatment because 
by doing so he had learned to survive as a minority person in 
a majority culture. He was more likely to say things were fine 
at the VA because the organization treated him similarly to 
how he had been treated by other institutions in the past.
The Vietnam veteran tended to feel that he deserved better.21
Becerra and Greenblat noted that regardless of the type of adaptation 
to their environment which veterans chose, “ethnic and economic 
discrimination was a fact of life, whether they lived inside or outside 
of the barrio.”22 The veterans they interviewed had joined the military 
expecting to be treated with respect as soldiers but they had experienced 
difficulties. They found that “ethnic tensions and racist feelings were 
as evident in the military as in the civilian world.”23 One of the veterans 
that Becerra and Greenblat interviewed expressed this sentiment: 
“We were proud Mexicans. We fought in the war to prove that. But we 
were still Mexicans in the service, looked down upon. They always 
treated you as if you weren’t smart enough.”24
One of the conclusions that Becerra and Greenblat reached is 
that when Hispanic veterans are faced with barriers to care at the VA, 
“they perceive these hindrances as a continuation of discrimination 
that has existed over a life-time of encounters with established 
institutions. Such barriers are understood as yet another example of 
society’s devaluation of Hispanics as human beings.”25 They state that 
Hispanics are insulted because they feel they are not begging for 
charity, but have earned the right to free medical treatment because 
of their service to this country.26
M E T h od o loqy
The information presented in this paper is based on a continuing 
study of Chicano Vietnam veterans. To date, twenty-five veterans from 
California, Colorado, Texas, and Arizona have been interviewed. 
Before the project is completed, veterans from several other states will 
be included. The interview instrument consists of sixty questions and 
the average length of the interview is three and one-half hours. The
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research questions encompass a variety of areas including family 
background, cultural identity, political socialization and various other 
social and psychological issues. Some veterans have been hesitant to 
delve into subjects which are still emotionally charged. However, the 
great majority have been very cooperative, honest, and forthright. The 
unanimous comment by the veterans interviewed is that they are glad 
someone finally cares enough to ask Chicanos their opinions and 
feelings about Vietnam.
The average veteran interviewed was nineteen when he went to 
Vietnam, although three were as young as seventeen. The majority 
(77%) had enlisted and 23% were drafted. Less than 25% of those 
interviewed attended college before they entered the military. Veterans 
were divided equally between those who had served in the Army and 
those who had served in the Marine Corps. Of those that had been in 
the Army, the maj ority were infantry (“grunts”); one was a paratrooper, 
one a medical corpsman, and one a microwave radio equipment 
operator. Of those that had been in the Marine Corps, the majority 
were helicopter gunners or crewman. About 66% of the veterans were 
promoted to the rank of sergeant, and one was a first lieutenant.
Their service dates in Vietnam ranged from January 1965 to 
July 1971. This range of service provides an overview of the Vietnam 
War during its various stages, and broadens our perspective on the 
war. Hopefully, this study will begin to fill a gap in the general 
literature on Vietnam. The participation, contributions, and sacrifices 
of Chicanos and other Latinos have too often been ignored.
FiNdiNQs
Few of the Chicano veterans interviewed had been aware of the 
history or politics of the Vietnam war when they entered the military. 
The maj ority considered themselves apolitical; only four of the veterans 
stated that they were very aware of the causes and progress of the 
Vietnam conflict, and believed they were also well-informed about 
other social and political issues. Three of these veterans had participated 
in antiwar demonstrations before they were drafted. The other 
veterans stated that they had been recent high school graduates, or 
workers in blue-collar jobs, with little knowledge of issues which lay 
outside the scope of their daily activities.
The majority of the veterans were conscious that race was an 
issue during the time they were stationed in Vietnam; both in terms 
of the camaraderie they felt with each other as Chicanos, and in terms 
of the relationships they developed with both Anglo and black soldiers. 
It was natural, they said, that Mexicanos would be drawn to each other 
by their cultural ties. Some especially looked to other Chicanos
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because they had come from segregated schools and neighborhoods. 
These cultural alliances started even before they were shipped to 
Vietnam. As one veteran stated:
Chicanos, during training, in the war and when I came back 
and I was at Fort Bragg, that was my life line. It was a strange 
world out there and I was a parochial kid and it felt good to 
be around the guys. We used to listen to rolas Mexicanas 
when we would get together. That wasn't music that any of 
us grew up listening to. I mean, we heard our mothers 
playing it on Sunday when they were cleaning house, but it 
wasn't music that was at our dances, the Midnighters and 
that kind o f rock-n-roll stuff. The guys from California, too, 
but I think it was the guys from Texas, by and large, that had 
that sense o f traditional culture. I remember in North 
Carolina, one o f the guys from Brownsville was married. He 
hadn't been to Vietnam yet and we used to go and have bar- 
b-que’s because his wife could make tortillas. I mean it's a 
sexist, chauvinistic thing, but all o f a sudden, forme at least, 
it symbolized home and the music symbolized home even 
though, like 1 said, it wasn't something that I would go out 
and buy. But this cultural awareness, I think, was because 
we were so far from the culture. In North Carolina they used 
to call us long-haired niggers. That’s the first time I ever 
heard anything like that and so racism made me take refuge 
in something that was familiar. I mean I understood racism.
I had experienced it here at some institutional level.... But 
there it was just blatant, I mean, it would be on big billboards,
Ku Klux Klan country and stuff like that.27
Cultural alliances and ethnic awareness continued as soldiers went 
from the US to Vietnam. Many veterans reported socializing with 
Chicanos in their camps and throwing parties for the ones who were 
going home. One veteran said:
There were Mexicanos from all over the place. Being from 
Tejas [Texas] originally, you would always figure out who was 
from where just by the way they talked. You started talking 
about “huercos", hey, this guy’s got to be from Tejas, right, 
and we had a way o f finding each other. Like in my case, there 
were very few Mexicans in aviation, from what I could see. So, 
there were a few and we hung around together. I remember 
being in our base camp, Marble Mountain, and when we got 
there, there wasn't a whole hell of a lot out there, but we got 
some electricity and we all chipped in and got a little black 
and white TV. There wasn’t hardly ever anything on TV, but 
I remember one time we were sitting in our hut and some
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Mexican program came on that had Mexican music, I think 
it was Little Joe or something, and it was real exciting.28
Another veteran explained his cultural awareness and pride 
this way:
We talked to each other in our own language. There was even 
a time in our squad that we wanted to set up the radio men 
to all be Mexicanos because the NVA were monitoring our 
calls so they knew what we were going to do before we did it, 
so we figured okay they know English pretty good, right, so 
we'U fix them, we’ll throw a snake in here so we put Mexicanos 
on the radios, so the Mexicanos would be talking back and 
forth. We had guys from Texas and we had guys from all over 
the United States naturally, but the Tejano and the guy from 
California talked a little bit different.... We used different 
slangs that we picked up to identify particular missions....
The other soldiers liked it because they knew were weren’t 
going to get monitored. They were sort o f proud that we knew 
how to speak Spanish.29
Some soldiers found that being in Vietnam strengthened their 
ties to their own cultural identity but, paradoxically, also provided 
them with their first opportunity to relate to other cultural groups. For 
many Chicanos, it was the first time they had ever experienced close 
friendships with Anglos, blacks, or other ethnic groups. Veterans 
speaking on this subject commonly made remarks such as: “One of 
my best friends wasn’t really Mexicano, he was a Puerto Rican from 
New York and he and I were real close;”30 and, “My best friend in 
Vietnam was a black and he and I were in Nam when Martin Luther 
King was assassinated."31
The importance of these new-found friendships was described 
by one veteran:
I think the most important thing that it did for me was my 
whole attitude about respecting others and also I guess my 
new attitude about the Anglo. Prior to that I didn't trust 
them, any of them, I didn’t care. I mean, they were my enemy 
back home. Everybody who was white was my enemy and 
with my experience in Vietnam and meeting and knowing 
and getting very close to a lot of Anglos, close enough to say 
that I trust them with my life, I learned a lot more than I would 
have if I never got out o f my neighborhood.32
Despite the fact that there were often friendships across ethnic 
and cultural lines, racial conflicts were common among servicemen
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stationed in Vietnam. While several of the veterans stated that in their 
own unit there was little or no racial disharmony, the great majority 
testified that they witnessed many difficulties. When soldiers were out 
in the field, they stated there was no room for prejudice because 
everyone depended on each other, but racism often surfaced when the 
men were back in base camp:
Where you’re under fire and all. everybody was equal and 
there was no room for prejudice and racial attitudes. But in 
base camp or wherever people are socializing and really 
relaxing it was obvious, blacks went to blacks, Hispanics 
went to Hispanics and even some of the Hispanics were kind 
o f unsure where to go because there were some Puerto Ricans 
that were black and they wanted to be with us and they 
wanted to be with the blacks. There were very strong racial 
lines drawn. There was racism and prejudice, yes, very much 
so.... Somebody would say something and then there would 
be blows and a couple of times it came to pointing guns at 
each other. The conflicts were generally between blacks and 
whites and usually the blacks and Chicanos were kind of 
together because we’re usually outnumbered, but then 
sometimes blacks and Chicanos would fight together, but 
most o f the time that there was conflict it was induced by 
alcohol.33
Veterans repeatedly made the point that the majority of the 
conflicts were between Anglos and blacks, and that very few of the 
incidents involved Chicanos:
There was a lot o f racism in Vietnam between the whites and 
blacks. There were a lot of fights. At the mess hall that we 
had, I personally witnessed locking and loading. Locking and 
loading means you’ve got the rifle, and it's ready, and if you 
just open up. ya comenso. 1 saw the confrontation as me and 
my buddy were having dinner. Eight or ten on each side and 
they just started locking and loading. These were all grunts 
that got together at our mess hall, blacks and whites. The 
Mexicanos were all on one table. So, I casually nudged my 
buddy and I said, you know what, I think I'm going to get the 
hell out o f here and he said, me too, let's get out real slow 
because they were screaming at each other and just pointing.
You know what defused the whole situation? Un Mexicano.
Honest to God. Un Mexicano came out of the woodwork. I 
don't know where the hell he came from y comenzo, “What the 
hell's going on here? Que chingados, what's going on? What 
the hell's wrong with you? Can't you see we’re in Vietnam you 
assholes?" And I mean this guy was yelling “what the hell’s 
wrong with you?" and all o f a sudden it defused the whole
Chicano Veterans 79
situation. Que digo yo. Goddamn. Because when you see 
death in a man's eyes, he’s going to kill you. There’s no ands, 
ifs or buts and that’s how bad it was with the gringos and the 
blacks.... In '68, when 1 was there, the Mexicanos were not 
a threat to the Anglos, the blacks were. That was when the 
Civil Rights Movement was going on, Martin Luther King and 
all that. But when you're in a war and you got a rifle in your 
hand, hyola, don’t call me a nigger, don’t call me a wetback 
because I'll kill you. But not with the Mexicanos. The 
Mexicanos were accepted in everybody’s status because we 
were Just there. In a group, the Mexicanos were always 
neutral, that I saw. That's the way it was with us. We didn’t 
have a war with the gringos or the Blacks. We had a war with 
the Vietnamese.3”
It was clear that in the great majority of the cases, Chicanos did 
see themselves as a neutral group, “sort of in the middle":
We had our share o f incidences, fights between Blacks and 
whites. I never really saw any between blacks and Chicanos.
I didn't see any between gavachos and Chicanos, other than 
a couple o f arguments here and there but between blacks and 
whites there were a number o f incidents there because of 
discrimination. I think we even had a couple o f knifings.
There was just racial bigotry.... Chicanos just kicked back 
and watched it. It ain't my fight. Que se den en la madre los 
dos. We ain't going to get involved. That's their pleito [fight].
The military tried to deal with it when it happened but I don’t 
think they really tried to solve the problem.... It was just like 
well, let it go and it will stop.35
Several veterans stated that race relations worsened after the 
1968 Tet Offensive. A  veteran who was a sergeant and a squad leader 
commented:
When you first got there, for the first three or four months, 
there was a relatively high degree of people trying to live the 
ideal, like that we were one family, one unit, one Army and 
we’re fighting the Viet Cong. I can remember that we actually 
were living it for four or five months. But after about the fifth 
or sixth month, and survival became the only thing, it 
became very individual. You always had to fight the 
individualism o f your squad members because they wanted 
to do as little as possible. I just want to get the hell out ofhere 
attitude. It was about one-third Latino, one-third black and 
about one-third white. The whites, in general, half o f them 
were Okies from the south and the other half were ethnics, 
like Italians, from the East Coast cities. After about the
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seventh or eighth month that I was there, one of the biggest 
Jobs that I had as the Sergeant was trying to ameliorate the 
racial things. Especially the white Southerners and the 
blacks, it's like constantly having them go at it, everybody 
claiming that they’re doing more than the other, and I’m 
constantly separating them. What I'm saying is when you 
first got there, there was this really conscious attitude to 
create a oneness, a family, a real single unit, but it broke 
down under the reality of the war.36
Another issue of race that was discussed in the interviews was 
whether Chicanos identified with the Vietnamese people on any level. 
The majority of Chicano veterans interviewed did not relate to the 
Vietnamese as being people of color like themselves. The Vietnamese 
were considered the enemy. Only three of the veterans stated this was 
an issue that bothered them, and they questioned their role as 
Chicanos in a war with other minorities. One veteran stated:
There are several other things that really come to mind and 
that really made me start thinking about the whole Vietnam 
experience. 1 remember that I had a white girlfriend in high 
school and she had given me her picture before I left and I 
remember I showed it to one o f the Vietnamese kids and he 
pointed at it and said she's Number Ten, and then he pointed 
to his face and then my face and said, we're brown. Same, 
same. So he was telling me like why are you fighting us, you 
and I look the same, and he called her Number Ten, which is 
the worst you can be. She’s Number Ten, he said, because 
she was white and I remember that struck me real deeply. It 
really impacted me that he was right. Where I’d come from, 
Chicanos and whites were segregated and antagonistic. I 
really started thinking about that. In fact, I remember writing 
to my parents about it. To me that's one of the few intimate 
moments I ever allowed myself with the Vietnamese. Since 
after that, for example, I never availed myself of any of the 
prostitutes, and I just detached myself from everything 
because 1 couldn't do both, fighting and be friendly with 
them. I just kind of left it alone.37
One of the veterans Interviewed, who now works at counseling other 
Vietnam veterans, provided an overall view of the issue: I
I think that any Chicano or any black that grows up in this 
country, has an implicit understanding of the dynamic of 
racism as an oppressive instrument. Like when we used to 
refer to the Vietnamese, a lot o f the guys called them gooks 
and zipperheads and like that, but I think a lot o f us just
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called them chinos because in every barrio there's a chino that 
owns the market. And I think a lot o f the guys, and I try to 
think of it retrospectively, I think because we experience 
racism ourselves and even though we’re saying those goddamn 
dinks, those slopes, it’s making something inside here, 
there's this kind o f understanding that we're taco benders, 
greasers and wetbacks.... Last year I went to a conference in 
San Juan and I remember talking to some of the vets that 
were from the barrios o f San Juan and they were telling me 
that when they came home, when they looked at their 
population, the racism that they practiced in Vietnam by 
calling those names came to them when they came home....
I think in Vietnam, however, because of the things 1 said 
about having to make war against these people, I think 
dehumanizing them was almost a psychological must, and 
the more you could dehumanize them the bigger the edge you 
had because you wouldn't fail one split second to do what you 
had to do. I think that seems to be the trick. I know we dealt 
with racism and ethnicity in one of the groups in East LA [Los 
Angeles], and 1 noticed that terminology, like gook and 
zipperhead gets used less in ethnic communities than it does 
in dominant culture communities.38
The veterans were asked whether their recognition of racial 
discrimination, or any other factor, made them question their role in 
Vietnam or the value of their presence there. Several of the Chicano 
veterans interviewed felt, from the beginning, that US involvement in 
Vietnam was wrong, and had been involved in protests against the war 
before they were drafted. The majority of the veterans, however, 
questioned the value of American presence in Vietnam only sifter they 
had been in-country for a while, or, alter they had returned to the US.
Only two of the veterans interviewed maintained that they have 
never questioned their involvement in Vietnam, and that they still feel 
it was a correct and necessary intervention on the part of the United 
States. These two veterans stated that they went to Vietnam to fight 
communism and that it was “better to fight it over there than in our 
own backyard.”39 Another veteran, who initially had the same idea, 
echoed an observation of Dr. Guzman’s, asserting that he felt pressured 
to prove his loyalty: “I enlisted for two years and I figured that, after 
two years I’m through and it was my obligation. I’ve done my duty for 
the government. I’ve earned my citizenship.... that’s what I 
accomplished by going over there.”40
The veterans all agreed that there were some soldiers “who 
were conservative when they left and conservative when they came 
back and they supported the President all the way."41 But they felt that 
almost every vet they knew, sooner or later, ended up being opposed
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to the war. One of these veterans, for example, stated he didn’t start 
questioning the value of US troops in Vietnam until he was almost at 
the end of his tour:
Towards the end of my tour in Vietnam, which was I think 
June of '68, by then the military discipline was starting to 
move into our base camp. I remember when we got there, we 
used to run around with our shirt sleeves cut off, we didn’t 
shave for two or three days, and nobody really gave a damn.
I remember when it got to the point in our base camp where 
we could no longer cut off our sleeves, and if we did we had 
to make sure they had a neat stitch on the sleeves. We had 
to shave every day, me entiendes, if we were in base camp. I 
remember coming backone day from a run and I think we had 
left at five in the morning, and we must have got back, God, 
at six in the evening. We’d been out twelve, thirteen hours.
We were all dirty and grimy and greasy and stinky and 
everything else. I remember we were walking back from our 
chopper and we were carrying our guns because we still had 
to clean them, and we got written up for being out of uniform 
because we were dirty. And, that’s when you start saying, 
what the hell are we doing here? Man, what is going on? I 
mean here we are in a war zone, how can you go out and do 
this stuff and then come back and get your butt written up 
for being out of uniform. How can you stay clean? I was in 
a chopper outfit and we had 24 helicopters in our outfit. Hey!
Pa que tengas 23 choppers out o f 24 down and none o f them 
flying, there’s a lot of dissatisfied people over there. I mean 
we actually went through a period where we had no choppers 
to fly.... There was something wrong with all of them. It got 
to the point where nobody wanted to go anymore. Toward the 
end of the tour, it was hey, right on. I didn’t want to go out 
anyway. I mean what am I going out for? Am I going to go out 
and take a chance of getting killed? And for what? I mean 
the big guys don't give a shit. Why should I?.... We weren’t 
as gung ho towards the end as when we got there.42
Soldiers who began to question the efficacy or legitimacy of 
American presence in Vietnam in the early years of US involvement did 
so frequently because of their own experiences with the manner in 
which Americans conducted the war. Many soldiers were gradually 
disillusioned by the apparently purposeless orders which they were 
given, and resented risking their own lives, and the lives of friends, for 
no apparent gain. In the later years of the war, many of the newer 
soldiers brought with them a different attitude about Vietnam, the 
result of a changing political ideology. These new men were arriving 
with a stronger sense of ethnic and racial identity, and a new political
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awareness:
The new wave, the second and third waves really were 
bringing the Chicano Movement. Black Power was very 
evident and the Puerto Ricans were also very nationalistic. 
So, the Chicanos kind of had our own tents and the blacks 
would have their tents and the whites. The whites were 
divided between the Southerners and the others. So, they 
even had their own splits. We came from segregated 
communities. In the late 60s, Texas still was segregated, not 
by law but in practice, so we knew, that we were different than 
everybody else, we didn't belong.'*3
Another veteran said:
Towards the end of my tour there. I started getting mail from 
my friends about the antiwar movement and Chicano 
movement and all that. I started thinking about it, but 
because 1 was really ignorant politically. I didn't have anyway 
to verbalize it. I Just kept reading about it. The music was 
starting to get to us because the new Marines that were 
coming in every day were bringing in the music with them and 
so we used to listen to it and we’d be hearing the antiwar 
slogans and we'd hear about the demonstrations at home 
and by late '66, the soldiers were wearing peace buttons and 
beads. They were bringing in the antiwar language and the 
sentiment of what was going on and really, in a sense, they 
were bringing a very different attitude than we had and I 
didn't really understand. It was making me mad that they 
were coming in sort o f really questioning the whole process 
and to me, because I was so rigid and so disciplined, I was 
thinking this won’t do because you won't be able to control 
these kids. So, it was that structure in me that was rejecting 
them. You know, it's funny because in a lot o f ways we 
understood what they were telling us because we saw the 
changing policies. We were always having to change to the 
needs of a general or somebody, so we kind of knew that there 
was chaos and there were problems. After a year, we knew 
that we didn't really know what our mission was. I remember 
a lot o f us talking about. Why are we here? Why are we doing 
this? We fight for a village for three days and then when we 
get there we give the sucker up or we take this mountain and 
we lose all these men and then after a day or two of staying 
on the mountain we leave. So, we had those questions and 
when we talked to the younger soldiers, coming in, not 
younger in age but younger in time of in-country, we’d argue 
with them. Our arguments were more at a personal level, 
that we disagreed with their attitude or we, meaning the first
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young guys there, we really didn’t understand all o f the 
change that was happening.4,1
There were Chicanos, however, who not only understood the reason 
that the attitudes of soldiers were changing, but also took part in 
initiating the shift. One individual, for example, had long felt US 
involvement in Vietnam was morally wrong, and he was granted 
conscientious objector status, serving as a medical corpsman. He 
expressed the following sentiment:
I didn’t want to be drafted. I’m a conscientious objector and 
I'm opposed to carrying a weapon, but once drafted I felt it 
was an opportunity for me to serve my country.... But I was 
pretty angry when I returned. I felt like being politically aware 
before I went and having a lot o f things confirmed for me, 
recognizing that people were telling me, go home GI we don’t 
want you here, that resulted in a lot o f resentment. I couldn’t 
get out o f my uniform fast enough when I got home and I went 
back to school immediately and I hid in school. I recognized 
that we didn’t belong there. That we had no reason to be there 
and now I really appreciate the fact that I was a conscientious 
objector because I don't think I carry one-fourth the baggage 
that a lot o f guys carry.45
The veterans who seemed to have had the most difficult time reconciling 
their current beliefs about the war with their past action were those 
who did not question their roles in Vietnam until after they returned 
to the US:
While I was in basic training and when I went to Vietnam, and 
all the time 1 was there, I really thought we were doing 
something for our country. I really believed we were stopping 
communism, preventing the spread of communism to different 
parts o f the world.... I wasn't aware until after I got out how 
1 was used and how we all were used and what a lost cause 
it was.... It was really devastating to come back and find out 
the truth about Vietnam. My first term paper in college, when 
I came back, was titled “Manipulation". I don’t know why I 
chose the term but it was how I was manipulated by the US 
government to thinking what I was doing in Vietnam was 
right. It took, I would say. four months after I was out to really 
understand what was happening. It was in that period o f 
time I joined the Vietnam Veterans Against the War and I was 
in every protest that was ever had on Vietnam while I was in 
college. Knowing now what I know about Vietnam, I think I'd 
go to jail if that’s what they decided for me. I wouldn’t serve, 
because it was unjust. It was wrong. It was a civil war and
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we had no business there. The more 1 looked Into it. the more 
I saw how we're Imperialist and that’s the side o f our countiy 
and our government that I'm really ashamed of and if there's 
anything I can do to change that. I'm going to do it. There’s 
not a whole lot that you cam do directly, but you’re voting and 
participating against whatever is happening in Central 
America and South Africa, all these things that we’re, if not 
directly, indirectly involved in where we're disrupting the 
government and the people o f the country I'm totally against.
I think if  I had it to do over again, I'd go to jail and my brothers 
would go to jail. We wouldn’t do it, no way.46
Despite the fact that they questioned their role in Vietnam, and 
that they often received poor treatment from both the government and 
members of the public when they returned home, Chicano veterans 
frequently emphasize the point that they had been good soldiers. 
Many still feel pride that they and other Mexicanos acted bravely in 
Vietnam. They say that some soldiers would do the minimum to get 
by; even refusing to go on patrol, but they and the other Chicanos they 
knew in Vietnam could always be depended on to do their job. Many 
of the Chicano veterans interviewed proudly reported that they 
volunteered for dangerous assignments. These men also frequently 
mentioned that they never saw a Chicano fail to carry out his duties 
or “run scared”. Many stated that, “If you were going to get hit, you 
knew that the Mexicano was going to be there, even if it meant his life. 
He wouldn’t run."47 They felt Chicanos had a strong sense of loyalty 
to their comrades and were very patriotic. This patriotism was 
steadfast, even though they were aware that discrimination based on 
race and socio-economic class was prevalent in the US. Their 
patriotism was based not only on national loyalty, but was linked to 
a cultural mandate that if they were going to j oin in a fight, they should 
fight well and with honor. One of the individuals interviewed—a 
veterans’ counselor—explained:
When I was a little kid, I remember guys were getting out of 
the army from Korea. Icanrememberthisoneguy.... He had 
his duffle bag over his back and he walked right down the 
middle o f the barrio just as proud as he could be, just covered 
with medals. I must have been around seven years old, and 
that was where I got my first message, this is what men do.
And then by the time Vietnam came, we were knocking down 
the induction center doors. All I wanted to be was a goddamn 
paratrooper.... This made me some man, you know, and 
there was no restriction from it. It's “Could I run five miles 
in the morning?" and “Could I jump out of a goddamn 
airplane?" and it was the first time that there was equal
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opportunity Jo compete and for once in my life I felt like I was 
a man. It didn’t matter what color I was. There is an implicit 
recognition on our part that this is as high as we can go in 
society. The message is from the dominant community about 
what our worth is and when we get a chance to compete to 
prove who we were, not just to society, war is a kind o f way 
for us to measure our own worth. But ifyou lookat the futility 
o f that because you don't come back a hero, you don't come 
back anything. When you come back, you come back 
somebody who is broken o f spirit, who is robbed o f humanity, 
and it's a cruel hoax about the way Vietnam veterans got 
treated. I think there are studies that would suggest that 
veterans' status, especially for men o f color, doesn’t increase 
one's ability to earn in the workplace. 1 think it’s a popular 
myth that says if you go into the military, you'll learn a skill 
and you'll come out and you'll be more marketable....
I think that in the Chicano community there is a positive 
value placed on being a warrior. The substantive message to 
us, before we went to Vietnam, is this is how men behave and 
we got that growing up. That is what America is about, at 
least from our oppressed perspective, because it was an 
oppressed existence and it continues to be and to say 
anything less than that is to lie. We were aware o f the racism, 
we were farmworkers, we were campestnos, we followed the 
crops. You go to any small town where they’re picking grapes 
during the harvest and you're aware of it. But we were told 
this is the country that we are part of, and to a great extent 
I think the implicit message is to prove that you are worthy 
to be a citizen. I've always, in my own heart, been proud of 
the warrior aspect o f myself, maybe not so proud of Vietnam, 
but that's one of the contradictions between who I am and 
what the war was, something that I deal with on a personal 
level.48
Another veteran who exemplified the views many of the Chicanos held
about their performance in Vietnam stated:
Maybe, it's my own chauvinism, I see things through my own 
perspective, but I feel really good about us in that situation.
I don’t feel bad about our performance in Vietnam, as a group 
or individually. I thought we did veiy well. We were very good 
soldiers. I could always count on the Chicano. They might 
complain to me but I always knew that I could trust them....
All the Chicanos that I had come through seemed to me to be 
different forms of myself. When I went there I was a very good 
soldier, they could count on me. There was work that every 
squad had to do and there was lots of drudgery, and I would
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always be willing to do my share and more. I made an extra 
effort and it seemed to me all the Chicanos who came had this 
general tendency. They came from different places, but they 
were different forms o f the same thing. There was something 
that was driving us. We wanted it to be a good thing and we 
wanted to be part of a good thing and even if it wasn’t, we were 
going to try to make it be if we could. And I think we probably 
tried too hard and too long. 1 mean, there’s reasons why more 
o f us got killed proportionally than others, and it wasn't 
because we were stupid or bad soldiers or dumb or even like 
John Wayne types or things like that. I think we were trying 
harder than the whites and the blacks to try to actually be 
something like we were supposed to be there, even if it wasn’t 
turning out to be that way.49
The strong feeling that they had performed well in Vietnam 
became the root of their anger about the discrimination that some of 
the veterans faced when they returned to the US. One veteran stated 
that he was treated like a “welfare recipient” when he started collecting 
unemployment insurance because he could not find a job. He felt 
veterans were considered “basically an embarrassment to the 
government.”50 Another veteran said:
No way, there was no equality. When I came back I couldn’t 
get a job. They asked do you have a high school diploma? No.
What do you want to do? Hey, I know how to set ambushes,
I know how to kill people. Well, there’s no job like this. I'm 
sorry. Get yourself in school. IfaM exicanowastosaylwant 
to join the service and I want to do this and do that for my 
country, or if he goes to prove that he belongs, those are all 
the wrong reasons to join. I think if he’s going to join, he really 
should look and try to get himself educated before he goes in.
...I never saw one college [educated soldier] in the bush...so, 
if that’s any indication to somebody that’s going to Join the 
military, he better get some kind of education before he goes 
in.51
A  veteran whose job was processing the discharge papers for 
Marines explained that the reaction of those getting out of the service 
after Vietnam was mixed. However, many of them were disillusioned 
with their experience in Vietnam, and disappointed at what faced 
them when they returned to the States:
Some of them were very politicized. Especially the blacks and 
the Chicanos were very politicized and they were very angry.
In fact, when I was in Camp Pendleton, 19 Marines were 
dishonorably discharged because they had signed a petition 
condemning the US war in Vietnam and these were mostly
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blacks and Chicanos. I remember them asking me to sign it 
and I was going, God, 1 can’t sign that. I was too freaked out 
and they were way ahead o f me in thinking and in their 
commitment and politics and they all got caught and 
discharged. They were Vietnam vets and they were getting 
ready to get out but they got Dishonorable Discharges and 
they lost their pay, their benefits, everything. They were just 
very angry because of what had happened to them as 
individuals and then because they knew, now that they were 
home, nothing had changed, the poverty and the 
discrimination. So, they were angiy that they had been used 
and by the time they were home, they had a total disdain for 
authority. I mean, they didn't salute anymore, they didn’t get 
up in the morning if they didn't want to and they cussed at 
their officers. This is '67, '68 by then and it was a total 
breakdown, so that the Vietnam vets that were coming back 
were kept on a totally opposite part o f the base from the new 
recruits. They didn't even let them anywhere close to them.
In fact, all the trainers o f the new recruits were lifers, guys 
that were non-Vietnam career officers. They didn’t want 
Vietnam vets training the new recruits because they knew 
they had a bad attitude.52
Feelings of disillusionment and anger were not the sole property 
of Chicano veterans. Like most veterans, those interviewed felt they 
had faced some difficult physical and psychological problems. Some 
felt they had lost their humanity in Vietnam. One of the veterans 
expressed this feeling in the following way: 1
1 remember the first time we went to pick up American 
casualties, being very careful about how we picked them up 
and how we put them in the helicopter. After awhile, you go 
pick them up and it’s like loading up sacks of potatoes. You 
just take them and throw them up in the back o f a helicopter 
to get them out o f there.53
Another veteran stated:
I think one o f the things that really sticks out in my mind is 
riding through the small towns and the Vietnamese people 
were very poor. I remember riding through at one time and 
at the end o f one of these little towns, there was a dead VC 
right in the middle o f the road and all o f the vehicles would 
have to go around it. I remember seeing the body was already 
getting all swollen. It was like black and blue. I almost got 
sick and it scared me because I thought that could be me, 
that could be anybody. By the time I left Vietnam, a dead
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body didn’t bother me at all. It was no big deal, it was just 
another one. It didn’t have the same effect. I came home 
thinking that life meant absolutely nothing, that it wasn’t 
worth anything. It was so easy to see somebody dead.54
The psychic numbing described by this veteran is a common effect of 
exposure to war, or other trauma. The veteran must deal with this 
problem, and overcome it, before he can enjoy a normal social pattern 
of love and friendship relationships. A  veteran and counselor explains:
One o f the big problems was learning how to feel again 
because you bottle up that emotion and you get the feeling, 
like if you ever start crying, you don’t know if  you’ll ever be 
able to stop. So as a Vietnam veteran, I recognize that that’s 
one oftheirproblems. I really focus in on that because they’re 
bound and determined to repress that. They’re really afraid 
that if they let go they won't be able to regain control again 
and that’s not true. We have a lot o f strength. We’ve been able 
to control it for ten, fifteen, twenty years, so there’s a way to 
relearn how to feel again and when we do that, then life 
changes, it becomes enjoyable again.55
Th is counselor believed that most Vietnam veterans did manage 
to cope with their troubles, and that many of them were doing very 
well. He also felt, however, that Chicano veterans face specific 
problems which are often overlooked or misunderstood, and therefore, 
they are not provided with adequate services or outreach efforts. As 
another veteran explains, expectations about Chicano veterans are 
still rooted in majority perceptions of race and class:
1 think the reason you see the differential in the assessment 
o f Post Traumatic Stress Disorder is because, not only do 
Anglos have higher expectations of life because, after all, this 
is their society, but I think the people who assess them also 
have greater expectations o f those veterans and when they 
don’t meet them it must be PTSD. But if the Chicanos didn’t 
meet them, well, they weren’t going to meet them anyway, que 
nd? They don’t question it. So that when the Chicanos fail 
to make it, so to speak, after Vietnam, there are plenty o f real 
normative explanations for why they don't make it. They're 
lazy, etc.56
The expectation that Chicano veterans are naturally going to maintain 
a lower socio-economic class status than white veterans impacts on 
the treatment Chicano veterans receive. As evidenced by the interviews, 
most of these veterans have never received any type of formal
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counseling or other support. Many feel that they would have benefited 
from some help in dealing with the emotions which they have kept 
bottled up for so many years. Instead, unable to forget, they must deal 
with intrusive memories on their own:
There’s no choice for me about whether I'd rather remember 
or forget Vietnam. I’ll never forget....You can’t look at your 
future without learning from your past and I wouldn't want 
to forget. I’d like to forget some o f the specific incidents but 
those are probably the ones I’ll never forget. They’ll always 
haunt me. Every now and then, when I see my kinds. I can 
see dead kids. I see my kid laying down, I close my eyes and 
I can see somebody’s head almost blowing out. and it hurts.
But that's part o f the price o f being involved. I don’t think 
anyone can wipe it from their minds, there’s no forgetting. It’s 
accepting it happened and forgiving yourself. Every individual 
has to have a different way of dealing with the memory of 
Vietnam.
I'm still struggling with it. I wake up at night thinking about 
it. When I first came, I felt somewhat guilty that I was able 
to come back. When I was on the plane, there were people 
without arms and legs and I had all mine. I felt a little guilty 
that I wasn't wounded or incapacitated in some kind o f way.
Then I got into my new life and started going to school and 
when I was really down, when I was not doing well in school 
or when I was having trouble with my relationships, I felt 
really guilty. I said what am I doing here? Why didn't I die 
in Vietnam? It was kind o f a suicidal thought, that I didn’t 
need to come back to all this. So it doesn't necessarily have 
to be a guilt about killing someone but a guilt, like I’m 
expressing right now, a guilt about me surviving and the next 
guy not, or me coming back with all my limbs and the next 
guy not. I feel really lucky when I stand next to a vet who's 
in a wheelchair or one that can’t see anymore or one that 
doesn’t have any arms. I feel fortunate, but yet under all that 
fortunate feeling, I feel guilty that it was him and not me. It’s 
a dichotomy, fortunate and glad but guilty and sad. I’ll 
always have that feeling when I see disabled vets or when I 
was at the “Moving Wall” [a travelling exhibit depicting the 
Washington, DC Vietnam Veterans Memorial]. I saw the 
mothers crying in front o f the names o f their sons. My mother 
doesn’t have to cry in front o f my name, you know, and I feel 
guilty for her, but happy. It's really a confused emotion that 
I’ve never been able to deal with. I just accept it as a confused 
emotion.57
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Another veteran expressed his feeling of guilt in this way:
My guilt was part o f my joining the Civil Rights Movement and 
Chicano Movement and being really involved in a lot o f issues 
and trying to do good. I worked for the Farmworkers for a long 
time and was always doing something for somebody else.
Part o f that was tiying to feel you were compensating for what 
you had done.... That was part o f not only the fear o f coming 
back, and feeling bad for what you went through and did, but 
also that feeling o f guilt that you had really done something 
horrible and you needed to pay something back.58
Many veterans didn’t want to forget. They felt it was important to 
remember their wartime experience and to remember their fallen 
comrades:
I'd rather remember. You know why? Because there’s a wall 
in Washington, DC that reminds me that I have to remember.
I can never forget. All those guys that I saw in the mortuary 
in Da Nang, all the guys that I saw at the USS Sanctuary, all 
those guys that I saw come in and out o f my life, I owe them 
something and that’s for me to survive as long as I can 
because a lot o f them didn't. I’ve got to go on for them..., I 
owe them.59
CONClusiON
There were a number of reasons why Chicanos served in the 
military during the Vietnam war. As Dr. Guzman pointed out, they 
had little opportunity to take advantage of the college deferments that 
were available to the predominantly white middle and upper classes. 
Few minority youths had the time, money, or resources to make a 
successful attempt at gaining Conscientious Objector status. Many 
Chicanos were drafted, but more enlisted because of their own beliefs 
and community expectations, serving because of their faith in duty 
and patriotism. For the majority, this patriotism remains unshaken, 
even though they are not blind to the problems of race and class in 
American foreign and domestic policy, and even though many of them 
came to disagree with American policy in Vietnam. They were 
disillusioned with the politics and the reality of the war.
This disillusionment at what happened in Vietnam and the 
war's aftermath only served to underscore the sense of tragedy that so 
many conveyed in their stories: comrades were lost, and acts of 
violence committed which can never be undone. It darkens their 
memories of having been good soldiers and brave men. In the end, they
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are left questioning the value of what they did in Vietnam and what it 
all meant:
Did the war accomplish anything? No. It just destroyed a lot 
o f lives. There would probably be a lot o f doctors, a lot o f good 
things that might have been invented, just that might have 
been. Probably ten thousand Chicanos who are dead today 
might be alive, they'd have kids and families and they're not 
here anymore. They’re just not around.60
The veterans who participated in this study shared their views with 
honesty and withcourage. My sincere appreciation to all o f them. Thetrinsights 
will help us to better understand the complexities o f the Vietnam war.
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" O ur M en iN V ietnam ": BlAck M ecJia as a 
S ource of tHe AfRO-AiviERicAN Experience 
iN S outheast A sia
WilliAM K inq
In an appendix titled "The Warrior’s Knowledge: Social 
Stratification and the Book Corpus of Vietnam,” James William 
Gibson, in his book. The Perfect War,' discusses the ways in which the 
combatants’ experiences of the war expressed in their writings and in 
oral histories contradict “the war-managers at virtually eveiy level.” 
Gibson observes that “(r)ace and ethnicity also constitute important 
social divisions in the warrior's knowledge" as this special issue of 
Vietnam Generation is intended to demonstrate. “Blacks, Latinos, 
American Indians, Asian Americans and other minorities are not 
present in the published accounts with anywhere near the frequency 
with which they were present in combat units...."2 One way of 
addressing this shortcoming respecting the black experience in Vietnam 
obtains by consulting articles and letters to the editor appearing in the 
Afro-American periodical literature and in black newspapers such as 
the Chicago Defender, Amsterdam News, Norfolk Journal and Guide, 
Ebony, Baltimore Afro American, and Sepia.3
As a case in point, what I wish to consider here is the monthly 
magazine Sepia which in August. 1966 inaugurated a regular feature 
called “Our Men in Vietnam," and invited black troops to send in 
letters, photographs, and stories detailing their “experiences 
...heartaches [and] joys while fighting communism in Vietnam.” The 
stated purpose of this request was that “Sepia want[ed] to salute our 
fighting men.”
The range of material contained in these submissions varies by 
the branch of service (the army is most heavily represented), duty 
assignment (whether in the rear area or in the “bush”), rank (officer 
opinions differ markedly from those of enlisted men, and those of lifers 
or careerists differ from those of conscripts), length of service in 
country and the period of service ( initial buildup of U.S. Forces, before 
Tet, January. 1968, after Tet, withdrawal of U.S. forces). Wrote one 
correspondent [August, 1968] “...I could tell many things that go on 
over here that you never hear about in the States, but all I can say is,
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eveiyone has his own story about Viet Nam and each one is different.” 
Still, however, there were a number of repetitive themes that 
cropped up in the letters and articles that appeared in Sepia during 
the years that the column ran. Most prominent was racism in the 
military whether it was manifest in assignment policies, promotion 
practices or awards criteria. A  second important theme was the 
contradiction between black men lighting for the freedom of the South 
Vietnamese at the same time that black people did not enjoy many of 
those same freedoms back in the World. Indeed, both these themes 
were often embraced by the larger rubric of Blacks having to fight a 
two-front war: one against the North Vietnamese Army and the 
National Liberation Front, and the other against white racism given 
that “the white man spreads his racist policies wherever he goes” 
[August, 1968],
A  third theme, which appeared with regularity, was concern 
with domestic matters—particularly the treatment of black people, 
and black veterans. Black soldiers expressed unwillingness to be 
remanded to the second-class citizenship accorded to black troops 
returning home from World Wars 1 and 2. A  fourth theme embraced 
both the anti-war protests and the rise of Black Power. Appearing less 
frequently than the four major themes mentioned above, but arriving 
on a regular basis were letters raising questions about war aims (more 
specifically, questions about what we were doing in Viet Nam in the 
first place, what it was we expected to accomplish while there and how 
long we would be there) and strategic policies. Letters also arrived 
which addressed the feelings of some black soldiers that the Vietnamese 
people resented their presence in Vietnam. Other writers described 
matters of personal impact, and complained about the inherent 
pettiness (and potential stupidity) of maintaining certain military 
practices [September, 1966).
What follows below, then, is a sampling of material drawn from 
these letters and expressing a wide variety of concerns. The excerpts 
Eire roughly chronological, and illustrate changes in the thinking of 
some black soldiers as the political environment in which they 
operated changed around them.
In your July issue, I read the story on PFC Milton L. Olive III 
[He had thrown himself on a grenade saving four o f his 
compatriots at the cost of his own life, 22 October 1965. For 
this he was posthumously awarded the Congressional Medal 
of Honor, the first black to receive the award since Korea and 
the first person to receive the decoration in Vietnam.) I 
thought that it was a good story about a fine hero. But as you 
know he was from South Side, Chicago. I would like to ask:
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Do you think that Negro men should look up to this as a good 
thing or should they ask why this young man died? Did he 
die for the freedom of all or did he die for the freedom of the 
white man only? How does the Negro really feel about this? 
[September, 1966].
In January, 1967 a Marine stationed at Camp Pendleton, 
California, complained about having to go back to Vietnam after a six 
month turnaround when there were so many that hadn't been over 
there once. This, he felt, was unfair and so he wrote in to tell people 
what was really going on because there were so many others “who are 
reluctant to speak out for fear of the disciplinary action which would 
be taken against them." There was also a trooper from the 173d 
Airborne Brigade who, in responding to the article “Why Do More 
Negroes Die in Viet Nam?”, said “he [had] experienced resentment from 
the Vietnamese People toward the Negro; and these are the people we 
are fighting for! Also, why must we fight over here only to go home and 
be treated like dogs?”
A  somewhat different point of view is exhibited in this letter: 
“It's time to call all men to fight for their country. It is time to stop the 
cause of aggression before it erupts any further, and it is time to 
distinguish the men from the boys. It is time to cease useless talk, and 
start reality. Its time for all nations of the world to unite and keep 
democracy strong for eternity.” Still, there is the soul brother who 
wrote in June, 1966 that although he was assigned to a non- 
aggressive unit, he and “another Blood (only 2) were among those 
picked when a platoon was picked to go up front." He had been in 
country for six months and in that time of the 25 Blacks in his 
battalion, he had only seen one promoted. In August, 1966, another 
soldier wrote in to confirm this when he observed “how people are 
moved from position to position to avoid promoting them.” However, 
he didn’t “mind fighting to make Vietnam free, because Alabama might 
be next.”
A  September, 1966 letter is interesting because it points out 
some of the contradictions between the first of the six codes of conduct 
issued to members of the U.S. military forces (“I am an American 
fighting man. I serve in the forces which guard my country and our 
way of life. I am prepared to give my life in their defense.”), and the 
American way of life—hell for this soldier because his skin “is black 
and the wounds of racial prejudice are still too fresh and painful for 
us Negroes to erase them from our memories.” This can be contrasted 
with a letter in the same issue which observes that “If the white 
discriminator thinks the War in Vietnam is one of fierce fighting and 
bloodshed, it will seem a game compared to the action resulting from
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an ex-Vietnam troop being segregated from those things he fought to 
save while away inVietnam.” The writer concludes his letter by calling 
for “first-class citizenship for Negroes—Mexicans and Puerto Ricans."
That black troops had their share of problems with the military 
justice system early on is demonstrated in comments about the court- 
martial of a Marine sentenced to life imprisonment for shooting a 
suspected NLF guerrilla: “It seems the war is becoming a very stupid 
and unwarranted thing. We train a man to kill in a country where the 
front-lines are non-existent and rob him of his life because he is 
fulfilling our President’s wish to ‘Bring the coonskin home.'”
In October, 1966, a few short months after Stokely Carmichael 
had called for Black Power from the back of a flatbed truck in 
Greenwood, Mississippi, one PFC wrote in to offer his opinion on Black 
Power and “this Vietnam mess." He observed that he loved Black 
Power with all his heart. And he believed it was “the only way the 
American black man can achieve equality in the home of the red man. 
How else can one deal with the white power structure? The strong 
never has to bend for the weak, but two strongs must and will come 
to a medium—power versus power.” He also chose to take issue with 
the magazine’s earlier editorial contention that Americans were in 
Vietnam to help the Vietnamese people. “Only a fool would think this 
war will stop communism. I am not a communist, but just a man who 
inquires, reads and loves Stokely Carmichael. The people here in 
Vietnam think we are fools. They don’t know why the American G.I. 
is dying over here, so how can you know?...”
In November, 1967, one airman, second-class, penned a 
“Eulogy for America”:
You sit back and slip the man $100 to get your son his 
deferment while you chastise Cassius Clay for his beliefs.
Just what do you believe? Sure, we're all behind the war.
Just as long as our Johnny is scheduled for 11 credits and 
gets his beloved 25. This past week a friend o f mine gave all 
he had for the glorious U.S. ‘A  good American,’ you say?
Hardly. The record will show he was Canadian. He voted for 
Uncle Sam, and he voted for freedom. What the record will 
not show is that he was more ‘American’ than 90% of you 
complacent bastards! But this is not a eulogy for my 
departed friend. It is a eulogy for America—unless you good 
people remember that there was once a Rome. I
I am said to be a fighting man.
Through the muddy fields and swamps 1 plunder. 
After endless days. I can help 
but wonder.
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I could walk Into a restaurant and be totally sincere.
The waiter will say,’I'm sorry, but you can't eat here.'
Now until death will I fight.
But my gain I do not know [December, 1967).
Many of the soldiers writing to Sepia said how grateful they 
were for the magazine because it kept them informed about what was 
going on back in the World. Some also complained that it seemed to 
take longer for information about black America to reach the field than 
it did for many of the white publications that were placed on sale in the 
exchanges and distributed through the military library system. There 
were also a number of requests for mail including the provision of 
addresses so that those who wanted would know where to write. And 
there were criticisms of earlier letter writers in an attempt to get across 
the point that everyone who went to Vietnam had a different story to 
tell:
Regarding a letter in your October, 1967 issue [the earlier 
cited letter about Black Power]. [Name] has every right to 
express his narrowed opinion, however, none o f your readers 
should take his views to be that o f any significant number of 
servicemen here. Frankly, I am as confused as most people 
are concerning the meaning of the phrase, “Black Power." 
Opinions differ as to the meaning of it, however, if it does 
mean social and economic equality it's a fine thing. I think 
many people regard this phrase simply as a war or battle cry 
to be used for the purpose o f spurring on restless and 
dissatisfied people to violence.
[Name] has done himself, his fellow soldier and his 
countrymen a grave injustice in assuming the role o f soldier 
and patriot, when really he shares no responsibility in our 
effort. I feel veiy fortunate that I have never had to serve in 
battle with him. This man certainly possesses no true 
convictions or he would not be serving in a cause under 
protest when he clearly had the option to refuse.
In being here, not only do we aid the Vietnamese 
people, but strategically, we are in defense o f our country and 
those o f other friendly non-communist countries. In addition 
to his weak will [Name] also appears to be a sleepwalker. One 
has only to see the tears o f joy o f an elderly man, the timid 
smile of a child, or the hesitant, but thankful touch o f a 
mother, all members of a village recently liberated from V.C. 
control. These people are grateful and thankful for our 
presence here.
[Name] should have long applied for separation from
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the service. Upon learning o f his intense hatred of his 
country and his undying love for Stokely Carmichael, (an 
avowed enemy o f the state), his application would have 
received great consideration, and probably aided in a discharge 
as an undesirable.
I pray for the sake of his unit members that [Name] 
is engaged in duties other than direct combat. A  man with 
such an attitude threatens the life o f everyone in his 
organization. Few of us here share [Name]’s feelings. On the 
contrary, we see the necessary cause which warrants our 
presence. If we risk our lives, the cause has not been 
unworthy. Finally, I hope that (Name) will soon become Mr.
[Name] in order that he can freely become a disciple o f Stokely 
Carmichael.
God bless [Name], Carmichael and all other such 
people, as I pray that He’ll bless all mentally ill persons in our 
society. [January, 1968]
Despite the assurance of the letter quoted above, many black 
soldiers still questioned what they were fighting for. In what way might 
they benefit from what they had been asked to do? One correspondent 
wrote in June, 1968:
...many times I have felt I was fighting in vain. I ask myself:
What will I come home to? There will be no arms o f love from 
the white man, who has gotten more out o f the war than the 
Negro. With all the riots and hate I can’t help but try to find 
an answerto the problem we face athome.... Let'sfaceit, the 
white man can’t get along without the Negro and the Negro 
can't get along without the white man.... Love is the answer 
to our problem. 1 can say I have no hate for anyone, yet when 
I get home I want what I fought for.
Another wrote one month later: “I th ink this conflict will end very soon, 
but the thing that bothers me most is how will I be treated when I get 
home? Will I still be discriminated against? Will I still be a second- 
class citizen? Will my family be able to ride at the front of the bus? 
These are the things I worry about. ” And from a third who was an army 
medic: “I’m just hoping that after my tour I can just go home to a nice 
quiet life with my family. Really. I wouldn’t know how or what to do 
if I leave here after having been here and safe for so long and then get 
shot at home in a riot. I’m just hoping that we can find peace at home 
instead of looking to the long, hot summer.” Still another wrote:
Often we pay no attention to radio, but this bulletin was the 
news o f the death o f Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.
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It was really a shock, not only to me but to everybody 
who stands for peace. It made us all realize that now Is the 
time to unite for peace. We knew that with the death o f Dr.
King, a great peace symbol had been discarded from life, and 
we knew that without his teaching o f peace the nation was in 
great danger from the violence we knew was to follow from 
hippies and Negroes who just thought it would be fun to 
participate in the burning o f a city.
It made the fighting man stop and ask himself: Am 
I fighting so those at home can keep on rioting and burning?
My answer, at least for one, is a resounding no!
As young Americans, we have proved we will fight 
and die for the land we love. We have served in honor and 
have given our lives for a cause far greater than the senseless 
burning o f cities. Dr. King died preaching nonviolence, and 
these people desecrated his memory.
In the last five years, about 175,000 troops have 
served in Viet Nam and returned home, and I believe the most 
o f them feel the same as I do about the situation, and I hope 
through our educated minds to solve our problems.
At the same time, I feel that if we have to fight against these 
people we will, because it will be in the same cause we're 
fighting and dying for now. [August, 1968]
As the ideological orientation of black people changed 
throughout the 1960s, and as the percentage of volunteers and lifers 
went down and the numbers of conscripts went up. there began to 
appear more and more letters addressed to the subject of Uncle 
Toms—the name given to the more moderate or conservative brothers 
who did not always see eye to eye with the nationalists: I
I know you probably will get many letters calling me an 'Uncle 
Tom,’ but I’m going to speak my piece anyway. I think it is 
no more for the Negro to serve in ‘the Nam' than it is for the 
rest o f the people here, and there are people here from 
throughout the world. Many men who have written to you in 
the past seem to have a complex against their country.
I am a Negro serving here in Viet Nam and I take it 
as an honor. You see, I read most o f the time, and I wonder 
why none o f the Negro entertainers want to come to Viet Nam.
They will take part in all kinds of demonstrations, but they 
don't think of their ‘soul brothers’ over here fighting the war.
My people will raise hell about equal opportunity, 
but they resent serving this country in a worthy cause. Can 
you please tell me why? I have gone through as many mortar 
attacks as any soldier serving here in Viet Nam, so please tell 
them to stop feeling sorry for themselves. I’m not home with
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my wife and family, either.
If they didn’t want to serve here, they should have 
taken the same course Cassius Clay did. I am going to give 
my countiy 2 years, and then I'm going back to live in it. I 
hope you will print this letter because maybe it will help our 
people to get a better outlook on life as an American Negro.
I am up north at a place called Tay Ninh, and it is surrounded 
by Viet Cong, but they haven't gotten me yet. I've still got 
about six months to go. See you soon world. [August, 1968]
And then there was the officer [October, 1968] who enclosed a copy of 
a letter he was going to send to Robert Kennedy. He sent it to Sepia 
because he did not know what to do with it now that Kennedy was 
dead:
Alter considering the contents o f the letter and the caliber of 
men I command, it became evident none of the shortcomings 
mentioned in my letter...exist among the 33 paratroopers in 
my platoon. Instead, they exist among the ranks of those for 
whom so many o f our comrades have made the supreme 
sacrifice. Before coming to Viet Nam I felt quite sure than one 
American life was too high a price to pay for these very 
unstable people. I've since had reason to change my mind.
[The letter to Kennedy follows, in italics.]
For the last two weeks I ’ve been wanting to write you, but have 
always managed to convince myself that due to the upcoming 
elections you probably would never receive the letter anyway. 
It appears you are in the race for the presidency, and to be 
honest I had hoped you would pass it up this time and try later, 
not that I doubt you could handle the job, but there are other 
reasons that seem to bother me.
Your brother. President John Kennedy, took a stand 
for minority groups such as mine, and was one of the few  
leaders brave enough to face the nation and speak out in our 
behalf, which I would say accounts for the majority o f the 
hatred so many Americans developed for him in spite o f his 
overall abilities as a world leader.
As anAmericanNegroIfeel as responsiblefor President 
Kennedy’s death as I did for the death o f Dr. Martin Luther 
King. As bad as I hate to think violently, I would say that our 
people should have gained completefreedom many years ago, 
even if it meant fighting for it.
Mr. Kennedy, I  consider you as being one o f our 
country’s most patriotic leaders, and at present our patriotism 
leaves much to be desired. I see a need for our country's 
leaders to call on aU. our people to try to become better 
Americans.
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Because of the temper of the times it is quite easy for 
anyone to see that unless some changes are made Americans 
are going to destroy America. Too many o f our people are 
protesting every policy set by our leaders, yet if  asked what 
they are in favor o f they couldn't begin to tell you. There are 
many things being done that I don't agree with 100 percent, 
but Ifeel the only decent thing we can do is support those we 
put in office and not allow our country to fall apart because it 
is composed o f Negroes and whites, Democrats and 
Republicans. We are all Americans, and if there has to be a 
line, there is where it should be drawn.
I don't meet too many who feel the way I  do about our 
country. Maybe it’s because I'm the grandson o f a slave and 
Just now beginning to enjoy thefreedom so many ofour people 
seem to take for granted.
In closing I would like to say that I think you, like your 
brother, will be strong enough toface the world and statefacts, 
and I also think you will consider the needs o f allAmericans....
One o f the advantages of being away from one’s 
mother culture Is the perspective that It provides on the 
society that supports that culture and the contradictions 
between what it is and what it says it is.
It seems unbelievable that I’m sitting in Viet Nam, 
participating In a war which I hardly know anything about. 
Why? I ask myself this many times and the only conclusion 
I seem to arrive at is: ‘I have no idea, only that Uncle Sam said 
that I should fight to safeguard America's freedom.’ Should 
1 regard America as being a free country, when thousands are 
starving, lack decent housing conditions, deprived of 
educational equality, and living without future perspective?
When I drain the truth out o f this situation, I literally 
become infuriated for not being gifted with the eloquence and 
courage to tell the world that this is wrong.
At one time, America could hide its domestic 
problems, but that time has passed now. Today, these 
problems deface us in the eyes o f the world. Even our so- 
called adversary, the communists, see these difficulties as a 
destructive means in which to obliterate us. People o f 
America, wake up before It Is too late.
The existence o f our nation and the unification o f its 
people lay in our hands. We can all walk the down staircase, 
but in the end, we'll all fall on our faces. [November, 1968]
Or this from a Marine PFC:
Being here in Viet Nam I find myself somewhat confused. 
Here I am fighting this war, while back home there is still
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another war. My people are still struggling for equality.
I often ask myself what I'm doing here when I should 
be helping my own people back home. I know when I go home 
I'll still be discriminated against.
I have many questions on my mind, but the one I ask 
myself most is why does the white man want to keep the 
Negro down? Why are we treated so cruel?
And then there were the experiences of those like the trooper who 
wrote, in December. 1968, about the unprovoked attack upon him by 
a white soldier. “Going through the chain of command, I was required 
to get permission to see my battery commander. In confronting him 
about this incident, I was given a small sermon by my commander, in 
the presence of the battery executive office and first sergeant." His 
commander informed him that he did not “like Black Power [or] African 
haircuts,” as if this was the issue at hand and not the request for 
remedy of the complaint. He also pointed out in his letter that a fellow 
soldier had problems with this same commander who paid no attention 
to the man’s medical record (doctors had recommended he be excused 
from shaving because of a skin condition), and how he dumped this 
man’s “Negro reading material” on the floor to indicate his displeasure 
with the same. The writer concludes by asking, “Now can you tell me 
who my enemy really is?”
Clearly, one enemy was the “aura of prejudice" which was “so 
strong and intense that many brothers [were] lashing out with vigor 
stronger than that in the cities of the United States. There [were] two 
separate wars being fought...in Viet Nam. One [was] the war against 
the Viet Cong and the other [was] white against Negro. This has spread 
to Southeast Asia. The white man [had] brought [it] along with many 
of his other Western traits.” [January, 1969]
Theblackman, sooner or later finds himself stigmatized. His 
immediate supervisors are white, as usual, and without 
orientating himself, he knows they are racists. Most blacks 
see this as a manifestation of racism, whether his constituents 
are aware o f the fact or not.
Not later, but right then and there, the black man 
becomes stubborn, his resistance becomes very strong.
The militancy and the prejudice he was not aware o f 
before comes to light. Therefore the white man quickly 
realizes he is not facing the usual Tom,' that was once 
common to him...even in a war zone, the black man is still 
discriminated against. Therefore it's time for the black man 
to lay his weapon down and go home to play his role in ‘black 
power.' [February, 1969]
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A  PFC felt that if a survey of rank in the army was done “the white on 
up through the chain would have the rank." He follows this with the 
observation that “Most of the soldiers in L(ong] B[inh] Jail are Negro 
soldiers who were forced one way or the other to do something against 
[their] will or belief. There are riots because white drivers have hit and 
run down Negro and Mexican Americans. If there must be discipline, 
let it be fair. Talk to some of the fellows in L.B. Jail and find out why 
they are there. Not all are there because of murder." He gives an 
example: “An incident took place where a white soldier and an Afro- 
American soldier had a disagreement which led to strong words and 
eventually blows. The white soldier didn’t get any type of punishment 
whatsoever, The Afro-American was reduced in rank and was 
transferred to another unit so he wouldn’t know what had happened. 
After trying to find out why he had been punished for defending 
himself, he was told by a white officer to let well enough alone." [April, 
1969]
Especially valuable were the perspectives of those who served 
more than one tour where there was some space between the two 
tours. Consider the observations of an army specialist who served his 
first tour in 1965 and his second beginning in early 1969:
Since I've been here, things have really changed a lot. The 
brothers are really sticking together now—all except the few 
Uncle Toms we have to put up with. A  majority o f us are being 
treated as if we are the ones who started this war. The little 
rank we get we have to do twice as much as the white man to 
get it and we have to wait twice as long. For instance, we have 
soul brothers who have been here in the field and jungle over 
six months and are still Pfcs.
Many white guys come over as Privates and when 
they leave, they either are Sgt. (E-5) or higher. That’s why, 
today, the brothers are coming out o f the field every chance 
they get because the white man is misusing them.
I know o f many black soldiers that do their part out 
in the field but don’t get credit for it. I know a brother who 
burned up two M-60 barrels on Viet Cong and saved many 
fellows from their deaths, and all he got was a slap on the 
back. But a white guy was given the Silver Star and a 
promotion to Sgt. The Viet Cong are treated better than the 
Negro soldier. We go out and fight Charlie, and when we get 
back to the base, we still have a private war on our hands with 
the white man.
So you see, the Negro soldier has two wars on his 
hand. Most o f the good jobs in the rear are held by white guys, 
and if a Negro comes out o f the field and tries to get a rear job, 
he is called a coward. Many black soldiers are AWOL today
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right here in Viet Nam because they are being pushed too 
hard.
In eveiy stockade in Viet Nam, the majority o f the 
people in them are Negroes. As I said before, we are really 
sticking together now and the white man sees it and doesn’t 
like it, but it’s nothing he can do about it, unless he puts all 
o f us in Jail.
My personal opinion is that the Army should be 
segregated because Negroes and whites can’t live together 
and get along. There are a lot o f people who don’t know the 
armed services is one o f the most prejudiced organizations in 
the world. I am speaking from experience, because I’ve been 
in the service for quite some time. I truly hope that one day 
someone back there will do something about what's happening 
over here and other places, before it’s too late and before there 
is a war between the Negro soldier and the white soldier.
Every day, things are changing, and every day there 
are soul brothers coming out of the Held shouting how they 
are being misused. Really, I don't blame any o f them because 
all they are getting is a hard time.
I only wish there were more people back there 
interested in what the Negro soldier is going through over 
here. A  lot o f people might say the white guys are going 
through the same thing. Well, yes, they are—in the field—but 
the black man's fight doesn’t really begin until he gets back 
out o f the field. We fight the white man physically and 
mentally to have a place in this world.
Some of the submissions to the magazine took the form of 
poetry. Sometimes it was the only way that the soldier felt he could 
get his feelings across:
Take a man, then put him all alone,
Put him 12,000 miles away from home.
Empty his heart of all but blood.
Make him live in sweat and mud.
This is the life I have to live,
And why my soul to the devil I give.
You ‘peace boys’ pant from your easy chairs.
But you don’t know what it's like over here.
You have a ball without near trying,
While over here the boys are dying.
You bum your draft cards and march at dawn.
Plant your flags on the White House lawn.
You all want to ban the bomb,
You say there’s no real war in Viet Nam.
Use your flags, your drugs and have your fun,
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Then refuse to use your gun.
There is nothing else for you to do.
And just think—I’m supposed to die for you!
I'll hate you until the day I die.
You made me hear my buddy cry.
I heard them say, This one’s dead.'
It’s a large price he had to pay.
Not to live to see another day.
He had the guts to fight and die.
He paid the price, but what did he buy?
He bought your life, by losing his.
But who gives a damn what a soldier gives?
His wife does, and maybe his son,
But they’re just about the only ones. [June, 1969]
Two letters that speak differently to the same subject appear in the 
December, 1969 and January, 1970 issues of the magazine. Thefirst, 
written by a sergeant, chastises those who would mistake the actions 
of one committed to doing his own thing “without having to prove to 
anyone how black and proud he is,” for Uncle Tomism. The sergeant 
insists: “The only way to beat a man at his game is to play it like he 
thinks he’s playing it and then find his weak points and use him as 
much as possible.” He continues: “At the several bases I’ve been 
assigned to, I wasn’t a part of the segregated ideas and thoughts of 
those who greeted me with. What’s going on, brother?’ I tried to get 
along with everyone and I demanded respect as an individual and not 
as a member of a group creating social pressure as the white supremist 
and black power advocates continue to do over here in Vietnam.” He 
says that the black men in his company became "unified, utilizing 
integrity and suppressing violence, when we knew a cool head could 
solve a problem instead of a hot temper.” However, he cautions, “Unity 
is great when it’s used correctly. And I'm not talking about the unity 
that comes from a whiskey bottle or a head that’s turned on by pot. I’m 
talking about the type of unity that comes about because one respects 
the man standing next to him because he is a man and an individual, 
black or white." Still one should not dwell “too heavily upon the past, 
for it would only anger you, and hate is a blinding factor, for our 
destiny is tomorrow, a not too distant tomorrow, my brothers.” 
Concludes our first writer, “The main reason why there is more racial 
strife on a non-combat base is due to the lack of communication 
between the people in charge of our bases and each individual. All the 
guys who’ve turned their backs on the white society need the help of 
the nearest head doctor and so does the white man who still lives on 
the hate taught to him by his ancestors." The letter written a month 
later stands in opposition to the sergeant’s point of view: “I found out
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one thing, my brothers, individuality gains naught but rebuke in the 
eyes of the white man—while unity will slow or stop his quick and 
hasty persecution of our black brothers and sisters the world over.” 
The second writer adds:
Three hundred years of constant attempts at dehumanization 
o f the black man, repeatedly repelled by the unyielding 
thought that we are also men, should qualify us as judge over 
the white man, for it was indeed he, who said, ‘all men are 
created equal, and therefore have a right to the pursuit of 
happiness.' It was an idea believed wholeheartedly by him, 
until he discovered the beast of burden he purchased on the 
slave block could actually reason, the one single factor that 
separates man from beast, and you can believe this brothers,
“we are going to keep on keeping on.’
Another poem, published the next month, seems to echo the sentiments 
of the January letter:
Dear America, I just had to write.
Because this may be my last night.
My buddies and I are pinned, there’s 
nothing we can do.
But I would like to ask two favors 
of you.
You see, I fought through day, dawn 
and night:
Knowing all the time that this was 
not right.
My people, black Americans, they are;
In America are being pushed back so 
far.
The young, are being deprived of a 
real education:
The old are being forced into a 
low paying occupation.
America! America! Please tell me why?
Because for that place I’m about 
to die.
Give them a chance. They’re human, 
too.
These were the favors I wanted to 
ask o f you.
And if they’re answered, my life I’m 
ready to give;
I would not see America again, but
I know my people would live. [February, 1970]
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Returning once again to the vagaries of military justice, one 
airman who had been in country for seven months observed that he 
was more than ready to leave: “This is not the black man’s war, it’s the 
white man’s. The white man is always trying to impress everyone that 
he’s the king of the world. I’ll never go along with that." He continues:
Afew  days ago there were two blacks here who were sentenced 
by a court-martial to a year in the stockade for something the 
court couldn’t prove they did. Itwasawhite man's court, and 
o f course they were guilty before they were tried.
There are brothers here in trouble who never 
committed any crime before they came to the Nam. The 
reason we get in trouble here is that we're tired o f the white 
man bugging us. We can’t take it any longer. [May, 1970]
But take it they would, for the war was not yet over, and life had to go 
on:
Even the Vietnamese people are prejudiced to a certain 
extent. They are saying the white man is No. 1 and the black 
man is No. 10. I think a small minority o f white GIs bring their 
hates with them to Vietnam. I can say that the brothers in 
Vietnam are together.... We are showing our black unity in 
so many ways, and it would make you feel good to see all the 
brothers getting together and doing their thing. [January, 
1971]
The white man here is the same as he is there. He thinks he's 
a better human being than anyone else. The white man is 
trying to use the Vietnamese as he uses us. He wants them 
to work for him for nearly nothing, and is always trying to 
’use’ them.... [Indeed, the] Vietnamese are faced with some 
o f the same problems the black man has, but maybe in a 
different way." [February, 1971]
This is my story. I am in LBJ [Long Binh Jail]. Why? Because 
the white man put me here because I didn't think like he 
wanted me to!....When the white man gets you in his jail, 
he puts leg irons and handcuffs on some of the black 
brothers and five or six of them jump, kick and beat 
you. But the black people back in the U.S. don’t know 
this and some of them don’t want to know... .A lot of the 
older blacks are set in their ways. They are used to 
having a white man over them and they can’t get used 
to having a black man over them. But I think it’s about
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that time. [April, 1971]
One black soldier was courts-martialed because he refused to 
cut his hair:
Out in the bush they try to be friends because they know that 
the black man can fight because they've been fighting all their 
life. But in the rear they tiy to do us any way. They try to give 
us the work detail. As far as rank, they don't give it to us, not 
like they do the beast [white men]. They say we are fighting 
communism, but me I'm fighting to get home where I can fight 
for my black people. Communism isn't what’s kept us back 
over 400 years. It's the beast. My enemy isn’t the VC. It’s the 
beast." [May, 1971]
In that same issue, there is a rather lengthy letter from a Spec. 
4 (E-4) that covers a multitude of topics. In reading through the 
several parts that are excerpted here, note how the themes that he 
discusses are linked together, having everything to do with the 
differential status accorded different race designations in a supposedly 
desegregated (not integrated) military organization. Note also the 
evidently different political orientation of this young man when 
contrasted with some of the essays from earlier periods in the conflict. 
Consider also that American troops were being withdrawn from the 
country at an ever increasing rate. At the time of this missive, overall 
troop strength was down to less than a third of what it had been in the 
Summer of 1968.4 Consider also that at the warrior level survival— 
not being the last man to die in Vietnam—becomes ever more 
important: I
I am a black GI serving in Vietnam and the people here are 
very cheap. All they think about is cheating the American GI. 
Whenever they see a GI in trouble, they sit back and giggle to 
each other and shrug their shoulders. 1 wonder why the 
government is making such a big Federal case o f this My Lai 
stuff. The soldiers out in the field have had enough without 
having to worry about jurisdictional or legal torture when 
they get back home. These people don't give a damn whether 
a man lives or dies, just so long as they get all they want.
Does that sound like the poor, innocent, defenseless 
people the white man has lied to the American public about?
No, it’s entirely the opposite. These people don’t want us over 
here. They never did. But you know how it is—the whites got 
to have their way or else. Or else— someone’s got to suffer, 
whether it be the American black man or the poor white man 
or Mexican-American.
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A  lot o f the white GIs around here are nothing but a 
bunch of George Wallaces, Lester Maddoxes and Spiro Agnews. 
Sometimes when I walk into a latrine for a little private 
business, I see on the walls...All Niggers—and literally Just 
about every sexual insult to the black man the smut peddlers 
can produce. I’m not going to repeat the insults because they 
are so nasty somebody might throw up.
Yes, no matter where he goes, the white man always 
has to show him bigotry and cowardly prejudice. He turns 
the Vietnamese people against us by lying the ‘Niggers are 
inferior,’ are No. 10, stupid, crazy or some other kind o f BS 
like that.
Prejudice affects people in strange ways, he explains, pointing 
to the phenomenon of Uncle Tomism, which he describes as “a 
constant problem among blacks in this man’s army.” He details the 
story of a black sergeant promoted from E-5 to E-6 who “went around 
making waron the brothers to lookgood infront of the pigs." but when 
the sergeant takes advantage of his new rank and “starts messing up 
his so-called white friends...his superiors who recommended him for 
that particular rank want to see him busted.” The man was transferred 
to another unit. “Just imagine," says the author, "All that Tomming, 
all that kissing backsides and look what it got him. A  black man is still 
subject to certain prejudices, certain injustices, regardless of rank, 
certain feelings of white bigotry, certain feelings of being inferior to the 
white man.” He continues:
I'm going to say something else and I don’t care who likes it 
and who doesn’t like it. The thing that’s holding the black 
people down is that too many o f them are too stupid to face 
reality. They only see what they want. They exercise too 
much faith and trust in the enemy (the white man) and too 
little trust in real black men, like for example, Adam Clayton 
Powell, Elijah Muhammad, Muhammad Ali, Eldridge Cleaver.
To some colored people that last man I mentioned (2nd to last 
also) is criminal because he is a Black Panther sticking up for 
the black cause and the other because he is in my opinion the 
heavy-weight champion of the world and refuses to be bullied 
or tricked into this war and treated like two cents. Also, he’s 
showing the white man that he doesn’t have to jump every 
time he moves his finger. I f he doesn't want to come into this 
Army, that is his prerogative.
Why die for the white man? We don’t owe him 
anything. He expects the young black men to come over here 
and fight the VC but won’t even grant us a decent trade when 
we get our discharge....
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One particularly interesting letter appeared the following 
month [June, 1971J. It is one of the few to address the issue of the 
wounded warrior from the veteran’s point of view:
We speak of Hanoi and the crime wave in American streets, 
but the majority seems less eager to fulfill our needed goals.
There is a prolongation of the war in Southeast Asia and 
trouble everywhere.
People have called me foolish since I got hurt. Others 
have said worse. Nevertheless, it has happened. What are 
they going to do with our wounded men after they come home 
and after recuperation?...
Ten months I lay in the hospital after the grenade 
explosion. Five years have elapsed. I am worse off than the 
day I arrived in Vietnam.
I suffered multiple leg wounds that left me maimed.
I'm not bitter, only curious as to what America and our 
government can do when we return. The prisoners there 
perhaps have it real bad. I was never a prisoner, but being 
a holder of the Purple Heart, I can say I am a lucky man....
Notable in this corpus of letters for its rare insight was one from 
a brother who had done a tour, gone back to the world and returned 
to the war of his own volition. This time, because of the isolation of his 
unit, he had “ample time to read and think.”
What am I, as part o f a despised race in a white majority 
society, doing fighting for democracy in Vietnam?
While at home, I am continued to be looked upon as 
“the white man’s burden" with little or no rights that society 
will respect or enforce. It is indeed Ironic. When will 
democracy in the United States mean equal treatment for all 
its citizens? Am I not human? Being black is not a crime. I 
am not an animal. I have a right to exist on this earth as all 
black people have a right to live and exist.
I have given thought to leaving the United States for 
more visible signs as related to democracy elsewhere, though 
the United States has been my home.
I fear the United States is not a mature nation nor 
will it be until blacks are allowed to develop freely and to their 
fullest potentials with the blessings o f white Americans.
The black soldier in Vietnam like his counterpart back in the 
world, suffered through his “blacker than thou” phase, especially with 
the rise and spread of black militancy in the military establishment.
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Cognitive dissonance had its effect. Though my own time in the service 
was a little earlier than the Vietnam era, I have memories of my years 
in the United States Navy, in and out of the South China Sea. I 
understood the ambivalence of the black soldier. On one extreme of 
the political spectrum was the Black Panther Party for Self-Defense 
(the sixth foundation of their party platform was that no black man 
should be required to serve in the United States military). At the other 
end was the lifer (which many claimed stood for Loud, Ignorant Fool, 
Escaping Reality) who represented blind adherence to classic American 
rhetoric. However, experience—which is ordinary for no one—has a 
way of confounding the canons of our beliefs. Most of the brothers, just 
like the folks back home, were somewhere in between, adrift in a sea 
of confusion. Given the historic treatment of black people in the 
United States, were black men obligated to serve “their" country in its 
time of need? It was a classic case of ideology shaping consciousness.5 
Resolving the question of duty was a preoccupation for some soldiers:
A  Brother [Name] stated in Sepia that he would rather be an 
Uncle Tom than give another brother the ‘power sign.’ He 
calls this action ‘street clowning.' Since he has viewed and 
reviewed the racial Situation, there are some questions I 
would like to ask.
Who am I to fight for the freedom of another race in 
a distant land? Why should I place my life in Jeopardy for a 
cause not known to myself? Should I be at home fighting and 
dying with my black brothers and sisters Instead of placing 
myself at the mercy o f the very ones who seek to destroy the 
black revolution? How can my conscience allow me to kill 
another being in the name o f democracy when this rare and 
precious idea is seldom experienced in my home land?
How can the rulers o f our land so readily pass 
legislation to send me 10,000 miles away to fight and die and 
then so reluctantly pass laws to make or proclaim me equal?
Why should I be a first class fighting man and salute proudly 
the red, white and blue, when back in America I’m a second 
class citizen and the mere color o f my skin exempts me from 
the rights to be equal in pursuit o f happiness? Doesn’t the 
flag work for us when we salute it? Is it too much to ask to 
be made a first class citizen before you ask me to risk my life?
[July. 1971]
But the flag did not work for them. In August, 1971 Brother 
Ray and 29 other others sent in a letter stating that there was a need 
for blacks to stick together to meliorate where possible the racist 
practices and attitudes to which they were subject:
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In this brigade there are whites who tiy desperately to keep 
the black brothers from getting any type o f rank at all. This 
statementwas made byawhite officer. He said that the black 
man is not capable of leadership. And another captain had 
a bad habit o f calling us brothers boys. When we brothers try 
to stand up and fight these racist swine, we are put in military 
custody and are considered militants and troublemakers....
The whites try very hard to keep us separated from 
each other because they know when some black brothers get 
together, we stick together no matter what happens. It 
makes it hard for the white man to mess with us. When there 
are just two or three o f us, they will try to make us do averting 
and keep us out in the field while the white guys get all the 
rear jobs. They get their R and R on time and get their leaves 
anytime they want them. When applications come down for 
rank, all the white guys make it. They go by time in the 
country but if you have more time than the white guys they 
still skip over you.
The blacks over here don't have a chance because of 
prejudiced whites. We have to fight for anything we get. The 
swine even try to turn the Vietnamese people against us 
brothers. They tell them we are Number 10, which mean 
troublemakers, no good....When we try to protect our 
interests,...they say we have broken the military law. The 
military law is just protection that the white man uses 
against the black man to lock him up for such things as 
standing up for his rights.
From standing up for one’s rights to protesting the underlying 
theme of genocide that troop assignment policies in Vietnam seemed 
to articulate is but a short step: “...I share the feelings of my brothers 
here because we are the victims of this unannounced genocide the 
white man has so oppressively put into practice. We are the product 
of his greed for money, while at the same time, carrying out his 
ingenious plan of keeping young black strength down to a proportion 
which is in his favor." This writer made it clear that black veterans 
should not “accept business as usual with racist cops striking out 
against any black organization that questions the system.” In that 
regard, they would set a new standard. There would be no more 
lynchings of blacks in uniform as there were during and after World 
War 1. They would launch themselves along new roads, building upon 
the gains of those black soldiers who returned from World War 2. 
Somehow, they would find a way to defuse and redirect a system rife 
“with lynchings, head beatings and all the corrupt politicians” to stop 
the dope flow into the black community: “[My] brothers and I plan to
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change it and we are willing to perish if necessary to do so."
The popular culture image of the black soldier as a doper, a 
coward, or a malcontent Ignores the truth that there were some 
brothers in the Nam who sought to make a difference. The struggle for 
change is evident in the letter of a Spec 4 who wrote that the “black 
revolution cannot be won on a white horse.” One brother wrote to ask 
“why black publishing companies don’t send black reporters over here 
to do stories on the black GIs and the way we are treated, so that all 
our black brothers and sisters can be aware of it." He wanted them to 
explore the reasons that the inmate populations of Da Nang stockade 
and the LBJ prison were almost 90 percent black. Perhaps, he 
suggests, if black media publicized the inequity, black soldiers might 
not be given the inordinate number of courts-martials they currently 
received—often because of insignificant breeches of the code of 
military conduct. He closes by saying how it hurt him to have to see 
unnecessary pain, especially since the war was for a white cause not 
a black one.
A  group which rose out of black soldiers' attempts at coalition 
building was the American Minority Servicemen’s Association. One of 
its members wrote to Sepia in November, 1971, about the uses of 
propaganda and lawful suppression as weapons for keeping the 
different, the dispossessed in their proper places: “It’s used to stifle, 
distress and confuse us, with the obvious but latent motive of diverting 
ourselves against each other." He explains that those who succumb 
to its siren song are given “guest cards" to a closed society. They are 
even made token leaders. “Those who resist are quickly branded 
dumb niggers, militants and fools who don’t know any better.” 
However, he suggests there is another way of looking at this; especially 
as we “begin to realize that maybe all those dumb niggers, militants 
and fools have rediscovered what it is to have honor, to have pride, and 
to possess manhood, a right in the sea of wrongs, a path in the land 
of the forgotten, this country of contradiction.” These will be the issues 
over which any future struggles will be fought “whether it’s behind the 
levers at the polls or the triggers of guns, you and I will be responsible 
for its outcome."
1972 brought additional letters which addressed many of the 
topics already covered. As more and more men were withdrawn from 
Vietnam, the tone of the letters suggests that institutionalized racism 
increased in virulence as the war drew to a close. There was discussion 
about the vagaries of the military justice system, and the punishment 
of black soldiers because they did not share white American attitudes 
about American conduct in Vietnam. There was concern that some 
brothers might be pimping their black power or at least treating with 
it in a faddish manner instead of being really committed to the Cause.
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There was even one letter, in September, 1972, which stated that 
though there were some good white people, most of them were “swine": 
“The swine (racist fanatics) have created their own ugly image, for it 
was they who destroyed Martin Luther King, Malcolm X, John and 
Robert Kennedy, Medgar Evers."
In addition to the letters. Sepia published a series of articles 
that echoed and amplified several of the expressed concerns in more 
detail. An October, 1966 piece asked the question “Why Do More 
Negroes Die in Vietnam?" It raised questions about assignment and 
promotion policies that kept black men in the field longer than white 
soldiers, and placed them in more hazardous situations. In February, 
1969 there was a story titled “Black Soldiers Fight Two Enemies in 
Vietnam.” The piece stated that black soldiers were shot at by the 
National Liberation Front and the NVA from the front, while from the 
rear they were sniped at(both literally and figuratively) by racists on 
support bases and in the towns. The June, 1971 issue offered an essay 
entitled “GI Race War in Germany." and explained that during and 
after the Vietnam war, American military bases in Germany had some 
of the worst troubles between the races in the whole military 
establishment.6 The August, 1971 issue gave readers “The Marines v. 
Prejudice,” which talked about the policies and programs the Corps 
was instituting to lessen tensions created by the arrival of a new kind 
of black Marine with a different self-consciousness and agenda than 
some of his predecessors. And finally, in April 1973, there appeared 
“What Now for Black Vietnam Veterans?” This essay was published 
three months after the column "Our Men in Vietnam" (renamed 
“Voices from Vietnam” mid-war) was closed out in January, 1973.
Several secondary pieces can help to provide a sense of 
organization and direction for interpretation of the letters: Gerald 
Gill's, “Black American Soldiers in Vietnam;”7 is particularly useful 
because it covers a number of topics and can be used to provide an 
outline of the black experience in Vietnam. Charles C. Moskos, Jr.’s 
“The American Dilemma in Uniform: Race in the Armed Services," 8 
and William Stuart Gould’s “Racial Conflict in the U.S. Army,"9provide 
important contextual materials that seek to put specific incidents into 
a larger pattern. Two members of the Lawyers Military Defense 
Committee of the ACLU, David F. Addlestone and Susan Sherer, who 
served in Vietnam from November, 1970 to November, 1971, have 
some interesting things to say in “Race In Vietnam,"10 as does Jack 
White in his “The Angry Black Soldiers."11 Myra MacPherson’s fourth 
chapter, called “The Blacks," in her book Long Time Passing12, opens 
with a recapitulation of one man’s experience, illustrating the kinds of 
problems black men endured in the war.13
Whatever meaning is made of the black experience in Vietnam,
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must be shaped by black people. Because of the character of the black 
experience in America and its relation to America’s activities, we are 
forced to address the DuBoisian “Double Consciousness,"14 Clearly, 
meaning would best be made within an Afrocentric orientation whose 
world view, normative assumptions and frames of reference flow out 
of the historical experiences and folk wisdom of black people.15
It is a fundamental truth of the Afrocentrie perspective that 
knowledge is a social product not an objective ideal that can be 
possessed, owned or brought in from the outside as if it has an 
independent existence. That is, knowledge is information that has 
been organized for some specific purpose whose intent is implicit in 
the organizational design. It is not so much that we discover the truth 
as it is that we manufacture the truth in keeping with our own 
interests and the criteria specified by the guardians of the craft or guild 
who saw to our own occupational socialization. To postulate an 
objective ideal of knowledge is not only an illusion but also suggests 
that the scholar in some way is separate and distinct from the 
phenomena and forces being investigated. This is, of course, patent 
nonsense that all too often is used to evade responsibility for the 
consequences of our actions. Our descriptions of reality are not 
independent of the realities they purport to describe. Our beliefs 
shape our scholarship and the values we embrace give meaning to the 
facts we select to buttress our arguments. Because the black 
experience in America goes to the very core of what this society is said 
to be about, to its founding concepts of freedom, equality, liberty and 
Justice for all, especially in time of war, much is to be gained by 
examining that experience from the perspectives of the persons who 
lived it. For it is when a country is at war that it is forced to come face 
to face with its contradictions. As I have attempted to show here, the 
black media is a useful source of the evidence required for that task. 1
1 (Boston: Atlantic Monthly Press) 1986.
2 Ibid.: 469.
3 One guide to some o f this material is contained in Lenwood G. Davis and 
George Hill, comps.. Blacks in the American Armed Forces, 1776-1983 (Westport 
CT. Greenwood Press,) 1985. See especially, chapters IX, “Blacks in the 
Vietnam War," and X, "Blacks in the Post-Vietnam Era."
4 Harry G. Summers, Jr., Vietnam War Almanac (New York: Facts on File) 
1985. See especially pp 27-59, “The Vietnam War: Chronology, 1959-1975.”
5 A  trenchant and sometimes troubling account o f the many dimensions 
and subtleties involved in this process is Maulana Karenga, “Society, Culture, 
and the Problem o f Self-Consciousness: A  Kawaida Analysis," in Leonard 
Harris, ed.. Philosophy BomoJStruggle: Anthology ofAfro-AmericanPhilosophy
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from 1917 (Dubuque, IA: Kendall/Hunt) 1983: 212-28.
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8 Annals (406), March, 1973: 94-106.
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I, Too, SiNq A m er ic a : V ietnam  as 
METAphoR in C o M iN q  H o m e
Verner D. MiTchElL
George Davis’ novel Coming Home is both a Vietnam war novel 
and a significant contribution to the larger body of Afro-American 
literature. Davis uses the war as a metaphor for dramatizing the black 
man’s struggle for basic human rights in America—his struggle, as 
Langston Hughes might say, to also sing America. This theme runs 
through the heart of Afro-American literature, and is reflected in the 
fictional journeys of characters like Richard Wright’s black boy, Ralph 
Ellison’s invisible man, Toni Morrison’s Milkman Dead, and Langston 
Hughes’ darker brother. They all journey in search of freedom and 
dignity.
Coming Home is also different from these traditional Afro- 
American odysseys. Davis’ book is one of the few black American 
novels which focuses on the dilemma of the Afro-American fighting 
man. Davis, like a few other black American authors, including John 
Oliver Killens (And Then We Heard the Thunder, 1962), John A. 
Williams (Captain Blackman, 1972), and AR Flowers (De Mojo Blues, 
1985), uses his literary talents to create a character trapped in a war 
on two fronts. Revolutionary soldiers in an age of slavery, Buffalo 
Soldiers in a society which condemned blacks and Native Americans 
equally, American soldiers in service of imperial conquest from the 
Philippines to Central America and finally to Southeast Asia, the black 
man in the military has always had an ambivalent relationship with 
the institution in which he serves. At the heart of Davis’ novel, then, 
is the artistic dramatization of the effects of this terrible double 
burden.
The protagonists of Davis’ novel. Air Force Lieutenants Ben 
Williams and James Childress, regularly fly tense combat missions in 
defense of such ideals as liberty, equality, and justice, only to land and 
be insulted by the “discriminatory practices of white peers and 
commanding officers. ”Many commanders believed that blacks were 
inferior beings and considered it prudent to protect white soldiers by 
assigning blacks to more dangerous missions—an unwritten policy 
which largely accounts for the disproportionately high number of
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black casualties during the war. Professor Mel Watkins observes that 
from 1965 to 1966 it was not unusual to find blacks accounting for 30 
to 60 percent of the combat troops in front-line units.2 A  Department 
of Defense report reluctantly admits that “blacks assumed a higher 
proportion of the casualties than might be expected,” given that blacks 
constituted 16% of the forces drafted and only 11% of the US 
population.3 In Coming Home Davis generates an example of the use 
of black men as cannon fodder, describing a situation in which Ben is 
forced to fly more sorties than his white peers.
Early in the novel the reader is treated to a vivid account of 
Ben’s reaction to discriminatory practices institutionalized within the 
military. Ben and Childress sit in a dirty, segregated bordello, 
thinking about the “cleaner, air-conditioned white whorehouses up 
the row":
I can only hate whitey for the smaller symptoms of the disease 
that he is spreading around the world, like...segregating the 
whorehouses and the bathhouses over here...like trying to 
get the Thai girls to hate Negroes by telling them niggers have 
tails and niggers have big dicks and will hurt them.4
In the end Ben, like Wright’s black boy and Ellison’s invisible man, 
discovers that America’s irrational obsession with race poses an 
insurmountable obstacle:
As I walk I feel strangely free, and I dread the thought o f going 
back to America. I don't know how I can ever feel right about 
America again.... I want to go to graduate school, but I know 
I'll never sit in a class and leam from a white man. And who 
will I work for, and where will I go?5
Ben eventually goes AWOL. Childress manages to complete 
his tour, but shortly after his return to the United States, he finds 
himself in trouble: I
I was walking down the street in Baltimore in the middle of 
the day and this young black dude was handing out leaflets 
on the comer. So I took one and started to read it. Then this 
big ugly white cop come up and told me to get moving, like 
that. So I told him to wait a minute until I finished reading 
my little leaflet. And he said, “Get your black ass moving.
Now.” I said, “Man, I got a Constitutional right to be here just 
like everybody else." And the sucker draws his pistol and tells 
me, “This is all the Constitution you need." So I go to get in 
my car, and when I started to get in, the cracker kicked me
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dead in my ass. So, I picked up a Jack handle and knocked 
the gun out o f his hand and knocked him down. He killed his 
own damn self when his head hit the concrete. All I was trying 
to do is teach him not to kick anybody any more.6
The reader is free to agree with or disagree with Ben’s or Childress’ 
behavior, but Davis insists that the audience begin to examine the 
complex social and cultural forces which combine to make black 
soldiers and veterans bitter about America.
Most other artistic works which focus on the Vietnam war deal 
with black characters in simplistic terms. The images of black 
combatants—both in movies and novels—resonate with negative 
stereotypes which subtly or blatantly suggest that black soldiers were 
cowardly in battle and criminal in inclination. These unflattering 
portraits appear again and again, even though it is commonly known 
that soldiers of color died in disproportionate numbers in Southeast 
Asia.
Tim O’Brien’s National Book Award winner. Going After Cacciato, 
contains the following account of a black soldier who wishes he was 
back home in Detroit, looting and raping: “Oscar Johnson said [the 
weather] made him think of Detroit in the month of May. ‘Lootin’ 
weather,’ he liked to say. The dark an’ gloom, just right for rape an’ 
lootin.’”7 An especially unpleasant example comes from the recent 
Hollywood Academy Award winner. Platoon. Oliver Stone’s Vietnam 
war film features a black character named Francis, lethargic and 
nonchalant when the enemy is out of sight, but cowardly and 
unprincipled when the fighting begins. When the Vietnamese 
communists attack, Francis jumps into a foxhole and stabs a knife 
into his leg, writing his own ticket out of the battle zone. As he is being 
carried to an evacuation helicopter, Francis—grinning like a character 
in a minstrel show—turns to another injured soldier and says: “Hey 
digit...manwegongetouttaheah. I’m gon see you in the hospital. We 
gon get high, high. Yes sir!” 8 In popular consciousness, black soldiers 
have become criminals and irresponsible cowards who are willing to 
do almost anything to avoid lighting.9
The popular culture portraits of O’Brien, Stone, and others are 
far removed from the reality of the Afro-American experience in 
Southeast Asia. Bombarding their audiences with racist stereotypes, 
they avoid the challenge of seriously attempting to detail the lives of 
black soldiers in Vietnam, and thus promote what Norman Harris 
labels “historical amnesia."10 Viewed collectively, these works suggest 
that Afro-American cowardice, criminality, and overall ineptness are 
usual: that the black misfit in Vietnam is only the latest in a series of
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infamous martial incompetents which extends back to at least the 
Revolutionary War. Such accounts are in direct contradiction to 
historical evidence ranging from written and oral testimony of black 
courage in war11 to the significant number of black men (20) awarded 
the Congressional Medal of Honor—America’s highest military award 
for bravery—during the Vietnam war.12
Coming Home is a welcome antidote to racist images of black 
men in Vietnam. Davis does not succumb to stereotyping his black 
characters; instead, he portrays the Afro-American combatant as 
neither a coward, nor a natural criminal. Rejecting oversimplified 
characterizations, Davis gives an empathetic rendering of black 
soldiers in human terms, a rendering which allows the reader to begin 
to understand the unique difficulties these men faced. Davis helps us 
imagine how Ben and Childress must have felt, flying in formation with 
white pilots to drop bombs and napalm canisters on a people of color, 
while they, as black men, were simultaneously suffering from the 
discriminatory racial policies of their own countrymen. Davis’ primary 
interest is in exploring the ways in which his characters might cope 
with their double burden. How do Ben and Childress resolve the 
paradox of risking their lives to bring freedom and equality to the 
Vietnamese when they do not themselves enjoy that freedom or those 
rights? How do they deal with the fact that American freedoms and 
rights are apparently not available to people of color, either Afro- 
American or Vietnamese?
Ben and Childress are the only black pilots in an F-105 
squadron based in Thailand. They are roommates, yet they still feel 
isolated and confused, as the war continues to reflect the hardships 
and inequities of the American system. Ben’s confusion began while 
he was studying at Harvard. He realizes that his training at this 
prestigious Ivy League university will undoubtedly ensure his material 
success, but the price of this knowledge has been a “bourgeois 
socialization”13 which has alienated him from his ethnic and spiritual 
roots. Ben is cognizant of the Western world’s greatest 
accomplishments, but unsure of his own identity and his place in the 
white Western order. Childress senses Ben’s ambivalence and labels 
him “a confused and fucked-up black motherfucker."14 But Childress 
doesn’t realize that he isjust as confused as Ben. Consequently, when 
Ben says that “the white man is a threat to human life on earth,” 
Childress responds in a self-assured and condescending manner: 
“What’re you going to do, sit around and whine about it?” 15 Childress’ 
solution to his situation is to isolate himself, putting up a fagade of 
stoic imperviousness. Cut off from meaningful relationships with 
blacks and whites both, Childress becomes more and more committed
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to his superman pose. In his mind he is immune to the effects of unfair 
and inequitable treatment, neither wanting nor needing anyone else’s 
help. Davis signals us to his character’s response in the scenes where 
Childress flies his sorties—Childress routinely ignores the authoritative 
air traffic control warnings: “Forward air controller, says ‘Number 2, 
you’re too low.’ I go lower. Fuck him.”16
Most telling, however, is Childress’ relationship with the Thai 
prostitute, Damg. Even in bed Childress persists with his self- 
deceiving, isolationist stance: “I didn’t need her love. Ijust wanted her 
to be with me.... I wanted her pussy, not her sympathy.”17 Davis 
signals us that Childress’ pose is false, in a scene in which Childress 
plants communist papers in Damg’s room to ensure that Ben will not 
“inherit" her when he leaves Vietnam. This is, Davis suggests, too 
elaborate a plan for a man who cares only about Damg’s body. 
Childress is unable to realize that he needs Damg’s compassion and 
human warmth, that he isn’t an unfeeling stone. Because he cannot 
come to terms with his own human needs. Childress betrays both his 
lover, Damg, and his friend, Ben.
Norman Harris, in Connecting Times, describes Childress as “a 
metaphor for the numerous black Vietnam veterans who were unable 
to generalize their war experience and therefore ended in prison, 
addicted to drugs, or killed in civilian disputes.”18 Harris continues: 
“Childress’ self-assured projection of himself made it difficult for him 
to interact with other Afro-American soldiers who were also searching 
for meaning.... Cut off from a community, Childress has difficulty 
discovering himself in the context of racial histoiy.”19 Childress leaves 
the war confused and ill-prepared for surviving within the American 
paradigm. His murder of the white policeman seems inevitable, an act 
committed because he does not have the knowledge which would allow 
him to avoid it. Childress lacks both the historical grounding and 
cultural literacy necessary for appreciating the nature of blackness in 
America. Davis communicates the inevitability of Childress’ downfall 
in the description of his last flying mission: “I almost wish I’d see a Mig 
today so I could get me one before I go home. Win another medal. Take 
it back to Baltimore and wave it in the Man’s face. When he says: 
‘Boy...’ I’ll say, ‘Boy, my ass.’ and slap him across his motherfuckin’ 
nose with one of my medals."20
In contrast to Childress, Ben eventually manages to situate his 
dilemma in a larger historical context. In a moment of extreme 
disillusionment. Ben “look(s] out across the water. Bangkok, Rangoon, 
Kuala Lumpur, Djakarta, Calcutta—dark music—and then across the 
Indian Ocean to Africa.”21 This is the strongest image which Davis can 
conjure: Ben is nurtured as he embraces his cultural and historical
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roots. He begins to join those dancers to the darker tunes in their long 
battle against European imperialism. No longer will he be an agent of 
white oppression and aggression. Turning his plane around, Ben 
returns to his base with a “full load of bombs," and tells Stacy, “I’m not 
going to fly any more. I’m tired of helping white men keep their hold 
over the world."22
Harris asserts that: “Despite the war’s overall negative effect. ..for 
Ben, ironically, it serves a positive function. It forces him to harmonize 
the two selves that Harvard created, and this allows him to appropriate 
an aspect of his racial past that helps him deal with the situation at 
hand."23 But Harris misses the point. Undeniably, dealing with the 
war's racial contradictions does lead Ben to embrace his communal 
roots and discover who he is. But the war’s overall effect on Ben is 
decisively negative, for Ben finally realizes that regardless of his 
military accomplishments and his level of education he—as a black 
man—still has no place in America. To find himself he must leave the 
country of his birth and renounce the ties of 400 years of his people’s 
history: 300 years in slavery and 100 years still not free.
With Ben’s decision to stop flying bombing missions, and to 
desert from the Air Force, come the achievement of an elusive dignity 
and inner peace. Nevertheless, the novel’s tone is one of mild 
pessimism. George Davis is clearly suggesting that Childress and Ben 
have received the answer to the question, “Can I, too, sing America?” 
And that answer, reverberating though history, is “Not yet. Not yet.” 1
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Bloods ReviewecT
Jo Mn A . WilliAivis
Bloods: An Oral History o f the Vietnam War by Black Veterans 
Wallace Terry 
Random House. 1984
Oral history has always been subjected to revision by later 
peoples who developed or controlled writing. The Native Americans, 
for example, say there is nothing in their legends about coming from 
another land to this continent. Their legends speak of ascent from the 
ground to the surface of land, or descent from the sky. All Americans, 
however, are taught that during an ice age, when the level of oceans 
dropped at least 300 feet, the ancient Asian trekked eastward to 
become the American Indian.
There are elderly people on some of the islands of the Caribbean, 
to provide another example of the subversion of oral history to written 
history, who to this day claim their most ancient fathers sailed 
westward from Africa to these places where they coexisted with the 
Arawak Indians, and also all along what is now the Gulf of Mexico. We 
are taught, and most of us believe, that Africans came westward only 
as captives to be put into slavery. This was true for most, of course, 
but not all, as Pre-Columbian art eloquently testifies.
Wallace Terry, as writer, testifies for the oral historians in this 
fine collection. (One wishes there were more histories, but, given the 
situation under discussion, they’d only be repeated and repeated). 
Even if it had been ready, and I do not know that it wasn’t in one form 
or another, the book would not have been published during or soon 
after the Vietnam war because the official line, hewed to by Government 
and Press, was that a new democracy was being bom  in the blasting 
pits of Southeast Asia. Oh, there was some hedging, and the Navy was 
the most racist of all the services, but the renditions always ended 
positively. Even some of the subjects in Terry’s book believed that the 
new democracy had arrived.
But, then, we all thought sports integration would make a
•This article originally appeared in Fiction International (17:1). It is reprinted 
with the permission o f the author.
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difference in the body politic, too, if integration indeed occurred with 
Tarzan Cooper on the Celtics, Jackie Robinson on the Dodgers and 
Marion Motley on the Cleveland Browns. What both sports and the 
military provided for the people in charge of these endeavors, however, 
was cheap labor disguised as brotherhood and the American Way. 
This is not to deny the obvious fact that in some cases brotherhood did 
happen; things always slip through the cracks.
Athletes accumulate press clippings and are routinely entered 
into the record books. The black soldier is almost without a public 
American history, though historian Benjamin Quarles tells us that 
black soldiers were there at the beginning (and will undoubtedly be 
there at the end, despite the pressure from some Europeans who wish 
him the hell out of their countries).
The military itself is the foremost proponent of the censorship 
that surrounds the black soldier. A  primary example of this was the 
1966 publication of the volume, in a series, US Army in World War 2, 
Special Studies, The Employment of Negro Troops, by Ulysses Lee. The 
series was produced by the Office of the Chief of Military History, 
United States Army. The word around Washington was that the 
publication of Lee’s volume was held up because certain generals did 
not want it to come out at all. The chief historian. Stetson Conn, 
acknowledges that most ofthebookwas done by 1951. A revision took 
place, but “the work was still too long." Conn then “reduced the revised 
manuscript...in length and reorganized and consolidated certain of 
the original chapters."
In 1966, “the new democracy” was in place and Lee's book was 
important to its underpinnings. By the same token, Terry’s book 
arrived on the scene when national reassessment of Vietnam was 
underway, which seemed to be related to events in Central America.
These considerations aside. Bloods takes its place in both 
general American history and in military history, with its twenty 
testaments from fifteen enlisted men and five officers who range in 
rank from PFC. to Lt. Commander and Colonel. Nineteen photos 
accompany the histories, a wise decision because the reader wants to 
look at the men who said this or that, to see if the visage matches the 
statement. Thus, when we check out Marine 1st Lieutenant Archie 
“Joe” Biggers’ history and And him to be about as gung ho as a Marine 
can be, we flip to his picture. He stands before one of the two artillery 
guns his platoon captured at Dewey Canyon. They are, naturally, 
identified as Soviet Weapons. Bigger looks assured, even cocksure. 
He does not appear to know his history, that black Marines have been 
around since 1775 in the state militias ofPennsylvania and Connecticut, 
serving aboard the Minerva and the Oliver Cromwell. Biggers won the
B loods Reviewed 127
Silver Star for the action. “We [black people] are a part of America,” 
he says. “Even though there have been some injustices made, there 
is no reason for us not to be a part of the American system.”
One hundred sixty-seven years after the first black Marines, 
Edgar A. Huffbecame one of the first group of blacks allowed to enlist 
in the Marines in 1942. When he went on furlough after finishing boot 
camp, he was promptly arrested by Marine MPs because they believed 
“There ain’t no damn nigger Marines." Huff went on to become the first 
black Marine sergeant major, serving under nineteen generals. Three 
weeks after his retirement party in 1972, after pulling duty in Vietnam, 
four white Marines drove to his house and threw phosphorus grenades 
into it, his car and his front yard. Although Marine authorities were 
given the license plate number—by a white Marine friend of Huff—the 
four were never brought up on charges; they were transferred or 
discharged. Says Huff, “I’ve fought for thirty years for the Marine 
Corps. And I feel like I am part of this ground I walk on every day.” 
Huffs is an open, wise face, overflowing with dignity.
Lt. Commander William S. Norman, who pulled three tours in 
Vietnam, questions not only the Navy’s rampant racism, but the war 
itself, and the “communist insurgency” cliches that buttressed it, to 
the extent that he only withdrew his resignation because the new chief 
of Naval Operations, Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, asked him to stay on to 
improve things. In three years they began 200 new programs. But 
other brass wanted Norman out and he himself felt that he’d achieved 
enough to resign once more. Under the Zumwalt-Norman operation, 
the first black flag officer, Samuel L. Gravely, came topside. (The army 
had a flag officer in 1942, and the Air Force at least three by the 1960s.) 
“I don’t think," Norman says, “you can call Vietnam a success story for 
young blacks who served there. A few stayed in service and did very 
well. But those who experienced racism in a war we lost wear a 
scar...the black soldier paid a real price."
The sad thing is, though, that every black serviceman paid a 
price in every war and they number in the millions. They stand in the 
shadows of Terry’s histories and must, like me, mutter: “Nothing’s 
changed.”
Terry’s May 26, 1967 Time cover story is slugged “Democracy 
in the Foxhole,” and is bracketed with photos of black servicemen, 
their families and white friends. His piece followed by ten months 
(August 22 1966) Newsweek's “Great Society—In Uniform." Both 
magazines cited the disproportionate numbers of black war dead 
whencompared to the civilian population—roughly 14.6 percent of the 
battle dead against 11 percent of the population.
The New York Times military editor, Hanson Baldwin, on
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November 20, 1966, claimed that “...The Negro has never had It so 
good In the Army.” He pointed out that blacks “in many line 
outfits.. .make up between 30 to 60 percent of the personnel,” and that 
“23.5 percent of the Army enlisted men killed during 1965 were 
Negro...." The price. Commander Norman, was high.
Black troopers seemed to have lost something else in Vietnam, 
and that is the general reputation for being far kinder to civilians than 
white troopers. The reputation came from the European theater 
during World War 2. Now and again it shines through in Terry’s 
histories, but it is always balanced, that kindness, with the overdone 
machismo of the bigot. But the enemy repaid brutality with brutality, 
and blacks did not escape. Still, there were instances, some stated in 
the book, where blacks ranged untouched in areas in Vietnam where 
white troops were decimated. Experiences in what one might call, with 
tongue in cheek, “Third World Solidarity" have been noted by black 
servicemen since World War 2. The Pentagon, undoubtedly, has 
already taken notice of this.
The oral historians in Bloods tend to confirm the conclusions 
of a number of books now on the market, which criticize commanders 
from headquarters down to company commanders. There is widespread 
contempt voiced for officers in the field by Terry’s historians.
Terry himself is the cool, practiced journalist here, all ears, and 
almost nowhere in sight except for the introduction and a photo of 
himself with two servicemen. Missing from the ranks of the subjects 
is a black flag officer—missing probably for good reason: Flag officers 
are not what you’d call outspoken on the issues, especially if they are 
black. Here and there the stitching within the selections shows, but 
always briefly and with the purpose of making the necessary transitions. 
Terry obviously eliminated gossip and litanies of complaints that did 
not relate to the topic at hand.
Terry has also captured the “range of the rap” from street black 
rap to the careful military jargon of the upper-level officers. The book 
echoes with frustration: these men wanted things to be better than 
they are. In reflection, and for most there is a careful reappraisal of 
what they were and what they did, they are proud that, when they had 
to be, they were tough and brave: they are puzzled that so many of 
them wound up with Bad Conduct discharges and no skills except to 
kill.
Perhaps Terry’s first historian, Pfc. Reginald “Malik" Edwards 
of the Marines says it all:
Sometimes I think we would have done a lot better by getting 
them [Viet Cong, North Vietnamese] hooked on our lifestyle
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than by trying to do it with guns. Give them credit cards.
Make them dependent on television and sugar. Blue jeans 
work better than bombs. You can take blue jeans and rock’n 
roll records and win over more countries than you can with 
soldiers.
Wallace Terry’s Bloods may be late, but better now than never, 
and its contents, for some Americans, make for a welcome addition to 
what all Americans need to know about their military machine and the 
men who make it what it is.
A Iamo  Ba y  ANd tHe Gook SyNdROME 
Henry LAskowsky
At the very beginning of my course on the literature of the 
Vietnam War I often ask students to give me their impressions of the 
war as part of American history. Except for the occasional veteran or 
returning student, most confess to having little detailed knowledge 
about the origins and conduct of the war, but nevertheless agree on 
the perception that it was some sort of aberration—an anomaly in 
America’s proud history of fighting on the side of virtue. One reason 
for enrolling in the course to begin with, they say, is the impression 
that the war constitutes a kind of grey area, or perhaps even a patch 
of darkness in the otherwise bright narrative of our military history. 
The many popular contemporary films, books, and television 
productions about Vietnam paint a picture of a morally ambiguous 
struggle.
My students are well prepared to deal with the war’s uniqueness; 
what they are not prepared to do is to see what happened in Vietnam 
as part of an historical pattern, a chain of events which culminates in 
Vietnam and which reveals a developing pattern of racist behavior.. To 
understand the specific assumptions of those Americans who went to 
Vietnam or those who created policy at home, we must become aware 
of the historical precedents for those attitudes as applied to blacks. 
Latinos, and Asians within our own borders. Additionally, it is 
important to review the development of racist beliefs during our 
westward expansion as we first fought American Indians and then 
crossed the Pacific to fight Filipinos before sending troops into 
Vietnam. One of the ways I have been able to get my students to begin 
thinking about such complicated matters is to show them the film 
Alamo Bay. In this essay, 1 will show the relevance of this film to an 
understanding of the nature and roots of American racism in Vietnam.
When James Madison wrote in 1826 that, “next to the case of 
the black race within our bosom, that of the red on our borders is the 
problem most baffling to the policy of our country,” he could not have 
foreseen how much more complicated America’s racial problems 
would become by the end of the century.1 After annexing Hawaii in 
July of 1898, the United States acquired Puerto Rico, Guam, and the 
Philippines from Spain for approximately $20 million in December of 
the same year. President McKinley had been undecided about
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whether or not he really wanted to buy the Philippines, and finally 
made his decision by going down on his knees to pray for guidance 
from God. What God told him was that it would be “bad business” to 
turn them over to France and Germany, “our commercial rivals in the 
Orient,” but that “we could not leave them to themselves,” since “they 
were unfit for self government." Therefore, “there was nothing left to 
do but take them all and educate the Filipinos, and uplift, and civilize, 
and Christianize them.”2 The Philippine people, however, saw things 
differently and by 1899, under Emilio Aguinaldo, they rose in revolt 
against their new American rulers, as they had risen under the 
Spanish occupation. After three years of war and the commitment of 
70,000 American troops, the US crushed the rebellion, but by then a 
pattern of racist thought and action had been established which would 
reassert itself another half of a century later in Indochina.
Faced with a non-white, non-Westem group of rebels, military 
and civilian officials responsible for subjugating the people of the 
Philippines quickly adapted the logic and the procedures used to 
conquer the American Indian, and turned them to use against the 
“savage” Philippine tribes. Like the American Indian, the Philippine 
people were considered by most Americans to be less than human. 
McKinley’s advisor. Professor D.C. Worcestor, had concocted a racial 
classification of the Philippine people and was put in charge of the 
Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes under various American governors of 
the Philippines. He wrote in a 1913 issue of National Geographic that 
the “Negrito" (Filipino) race ranked “not far above the anthropoid 
apes,” and that “they are a link which is not missing but soon will be! 
In my opinion, they are absolutely incapable of civilization."3 Theodore 
Roosevelt, who in 1900 was McKinley’s running mate, observed that, 
“to grant self-government to Luzon under Aguinaldo would be like 
granting self-government to an Apache reservation under some local 
chief,” and went on to say “the reasoning which justifies our having 
made war against Sitting Bull also justifies our having checked the 
outbreaks of Aguinaldo and his followers.”4
In the field, old Indian fighters such as Generals Franklin Bell 
and Jacob H. “Hell Roaring” Smith used the same tactics on the 
Philippine rebels as they had used on American Indians, including the 
destruction of entire towns and villages, the massacre of men, women, 
and children, and the burning of crops. Later court martialed for 
ordering the murder of eleven prisoners. General Smith, according to 
the trial records, gave the following orders to his troops: “I want no 
prisoners. I wish you to kill and bum; the more you kill and bum the 
better you will please me.” He wished “the interior of Samar [to] be 
made a howling wilderness.”5 Nor was theological justification for 
pursuing an “Indian war” against the rebels lacking: according to 
James W. Thobum, Bishop of the Methodist Church for India and
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Malaysia, the Philippine people were “very much...like our American 
Indians...treacherous in their character."6
The rationalization for brutal treatment was displayed to every 
American in 1904, when the St. Louis World’s Fair of that year 
presented absolute “prooF of the racial inferiority of America’s native 
peoples and those of the Philippines by placing both Geronimo and a 
group of Philippine Igorots on exhibit to satisfy the curiosity of those 
"civilized” Americans who would pay to view them.
If the American Indian provided the clearest analogy to the 
Filipino for those Americans who came to conquer and civilize the 
natives, it is also true that American history had provided an alternative 
way of identifying the inhabitants of those islands. According to 
Howard Zinn, “between 1889 and 1903, on the average, every week, 
two Negroes were lynched by mobs—hanged, burned, mutilated.”7 
Since the Colonial period it had been American policy to treat blacks 
as a sub-human race undeserving of the protections and rights 
guaranteed to white men by law. This disregard for the humanity and 
dignity of blacks was easily extended to the dark-skinned people of the 
Phillipines. All Filipinos were called "niggers” by white American 
soldiers, and were sometimes murdered for no other reason than that 
their skins were brown. According to a correspondent for the 
Philadelphia Ledger, writing in November, 1901:
The present war is no bloodless, opera boujfe engagement: 
our men have been relentless, have killed to exterminate 
men, women, children, prisoners and captives, active 
insurgents and suspected people from lads of ten up, the idea 
prevailing that the Filipino as such was little better than a 
dog.... Our soldiers have pumped salt water into men to 
make them talk, and have taken prisoner people who held up 
their hands and peacefully surrendered, and an hour later, 
without an atom of evidence to show that they were even 
insurrectos, stood them on a bridge and shot them down one 
by one, to drop into the water below and float down, as 
examples to those who found their bullet-loaded corpses.8
Typically an American soldier could write home that, “Our fighting 
blood was up, and we all wanted to kill ‘niggers’.... This shooting 
human beings beats rabbit hunting all to pieces.”9
The language and attitudes of the white American soldiers 
created an enormous problem for the soldiers who constituted the four 
black regiments on duty in the Philippines. Many black soldiers 
resented the term “nigger” when it was used by white troops to 
describe the Filipinos, and there was an unusually high desertion rate 
for black soldiers, some of whom joined the rebels and fought against 
the American army.10 Thus, Patrick Mason, a black soldier in the 24th
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Infantry could write to the Cleveland Gazette:
Dear Sir: I have not had any fighting to do since I have been 
here and don't care to do any. I feel sorry for these people and 
all that have come under the control of the United States. I 
don't believe they will be justly dealt by. The first thing in the 
morning is the “Nigger'' and the last thing at night is the 
“Nigger"....11
Other black soldiers joined with the whites in calling Filipinos “goo- 
goos"; the origin of the term is unclear, but it was obviously developed 
to describe these people—neither Negro nor Indian—who nonetheless 
did not deserve the privileges due to those with white skins. The 
complexity and magnitude of American racism in the Philippines is 
further signified by the fact that black soldiers sometimes took Filipino 
women as lovers and wives and called them “squaws."12
Approximately sixty years later, when American troops crossed 
the South China Sea which separates the Philippines from Vietnam, 
they came to replace the French as we had replaced the Spanish in 
Manilla at the turn of the century. The essential features of our 
Philippine occupation would be repeated as in a recurring nightmare. 
Once again, villages would be burned, crops destroyed, people displaced; 
men, women and children would be massacred. Because of 
advancements in American war technology, Americans in Vietnam 
were able to wreak terrible damage upon the peasant peoples and 
cultures of Vietnam (as well as the surrounding countries of Laos and 
Cambodia), killing at least two million Vietnamese (approximately 
58,000 American died) and devastating the land with millions of tons 
of bombs and chemical defoliants.
On the ground, American soldiers would speak of land occupied 
by the Viet Cong as “Indian country," and many would try to emulate 
the mythic American hero and Indian fighter as portrayed by John 
Wayne. Blacks once again found themselves in the confusing position 
of being required to kill people of color while their own status as victims 
of racism was made clear to them by white reaction to the civil-rights 
movement of the 1950s and 1960s. Vietnamese “gooks” replaced 
Philippine “goo-goos” as the victims of white racist aggression, and it 
was frequently stated by American soldiers that “the only good gook 
is a dead gook." Once again, the history of America’s racism was 
shaping America’s military encounter with an alien group of people; 
only this time, approximately 3 million Americans would become 
involved in that complex of racial attitudes which Robert Lifton has 
called “the gook syndrome.”
shrimp wholesaler, who has employed other Vietnamese because
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Burial of the dead at Wounded Knee, New Tears Day, 1891. Photo by 
GI Trager, Nebraska State Historical Society.
The word “gook” has two primary definitions in the American 
Heritage Dictionary: 1) “A  dirty, sludgy, or slimy substance;" and. 2) 
“An Oriental.” Like those other derogatory terms, “dink” and “slope,” 
the word “gook" referred to aU Vietnamese and not merely the National 
Liberation Front and the North Vietnamese Army against whom 
American soldiers fought. The transference of hatred from a particular 
enemy to all people of a given race is a necessary precurser to 
massacres, such as the one at My Lai, where civilians of all ages were 
slaughtered by American troops. A soldier at My Lai is reported to have 
said:
I hate the gooks—in terms you can actually understand. I 
hate them a whole lot. That means I hate them worse than 
anybody does.... And of course the only way you could 
determine who hated them the most was how many times you 
beat them or killed them or raped them or something like 
that.13
Ingrained patterns of racism made it easy for American soldiers to 
transfer blame for the horrors and absurdities of the Vietnam war onto 
the Vietnamese, making them scapegoats for Americans who were not 
able to conceive of the idea—let alone acknowledge the fact—that they
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Burial of the dead at Santa Ana, February 5, 1899. Photo from the 
National Archives (US Signal Corps No. lll-RB-1037).
were fighting an evil war. According to Lifton:
The [gook] syndrome draws upon, but in a basic way violates.
Biblical imagery o f the scapegoat. The sin (the war] is there, 
but it is not confronted by the [American] community....
Instead the scapegoat—or gook-victim—is made to bear the 
unacknowledged guilt o f the victimizing community; the 
human sacrifice is instead performed to appease appetites 
for killing (those ofGIs, company commanders, generals, the 
Pentagon, the White House, and, as perceived, o f possibly 
still higher powers),...but without convincing inner 
justification. The gook syndrome thus requires that one kill 
or otherwise brutalize the scapegoat-victim, but prevents the 
atonement at the very center o f the original scapegoat ritual.
Indeed, the compulsive killing of “gooks" can reflect an 
aberrant substitute for that atonement—a perverse and 
continuous struggle toward a ‘cleansing ritual' that leads 
only to more blood guilt and still more compulsive killing.1'1
As in the Philippines, many Americans who were of African, American 
Indian, or Asian ancestry also fell victim to the gook syndrome, in part 
because of the melting-pot myth which required such people to leave
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Massacre at My Lai, March 16, 1968. Photo by Ronald Haeberle, from 
Life Magazine (© 1969 Time, Inc.).
their racial and cultural origins behind in their quest to become truly 
American.15
Along with the general unwillingness of most Americans to 
accept this country’s failure in Vietnam, there is an unsurprising 
reluctance to fully face the racist nature of the American struggle 
there. The only American film which does begin to come to terms with 
the racial complexities of the war—Alamo Bay—takes place on the gulf 
coast of Texas. Perhaps this is as it should be, for the tragic events 
which were enacted in the Philippines and which were then repeated 
in Vietnam were, after all, written and rehearsed here at home.
The film takes place in a small town called Port Alamo after the 
war is over. A  number of Vietnamese immigrants have settled locally 
to work in the fishing industry. The opening shot is of a young 
Vietnamese man, Dinh, holding a small American flag while walking 
into town. He is given a ride by an American veteran who tells him 
about the “beautiful women and good drugs" he found in Vietnam. 
This kind of reception is ordinary, expected, and if the film dealt only 
w ith Am erican-V ietnam ese relations, an im osities, and 
misunderstandings, it would have accomplished something significant: 
but the director (Louis Malle) has intentions which are much more 
complex. Arriving in town, Dinh seeks employment from Wally, a
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“Immigration has run off all my good Mexicans.” Dinh does not know 
this, nor does he know the meaning of the letters KKK that he sees 
written on the side of a building; these are Malle’s signals to his 
audience that the film will concern Itself not only with America’s 
problems with Vietnamese immigrants, but with the way these 
problems are created, recreated and complicated by the history of 
American racism. Very early in the film, when Dinh, having bought 
into the Alger myth of individual accomplishment, announces to one 
of Wally’s Mexican-American employees that, like every American, he 
wants to get rich, the Chicano replies, “This is a gringo bay.” Again, 
Dinh does not understand, just as he does not understand the 
significance of the fact that he lives in a place called Port Alamo. But 
if Dinh is as yet ignorant of American history, its consequences will 
nevertheless be devastating for him.
Dinh’s antagonist in Alamo Bay is a white fisherman, Shang, 
who has taken out a bank loan and bought a boat he calls American 
Dream Girl. When we first see Shang, he is wearing a t-shirt with the 
words “Nam Vets of Texas" printed on the front, and a hat with a 
Confederate flag sewn on (a second reminder from Malle that we are 
in the South). Under extreme pressure to pay off his boat, Shang is 
bitter about the Vietnamese who live in a group of mobile homes near 
his own. (Shang’s wife calls the Vietnamese settlement “slop city”.) He 
feels, as do otherwhite fishermen, that the Vietnamese are takingjobs 
away from them, and that they are “overgrazing the bay” and 
endangering the traditional livelihood of Port Alamo’s fisherman. Like 
many veterans, his antagonism toward Dinh is shaped by his own war 
experience. For Shang, it is as though his enemy has returned to to 
plague him once again, and is in fact responsible for all his troubles. 
Because he has never successfully resolved the problems caused by 
his Vietnam experience, nor those engendered in him by virtue of the 
fact that he is a white Southerner and a Texan who “remembers the 
Alamo," Shang simply does not know which way to turn...but he 
knows who to hate.
Shang’s hatred and the hatred of others in the community 
provides a fertile field for a KKK organizer who shows up to organize 
the white workers of Port Alamo to drive out the Vietnamese. Charging 
that their presence is part of a Communist-Catholic plot (the Vietnamese 
are Catholic) he is at first unsuccessful as the people of Port Alamo 
attempt to resolve the problem peacefully through discourse. But the 
town meeting results only in the repetition of cliches previously used 
to describe blacks and other minorities, and residual animosity over 
the Vietnam war intrudes as a woman in attendance remarks that, 
“my boy fought the VC and now they're here taking bread from our 
mouths.” More innocent sounding statements, such as “We just want
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to be American and make a living,” reveal the unacknowledged depths 
of prej udice operating in law abiding citizens. The meeting accomplishes 
nothing, especially after it is interrupted by Dinh, who demands that 
something be done about (white) vandals who have damaged his boat.
Actions against the Vietnamese and those perceived as 
sympathetic to them escalate as garbage is dumped on Wally’s lawn 
by youths, yet nothing is done about it because, as the Sheriff 
contends, “these kids know that the Vietnamese are driving their dads 
out of business." There is also a strong sexual component to the 
harrassment of the Vietnamese, as several white youths taunt 
Vietnamese schoolgirls, and threaten them with sexual violence. More 
complex is the relationship between Wally’s daughter Glory and Dinh. 
Shang has become jealous because he has seen Glory (a woman who 
was once his lover, and with whom he still shares a strong sexual 
attraction) in conversation with Dinh. Glory reacts angrily to Shang’s 
intimidation tactics, which causes Shang to explode at her: “You 
Communist cunt, are you going to walk down Main Street with that 
gook?”
As the people of Port Alamo find themselves more and more 
involved in their own gook syndrome, random intimidation turns into 
organized violence. At a meeting, the KKK organizer proclaims that 
“history is with the white race,” and advises the fishermen to use 
strategy, saying (outrageously) that “we have something to leam about 
public relations and strategy from Martin Luther King.” A  veteran 
answers that what is needed is “a little search and destroy.” The result 
is a flotilla of fishing boats manned by whites whose purpose is to 
prevent the Vietnamese from fishing the bay, to drive them out of the 
white man’s hunting grounds. On the boats are men dressed in Klan 
robes; others have shirts with the words “white power” emblazoned on 
them; some men are dressed in their old army or marine fatigues. On 
one of the boats, a dummy Asian is hanged in effigy. The men shout 
in pidgin Vietnamese at Dinh who—irony of ironies—has taken to 
wearing a cowboy hat and is now armed. Completely outnumbered. 
Dinh and his friend comply with the orders of the whites and steer their 
boat out of the bay. Not satisfied with this victory, the whites proceed 
to bum a cross in front of the Vietnamese settlement while shouting, 
“White Power—Death to the Cong—Death to the gooks.”
Frightened by the tactics of the white citizens of Port Alamo, 
the Vietnamese decide to leave. The sight of people forced to flee their 
homes, carrying whatever possessions they can, marching off to an 
uncertain destination, resonates with images of earlier evacuations: 
the Cherokees on the Trail of Tears, the relocation of Philippine 
villagers, and the movement of the Vietnamese from their homes to
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“strategic hamlets.”
Dinh, however, is not frightened off, and will not abandon his 
boat and his chance to succeed in a new country. Faced with such 
obstinacy, Shang and his friends resort to what has become a typical 
racist final solution to the problem of a recalcitrant minority population. 
Like those Puritans who burned a Pequot village in 1636, killing 
hundreds of men, women, and children and beginning a genocidal 
campaign against the American Indian peoples: like those soldiers in 
the Philippines who did the same: and like the American troops who 
burned Vietnamese houses and crops: Shang and others of his 
mentality make Molotov Cocktails in order to bum the Vietnamese 
out. They are, however, not completely successful, for as the fire 
consumes Dinh’s boat, and as Shang is preparing to kill Dinh, Glory 
appears and shoots Shang. In Vietnam, Americans—white and 
black—deliberately killed other Americans (“fragging") while opponents 
and supporters of the war fought each other in the streets of America: 
after the war, Americans are still embroiled in a struggle with 
themselves and each other, trapped in the confusion and ambivalence 
of their racist heritage.
Alamo Bay demonstrates that although the Vietnam War is 
technically over, the gook syndrome still survives: and as long as it 
does there is the likelihood that American interventions will continue 
to produce tragedy, both here and abroad, as history repeats itself over 
and over again. 1
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The SilENT MAjoRiTy BAby B o o m er s: C Iass 
of 1966 in a Sourh JtRSEy Town
PauL LyoNs
In James Fallows' influential “What Did You Do in the Class 
War, Daddy?” Harvard antiwar activists are juxtaposed with the sons 
of Cambridge blue-collar workers.1 The collegians, mostly exempt 
from the war through anything from student deferments to psychiatric 
rationalizations submitted by friendly shrinks, look on as the less 
privileged march off to boot camp. The imagery is powerful, and, I will 
suggest, incomplete. In our images of the generation who lived 
through the Vietnam era. we tend toward a dualism of doves and vets, 
the soon-to-be-YUPPIE twenty-somethings and the victimized “salt of 
the earth” GIs of Oliver Stone’s Platoon.2 In brief, you either served 
your country, or you opposed its policies.
The responses of baby-boomers to the Vietnam war are not 
captured by a dove-vet polarity. There is a sizable group among the 
Sixties generation whose experience fits neither that of activist doves 
or blue-collar vets. Myra MacPherson describes, in her book Long 
Time Passing: Vietnam and the Haunted Generation, the demographic 
characteristics of the men of the Vietnam generation. 27 million men 
became eligible for the draft in the years spanning the whole of the 
1960s and the early 1970s. Of those men, 9 million served in the 
military, and approximately 3 million actually served in Vietnam. This 
leaves 18 million draft age men who did not serve either in Vietnam, 
or in the military at all. and 26 million women.3 Given even the largest 
of the estimated sizes of the antiwar movement,4 the number of active 
protesters could have formed no more than 20 percent (10.6 million) 
of the total population of the generation. A 1973 study byJohn Mueller 
shows that “those under thirty consistently supported the war in 
larger percentages than those over thirty.”5 Though MacPherson 
herself succumbs to the dove-vet polarity, we may reasonably conclude 
from these figures that of the 53 million members of the Vietnam 
generation who did not serve in the military, a majority of them were 
neither activists nor in possession of any very strong sentiments 
against the war. In fact, this generational segment is best characterized 
by its silence, and I find some value in labeling them the Silent Majority 
Baby-Boomers.
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This article reviews an ongoing case study of such a group, the 
1966 graduating class of Mainland Regional High School, which 
includes the southern Jersey towns of Northfield, Linwood and 
Somers Point. Over the past year I have been able to complete 
extensive, taped oral histories of 41 graduates in a class of 248. In 
addition, I have talked with administrators and teachers who worked 
at the school during the mid-1960s.
Atlantic County has been shaped by the roller-coaster history 
of Atlantic City since the first roads, soon followed by rail lines, 
connected Philadelphia with the salt marshes of Absecon Island. 
Atlantic City peaked in the period between Prohibition, during which 
it flourished as a “wet" oasis, and World War 2, when it served as an 
armed forces medical and recreational facility. The seaside resort 
flourished until the successes of commercial flights to Florida and the 
Caribbean in the post-World War 2 period precipitated a decline, 
capped by the disastrous Democratic Convention of 1964 when the 
national press had a field day trashing its filth, inefficiency and 
tawdriness.6
The mainland communities had a sleepy, small town, even 
rural flavor during much of this history. Early Quaker settlements 
had been replaced by shipbu tiding and port facilities by the nineteenth 
century, but the lack of deep water harbors limited such industry; at 
the turn of the centuiy the three towns combined had about 3,000 
residents, mostly in Northfield. By the time of the Japanese attack on 
Pearl Harbor, combined population had almost doubled, with most of 
the growth in then rural Linwood, only incorporated as a city in 1931, 
and the more resort-oriented Somers Point.7
These communities grew during the post-World War 2 boom, 
often providing homes for middle-class and working-class people 
fleeing the declining and increasingly ghettoized Atlantic City. During 
the period within which these 1966 graduates were growing up, 
population exploded; for example, Northfield, which had 2,848 residents 
in 1940 nearly tripled in population by 1970 to 8,046. In little more 
than ten years Somers Point jumped from 2,480 to 8.500 residents; 
Linwood, with 1,479 population in 1940 rose to 4,274 by 1965. 
Suburbanization was well in process, as state roads like the Garden 
State Parkway and sophisticated industries like the Federal Aviation 
Administration's National Aviation Facilities Experimental Center 
(NAFEC) with its 1,800 employees, emerged.8
The small town character of the three off-shore towns merged 
uncomfortably with the newer suburban tempo. First of all, during 
this period, the region was stagnant to declining economically, mostly 
due to Atlantic City's collapse. The paradox of the area is its 
burgeoning population and its lack of economic promise. In my
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Interviews, many graduates noted that those with more ambition 
knew that they would have to leave the area. In the ten years following 
their graduation, Atlantic City lost 5,200 hotel rooms; the kinds ofjobs 
available, many of which rested on seasonal resort work, were 
evaporating. There were stable employment opportunities available in 
a few large Arms, like Prudential, or utilities like Atlantic Electric, but 
in this strongly conservative. Republican county, run by the likes of 
Nucky Johnson and then Hap Farley, connections were usually 
essential.9
1966graduates recall, with considerable nostalgia, the stability 
of their childhood communities, with lots of farm and vacant lands, 
little traffic, and innumerable opportunities for hunting, fishing, 
hiking, or exuberant play in the woods. Of the three communities, 
Northfield was the most settled and small-town in atmosphere; 
Linwood, which still had large tracts of farmland interspersed with 
estates, new suburban tracts, and smaller bungalows, had the 
reputation of being the poshest, with its Gold Coast, bayside section. 
The new Mainland Regional High School, built in Linwood in 1961, 
occupied what had been a farm operated by one of the area’s socially 
prominent families. Somers Point, also with burgeoning suburban 
settlements, was more defined by its strip of resort-oriented taverns 
and restaurants; graduates agree that if there were kids who got in 
trouble—and they always add that trouble was minor delinquency, 
rowdiness, drunkenness, truancy—it would be Somers Point kids.10
All three communities were lily-white, and almost completely 
Christian. There were a few Jewish families, but most mainland kids 
associated Jews with the fancy Linwood Country Club where many 
young locals caddied. In fact, few paid much attention to the fact that 
Linwood Country Club existed because the most prestigious clubs— 
Seaview and Atlantic City—were restricted. Anti-Catholic prejudice 
seems to have been a minor factor; some 1966 grads note that their 
parents made anti-Catholic or anti-Italian slurs, but this doesn’t seem 
to have been a significant pattern, especially among the baby boomers. 
Social patterns of friendship and dating weren’t effected by Protestant- 
CathoUc tensions, except within truly fundamentalist households.
I chose the 1966 class at Mainland Regional High School 
(MRHS) because it seemed to be closest in Atlantic Country to a 
mainstream, middle-class environment, allowing me to test my 
assumption that a goodly portion of the 1960s generation were neither 
protesters nor Vietnam-bound GIs. MRHS was one of the elite schools 
within the county, but was more middle- than upper-class in its 
essential attributes:
S ilent Majority B oomers 145
TAblE 1
Atlantic Country Median Family Income, 196911
Town Income (in 1979 dollars) County Rank
Linwood 24,318 2d
Northfleld 22,555 4th
Somers Point 17,688 13th
Atlantic City 12,342 24th (last)
The parents at the more affluent end of the spectrum were 
professionals, owned small businesses; the largest segment had 
parents who either were small tradespersons, owning the local bakeries 
and luncheonettes, or were blue-collar workers in the light industries 
and service trades of the area. They were typically churchgoers— 
Methodism seems to have been the most popular denomination— 
politically conservative. Republican and old-fashioned.
Most describe their households as stable (little divorce) and 
subdued. Most grads could not recall any discussions of political 
issues at the dinner table; public issues of the day—Kennedy, Cuba, 
Berlin, civil rights, Goldwater, Vietnam—were rarely mentioned. Bob 
Boileau described the “Methodist" nature of household discourse 
within which one had to infer one’s parents’ political views.12 Of 
course, there were tirades against godless communists, Negro agitators, 
big government, taxes; but they were clearly outbursts breaking the 
hum of conversations focused on family, TV, neighbors, or, often, long 
silences before children could run off to play.
Most 1966 grads grew up in a highly localized environment, 
seemingly oblivious to larger national or global concerns. That local 
blacks were restricted to Missouri Avenue, Atlantic City’s “Chicken 
Bone Beach,” wasn’t an item of controversy to students in an all-white 
environment. Those whose parents had migrated from Atlantic City 
and nearby Pleasantville carried stories of stereotypical black behavior 
which matched up with the Southern-tinged racism of more Protestant 
families, some of whom actually had Deep South roots. Martin Luther 
King, Jr. was viewed as a troublemaker, and there was some attraction 
to the emotional message of resistance and resentment evoked by 
George Wallace. Kennedy, at least in retrospect, was an attractive 
figure, especially to Catholics, but the mainstream among Mainland 
families leaned toward moderately conservative. Eastern-wing 
Republicans like Henry Cabot Lodge. This was not, for the most part, 
Goldwater country, although he won the area against LBJ in 1964. 
1966 grads weren’t stirred, or even aware of who Fanny Lou Hamer 
was when she spoke of being beaten by segregationists at Union 
Baptist Church during the 1964 Democratic Convention in Atlantic
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City.13
15,000 county residents had served in World War 2; many of 
the 1966 grads’ fathers were among them. Many respondents suggest 
that pro-military feeling was reenforced by the families working at 
NAFEC, particularly those associated with 177th Tactical Fighter 
Group stationed there. For the most part. 1966 grads grew up with all 
of the standard Cold War shibboleths about Communism. As such, 
they were predisposed to accept the words of Linwood Mayor George 
K. Francis, spoken at the 1966 Memorial Day services: "We are 
demonstrating reverence for those who shed their life’s blood defending 
our Nation’s freedom." Francis posited that Vietnam was “a critical 
test of the so-called wars of liberation as instigated by Communism.” 
His declaration that retreat from Vietnam would “be catastrophic to 
peoples throughout the world who are working to achieve their 
independence,"14 was well within the ideological framework of 
Mainland’s graduates.
1966 was the first year in which the Vietnam war was likely to 
impose itself on graduates of MRHS. It is striking how few answered 
the call to arms. At least upon reflection, 1966 graduates speak of 
resistance to marching off to war. Something seemed awiy—this 
wasn’t a declared war; it was off somewhere outside the students’ 
focus of attention or knowledge. In the spring of 1966, the "Sixties” 
had not yet reached this part of South Jersey, though the British 
invasion had already hit, as the school magazine Hoofprints indicates 
in its special April 1964 issue devoted to the Beatles. The girls rallied 
by a margin o f80-32 in favor of the moptops; the boys, less enamored, 
approved in a closer 63-53 vote. But for the most part, pop music still 
meant the Beach Boys. Motown, and danceable rock and roll. No one 
was listening to Bob Dylan yet, and the yearbook gives little indication 
of anything beyond a clean-cut, conventional, 1950s image.15
Events and behaviors which were already passe in the 
Philadelphia area had not reached the mainland communities, a mere 
hour’s drive, but light years away. No one was experimenting with 
drugs: risk-taking centered on adolescent drinking parties, including 
after school, weekend sprees out in the woods, mischievous pranks, 
e.g., mock gun battles at the shopping center. The yearbooks over the 
next several years do suggest changes—longer hair, more rebellious 
postures,hippercommentaries. Butaslateas 1970,theyearbooktext 
reads that the US has pledged “her honor...to stop the spread of 
Communism” in Vietnam. The 1969 prom theme was “Tara,” called 
“a symbol of life long forgotten,” and the yearbook lamented that “a life 
once so grand, so stately, so tall—Has quietly Gone With the Wind." 
This prom featured “attendants dressed as Negro slaves.”16 As far as 
can be determined, the Civil Rights Movement had made no impact on 
community consciousness.
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1966graduates approached the issue ofVietnam pragmatically; 
they were not protesters, nor were they interested in volunteering to 
serve. Of twenty-two males within my sample, nine were deferred from 
service because of injury, school, or drawing a lucky number during 
the first years of the draft lottery. (There seems to be a consensus that 
during the time of the lottery, no one wanted to go.) Nine men served 
in the reserve or national guard units: six in the Naval Reserve, two 
in the Air National Guard, and one in the coast Guard. Only four men 
went into the Army: two ended up serving one year in Vietnam, but 
not in combat situations; one was involved in transporting supplies to 
Vietnam from the States on a regular basis; the fourth was stationed 
in Germany. One of the Naval Reservists, while on active duty, served 
a tour aboard the USS Ticonderoga, a carrier whose bombers struck 
enemy targets from the Gulf of Tonkin.
The graduating class of 1966 numbered 248, and included 129 
men. I have been able to track 102 male graduates. No one from the 
Class of 1966 died in Vietnam, and I have found only five who served 
there (in addition to the two mentioned above, there was one in the Air 
Force stationed in Thailand, one Marine helicopter pilot, and one Army 
infantryman). No graduates from any class at Mainland Regional died 
in Vietnam. One Linwood resident, Joseph Goldberg, died in Vietnam 
in 1962 but he was bom in 1930 and, consequently went to high 
school before Mainland Regional existed. Compare the price the 
mainland towns paid with that of more working class and minority 
areas:
TAblE 217
Town Population Per Capita Black% Vietnam War 
Deaths
Linwood 6,159 7098 0.1 0
Northfield 8,875 6523 3.5 0
Somers Point 7,919 6442 0.5 0
Mainland Towns 22,953 0
Atlantic City 47,859 5950 43.7 16
Pleasantville 13.778 5148 33.6 7
Most Mainland grads knew next to nothing about either the 
country ofVietnam or the politics of the war. The high school social 
studies and civics program was taught, for the most part, by politically 
conservative men, several of whom were Korean War veterans, who 
articulated the basic Cold War anti-communist positions. Most 
graduates assumed the accuracy of such interpretations, believed 
themselves to be patriotic, but had little enthusiasm for serving their
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country, especially in Vietnam. Graduates did know that draft calls 
were rising, and those not continuing on to college were aware of new 
risks. Within my sample, almost half (20 of 41) did not go beyond high 
school; an additional seven finished two year programs.
Afewgraduatesjoined the armed forces immediately, but more 
of the non-collegians took advantage of their free summer before 
facing the inevitable. Most of these young men sought out Reserve or 
Guard options. In a few instances, including later ones involving 
college graduates in 1970-71, men used whatever influence was 
available to avoid the draft, e.g., relatives who had connections with 
Guard or Reserve personnel. But equally often grads tested into their 
Reserve or Guard units. Several of the men in my sample had been 
inattentive students, mostly interested in sports and partying while in 
school. Yet they were quite bright, as their future careers would 
indicate. For example, one C student, Nick Bessor, who qualified for 
the Naval Reserve went on to a prestigious executive position for 
Atlantic Bell despite having no formal college training; John Jones, 
who became a chemical warfare expert in the Army, despite needing 
an extra year to just barely graduate from Mainland, went on to take 
charge of all construction for a national shopping mall combine.18
These white, middle-class, sometimes even working-class, 
kids could utilize connections to beat the draft, but essentially their 
middle-class environment created the possibilities, in a sense, behind 
their backs. Life in mainstream, middle America comes with built in 
privileges: such benefits acquired through the use of family and 
community networks are part of the informal system which gives an 
edge to their children. And yet those within such networks rarely 
notice the differentials. After all, how else could we explain the outrage 
over affirmative action, a formal procedure rarely able to counterbalance 
the informal old boys’ networks integral to our culture?
In one case, admittedly rare, a grad, John Edwards, who went 
on to college and a profession said, “I felt that Vietnam was for the 
dummies, the losers."19 But such overt elitism isn’t the norm; most 
graduates spoke of an uneasiness about this particular war. Their 
fathers were often World War 2 vets; in some cases their parents had 
met during the war when Atlantic City had been partially converted 
into a hospital facility. But Vietnam was far away and undeclared. 
Everyday life seemed unaffected; high school seniors went to 
mainstream movies like Flower Drum Song, The Sound of Music, and 
saw Sandra Dee and Bobby Darin in That F\mny Feeling. On TV they 
watched The Lucy Show, Andy Williams, Hazel, and Ben Casey. Even 
though syndicated columnist Mary McGrory was warning readers that 
there were “voyagers of the mind” taking a hallucinogenic called acid, 
the Sixties had not arrived on the mainland.20
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No one had heard of the recreational drugs popular in New 
York or San Francisco. There were no long-hairs, no hippies, no 
beatniks, no radical student activists. Rebels were typically rowdy, 
highly individualistic, but essentially straight and apolitical. The boys 
argued over whether the Phillies’ Johnny Callison was as good as Willie 
Mays. Iconoclastic girls either were sexually liberated or arty. Vietnam 
existed on the edge of their consciousness, it was confusing, even 
annoying. With few exceptions, no one wanted to go.
And yet, almost all male grads told me that if called they would 
have gone, emphasizing that they believed in national service, assuming 
obligations and duty toward their country. Few felt any contradiction 
between their generally conservative, hawkish values and their actual 
choices regarding Vietnam. In a few cases, reservists specifically 
turned down Vietnam options. But in most instances. Mainland 
graduates carried the invisible benefits of being mainstream Middle 
Americans. In fact, this invisibility of social class, racial and gender 
advantages, particularly in a non-elite environment, is critical to any 
effort to understand Middle American life and culture.
I have been struck by the marginal way in which my subjects 
were affected by the movements and social earthquakes of the 1960s. 
Within my sample, there were eight marriages of high school couples, 
six of which occurred almost immediately after high school. Those 
who didn’t go off to college, particularly if they married early and began 
a family (sometimes the reason for the marriage) went immediately 
into an adulthood virtually untouched by the Sixties. But even those 
who went off to college had only marginal experiences for the most 
part. Most went to either small sectarian or in-state teachers colleges, 
fairly conservative campuses at best late in being affected by either 
student radical or countercultural influences.
Karen Carson, attending an elite Ivy League school, dabbled in 
campus activism but only at the margins; mostly she embraced the 
freedoms of the anti-authoritarian ambiance. But, like Doris Farmer, 
who went to a Southern elite college, even though she was a “semi- 
hippie,” she didn’t participate in the generational conflicts so 
characteristic of the late 1960s for many students. Farmer remained 
active in her sorority while occasionally going to an antiwar rally. But 
her dominant feeling was that the “real" hippies and radicals were 
“losers," not practical or purposeful in their lives and too extreme in 
their politics.21
Within my sample, there are are two examples (both male) of 
a fuller identification with the radical currents of the period. Bob 
Bums described himself as “an old Sixties radical, an unreconstructed 
hippie who lived by the subversive rock’n roll of the times and found 
liberation through the other parts of the triad: sex and drugs." 
Sterling Brown participated in campus demonstrations but was more
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attracted to the natural and environmental aspects of the 
counterculture, and after graduation explored a scaled-back lifestyle 
through much of his twenties and early thirties.22
The most striking, if not characteristic, experience was that of 
Jane Winters, a very bright, strong woman, now a teacher, who 
admired the real activists for taking risks, going public, living a more 
authentic existence, but couldn’t imagine doing such things herself. 
It was simply outside of her essential character to directly challenge 
authority, to be Iconoclastic, to openly rebel. This very productive 
woman, a negotiator for her teachers’ union local, a competitive 
athlete, a computer and science Instructor, could only express 
admiration, then and now, for the activists, the radicals.23 Although 
she was the most explicit about this often gender-shaped timidity, I 
found a sense of the alien character of protest in the words of many of 
the men as well.
After 41 interviews, I find myself focusing on this quality, this 
sense that to the 1966 MRHS graduates, activism is a totally alien 
concept, an activity which might as well be engaged in by Martians. 
There is a range of responses, from hostile to envious, with most in- 
between and oblivious, but to mid-1960s graduates from the off-shore 
communities, political activism seemed, and still seems to be foreign, 
odd. Whether the subject is peace, civil rights, feminism, or 
environmentalism, 1966 graduates find it virtually unimaginable to 
openly protest, demonstrate, or engage in more conventionally defined 
electoral political activity.
These are not, for the most part, members of what Tom Wolfe 
called the “Me” generation, affluent baby-boomers now searching for 
self-fulfillment through exotic therapies and expensive lifestyles.24 
They are people who focus on sustaining family life and careers, who 
are very active in local community activities ranging from Little League 
sports to volunteer charity drives to PTAs to zoning and school board 
membership. They’re not by any conventional definition “selfish,” nor 
do they fit Christopher Lasch’s “narcissism" model of ego-weak 
individuals dependent on seducing the admiration of others, and 
incapable of experiencing genuine feelings of love.25 In fact, the most 
selfish individual I’ve interviewed is the self-defined hippie.
All have been affected by the 1960s: they’re less religious, 
more tolerant, less racist, less sexist than their parents. They’re not 
enamored with the 1960s, having experienced it mostly in terms of 
friends or younger siblings who suffered from self-destructiveness, 
drug abuse, aimlessness, or an inability to grow up. Their perception 
of the Sixties has made many of them particularly sensitive to 
achieving stability, to maintaining family life and traditional values in 
the midst of the fast-lane hedonism and crude materialism they 
associate with the casinos, which they acknowledge as a regional
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salvation, yet they fear and deplore. They are trying to be “old- 
fashioned” in a post-Sixties environment. It is an ongoing struggle. 
Despite their ideals, these 1966 graduates suffer from high rates of 
divorce and, in addition, there seems to be a fair amount of alcoholism, 
often rooted in family histories.26
Most pay minimal attention to Vietnam. Nick Bessor, for 
example, refuses to watch any of the recent films or TV shows dealing 
with the war, because he finds it too painful, too shocking. Many of 
these baby boomers, now reaching forty, have built walls of work, 
family, hobbies, and community activity to fend off the complexities 
and anxieties of the interdependent world they inhabit but, in a very 
real sense, resist. Most have remained Republicans; there is more 
independent voting than among their parents, but, significantly, less 
voting. A  few grads have never voted. And in most instances they have 
a skepticism, even a cynicism about politics and politicians. Since 
they cannot imagine how to affect larger national and global issues, 
they choose to pay them little attention, focusing instead on their off­
shore, face-to-face world.
We have been ignoring an essential component of the Sixties 
generation, those I call the Silent Majority Baby Boomers. These 
people don’t show up as characters in Woody Allen movies; they 
haven’t been big chilled, or, in most cases, YUPPIEfied. For the most 
part, they didn’t protest the war and they didn't fight in it. We must 
keep in mind that the antiwar movement radiated out from the more 
elite campuses to a much broader expanse by 1969 and 1970 (to Kent 
State, for example), but it never became a significant part o f the lives 
of the vast majority of students, including those at places like 
Columbia and Harvard. For those at southern and western colleges, 
at conservative sectarian institutions, the 1960s volcanos of rebellion 
and defiance rarely erupted. Writers like Jim Fallows and Myra 
MacPherson have, perhaps unintentionally, created metaphors of 
Harvard elitists opposing the war and Joe Lunch-Buckets fighting it. 
In fact, we need to examine the thoughts and behaviors of those who 
remained, for the most part, silent. So long as such essentially decent 
but parochial people remain a silent majority we will not, with any 
confidence, be able to speak of “the lessons of Vietnam.”
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BiblioqRAphy of Sources on Latino SoldiERs ANd
Veterans
The fact that we did not receive a suitable article on Puerto Rican 
soldiers in, or veterans of, Vietnam was a great disappointment to us. We did, 
however, receive a letter from Mr. Angel Rivera-Estrada, a readjustment 
counseling therapist at the Manhattan Vietnam Veterans Outreach Center. 
Mr. Rivera-Estrada outlined a number o f the problems faced by Puerto Rican 
soldiers in Vietnam, and by Puerto Rican veterans returning home. According 
to Rivera-Estrada, the language barrier was a terrible stumbling block for 
many Puerto Rican soldiers. A  large number o f Puerto Rican draftees, he 
explains, grew up on Puerto Rico in Spanish speaking communities and were 
inducted into an English speaking military system. Because o f their lack of 
facility with English, most did not qualify for advanced training and were 
channeled into combat positions where their lack o f language skills continued 
to cause them trouble—a soldier's life often depends upon his ability to quickly
B ibliographies 157
understand commands and information. His patients, Rivera-Estrada asserts, 
have repeatedly expressed the belief that they were “abandoned under fire" 
because they did not understand the command to retreat. While in the service 
Spanish-speaking soldiers were discriminated against on an institutionalized 
basis; like black and other minority soldiers, they were promoted less 
frequently than their white counterparts, and reprimanded or given Article 
15s or court-martials with greater frequency. The language barrier is still 
troubling to many Latino Vietnam veterans, who feel that VA officials and 
caregivers are sometimes disrespectful and unhelpful because they do not 
speak English well.
Rivera-Estrada also claims that Spanish-speaking veterans have the 
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BiblioqRAphy of Literature on A sIan A mericans 
ANd ThE VIETNAM WAR
It is unfortunate that we did not receive any article on Asian American 
soldiers or veterans o f Vietnam which was suitable for publication in this 
issue. The topic is important, and should not be ignored by scholars o f the 
war, because it embodies some of the most complex intersections o f race and 
war. As Laskowsky mentions in his article “Alamo Bay and the Gook 
Syndrome," the question of how America's racist heritage intersects with the 
tendency to “otherize" the enemy, is made more urgent when some o f the 
people doing the killing for a racist America are themselves o f the hated race.
Approximately 85,000 Americans of Asian descent served in the 
military during the Vietnam Warera; if the percentages were evenly distributed 
(and there is no reason to assume that they should be), the number o f Asian 
Americans who are veterans of the Vietnam War should be around 30,000, or 
about 1 percent o f the total Vietnam veteran population. We have no current 
information on the number o f Asian American women who served in Vietnam, 
though the presence o f Asian American women in the nursing corps is attested 
to in some o f the oral history collections listed below.
Asian American women serving in Vietnam were liable to be mistaken 
for Vietnamese women, and thus, for Vietnamese prostitutes. Asian American 
men were in danger o f being mistaken for the enemy in the field, and suffered 
additional threats and ill-treatment from white soldiers who had internalized
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internment camps constructed by the US government during World War 2.
There were, we assume, some Asian Americans active in the American 
antiwar movement also. During the war there was an active Asian-American 
student group which, we have been told by members, was involved in some 
antiwar protest. Literature and information on that subject, however, has 
been impossible for us to locate. It is impossible to imagine that no Asian 
Americans in the US in the 1960s saw a similarity between US racism against 
Aslan Americans and US policy in Southeast Asia.
Today there is an active community o f Asian Americans (veterans and 
nonveterans) working to gain benefits and acknowledgement for those Asian 
Americans who served in the American armed forces in Vietnam. In the fight 
for veterans' rights and services, the story o f the unique political, moral, and 
emotional dilemma of Asian American soldiers is often obscured. We offer this 
bibliography (small as it is) in the hopes that there are Vietnam generation 
scholars interested in exploring the intricacies o f the Asian American experience 
in Vietnam. We encourage you, also, to send us additional references, and 
submit articles on the subject.
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